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ABSTRACT
The research presented in this thesis presents a methodology compatible with the Department of
Defense (DoD) Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) process for analyzing and recommending
appropriate enterprise architectures for the challenge of integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) in the national airspace system (NAS). Thesis organization is sub-divided into four
sections. Section I provides the introduction, context, and recent efforts of the UAS airspace
integration challenge and the underlying motivations driving the increased desire to see UAS
better integrated into the NAS. Section II details the methodology used in the analysis by
extending various value-focused, lean enterprise constructs using rigorous object process
methodology (OPM) to describe and build alternative enterprise architectures. Section III
applies the methodology to the UAS airspace integration problem specifically with the
development and selection of a preferred enterprise architecture and a recommended
transformation plan. Section IV concludes with a discussion on extending the methodology for
specific application back into the CBA process, the issues involved in creating an executable
model for enterprise architecting, and final thoughts on the iterative nature of the methodology
and the need to further refine the initial results with the UAS airspace integration enterprise
decision makers.
Thesis Supervisor: Donna Rhodes
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Engineering Systems Division
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Context
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) shifted the military emphasis from traditional warfare to
irregular warfare. Traditional warfare focused primarily on having the force structure needed to
destroy enemy capability at Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. In the GWOT context,
the emphasis is now on finding small, highly maneuverable, asymmetric threats [1, 2]. The
result is the Combatant Commander's rapidly increasing demand for specific, time-sensitive and
actionable information from Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide a significant and flexible ISR capability to meet this
growing demand [3] at significantly lower cost than would otherwise be expended for an
increase of more traditional manned ISR aircraft. This is a significant factor to the Air Force,
operating with the oldest flying airframes in its history and attempting to recapitalize its force
structure [4]. The impact of these factors is an exponential growth in the numbers of UAS
platforms procured over the past 5 years.
The rising numbers and growing importance of UAS missions creates a burgeoning need for
UAS airspace access that challenges existing DoD restricted airspace capacity. This is
increasing the pressure to ensure UAS are more fully integrated into the U.S. national airspace
system (NAS) for operations and training from home garrison bases. Without integration,
assured separation from other air traffic demands non-standard margins in space and time. In
consequence, UAS are poor stewards of scarce airspace today. As flying operations increase,
their "airspace consumption" is highly disproportionate to the growth in flight hours. This
further complicates an already dense air traffic picture the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is attempting to manage while also ensuring the safety of the airspace.
Several organizations responded to the need to better integrate UAS operations in the NAS.
These included an effort by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) called
Access 5 that incorporated representation from across industry and government; the creation of
an UAS Program Office within the FAA; the stand-up of a sense-and-avoid standards body by
the FAA federal advisory committee RTCA; the establishment of a Joint Integrated Product
Team by the Military Services' UAS program managers; the initiation of an UAS Task Force by
the Air Force; and the creation of an unmanned warfare office with an air component under the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)). All of these efforts engaged at some level on increasing the degree to which
UAS operations and training integrate into the NAS, and several of them are on-going initiatives.
To date, none of these efforts successfully increased the degree of airspace integration beyond
the existing baseline established by the FAA's Certificate of Authorization/Waiver (COA)
process.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this research is to investigate, develop, and implement a value-focused
methodology compatible with the existing DoD Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) process to
provide an avenue for assessing the issues associated with defining an UAS airspace integration
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(AI) enterprise, and the required value delivery needed to move the activity forward within the
previously described context. The scope of this research is limited to Level 3-5 UAS flown by
the Air Force (i.e. MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4 platforms) at medium to high altitudes. In every
other regard, this research addresses the value definitions across the entire spectrum of UAS AI
enterprise decision makers (ACC, FAA, and Air Force acquisitions) needed to move UAS AI
forward.
Methodology
The methodology implements frameworks from several different disciplines and research. An
overarching value-focused approach provides the framework for the analysis, drawing heavily
upon work by Keeney [5] and Murman et al. [6]. The unifying approach is the three-phase,
value-creation model by Murman et al. The three stages to value-creation are value
identification, value proposition, and value delivery.
Value identification focuses on defining the enterprise purpose and the most important
stakeholders in the enterprise, called enterprise decision makers. In this research, an enterprise is
an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for its multiple stakeholders (e.g. the UAS Al
enterprise comprised of the user, the developer, and the regulator acting in concert to restore
maneuver). An "extended enterprise" consists of the enterprise under investigation as well as the
additional organizations laterally or above the focus enterprise contributing or constraining on-
going activities. An example is the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) extended enterprise
composed of not only the UAS AI enterprise, but also other organizations contributing to Global
Strike like fighter aircraft enterprises, higher headquarters, and senior leadership). Vertical value
alignment between enterprise and extended enterprise is accomplished using a structured
enterprise purpose statement framework developed by Crawley [7]. Enterprise stakeholder's are
identified and ranked using a modified stakeholder saliency approach described by Grossi [8]
and implemented using the decision maker model put forward by Ross [9]. Horizontal value
alignment implements a modified X-matrix approach based on the work of Stanke and
Nightingale [10].
Value propositions use the enterprise architecting method advanced by Nightingale and Rhodes
[11] to generate alternative means of delivering value. This approach is a full-dimensional
analysis across eight different aspects of an enterprise with the focus of creating a lean, value-
delivering enterprise. Analytical rigor is enforced through the use of QFD analysis and Object
Process Methodology first put forward by Dori [12] and modified for system architecting use by
Crawley [13]. Alternative architecture evaluations use the Software Engineering Institute's
Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) [14], supplemented with additional criteria
from Crawley [7] and Wagenhals et al. [15].
Value delivery is the final stage in the value creation framework. The approach in this thesis
implements the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap model described in Nightingale and
Srinivasan [16]. The ATAM method provides additional insights into sensitivity and tradeoff
points in the architectural design that provide high-leverage activities for architectural change at
the enterprise level. Specific, concrete action for a transition plan results through the definition
of the desire future state of the enterprise during the value proposition stage and implementation
considerations provided by the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap framework.
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Application
Data collected from various organizations across the Air Force, DoD, and FAA provided insight
into UAS AI enterprise needs and challenges. UAS AL enterprise organizations interviewed
included representation from the UAS user community, the UAS acquisition (engineering and
budget) community, the relevant policy offices within Headquarters Air Force and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and the appropriate offices within the FAA operations and safety
divisions.
Value identification used the enterprise purpose statement and stakeholder saliency frameworks
described in the previous section. Vertical value alignment results from a restatement of the
UAS AL enterprise purpose statement to focus on restoring the principle of maneuver to UAS
platforms with the stated goal of enabling global strike at the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF)
extended enterprise level. Maneuver, as a principle of war, is where air weapons systems have
historically excelled through freedom of navigation and global access. UAS platforms today
tend to diminish this hallmark advantage of airpower as they expand in the force structure.
The three primary groups of UAS AL enterprise decision makers are ACC, the FAA, and the Air
Force acquisition community. The X-matrix provides horizontal value alignment with
significant insights on enterprise performance, behavioral characteristics, and metrics. The
enterprise value definitions require not only specific performance attributes, but also a defined
process in which to deliver those performance attributes (i.e. enterprise behavior).
Three primary alternative enterprise architectures emerged from the value proposition stage. The
first architecture focused on process-centric activities, the second architecture on product-centric
efforts, and the third architecture combined strong points from the first two architectures. The
third architecture proved to provide the best all-around value delivery assessment by integrating
the need for a strong criteria-driven governance structure (i.e. a process or rule-based decision
method) with the funding benefits that accrue with focusing on specific platform
implementations.
The value delivery activity demonstrated a clear need to create a 2-year, budget-driven plan that
focuses on time-certain delivery of incremental UAS maneuver gains. The UAS AL enterprise
and the GSTF extended enterprise assess the incremental value delivery of the effort. Explicit
recommendations detailed in the next section describe specific steps drawn from this research for
delivering value.
Consolidated List of Research Findings and Near-Term Recommendations
A list of the "Top 5" research findings and near-term recommended actions resulting from this
effort summarizes the hardest hitting results of this research. The research findings provide the
context for implementing the near-term "tactical" recommendations that follow.
Research Findings
This summary of the research findings provides a succinct statement of the insights the
methodology developed in this thesis provided in the analysis of the UAS AL effort. No
ubiquitous claims to validation or extensibility result from this research; however, the
methodology did prove useful in the following ways:
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1. The deployed methodology provides a clean interface to the existing DoD
Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) process. The results and implementation
recommendations appear to align well with Air Force and DoD organizational structures
and responsibilities. In addition, the recognition of CBA as a value-based approach
resulted in significant insights and extensions to the current CBA processes based on the
broader value-focused literature and theory.
2. The enterprise purpose framework and the X-matrix analysis yield well-aligned
value structures both vertically and horizontally across the Global Strike Task
Force (GSTF) extended enterprise and the UAS AI enterprise, respectively.
Disconnects between the UAS AI enterprise and the broader GSTF extended enterprise
were highlighted. Using the X-matrix to assess the internal UAS Al enterprise provided
key insights into needed development of specific attributes and metrics to align disparate
decision maker perspectives within the enterprise. The coherency established by the
value alignment in both dimensions provided a basis for accomplishing the more detailed
analysis for the enterprise architecting effort.
3. Unarticulated assumptions come to the forefront of the analysis, and several
doctrine-to-activity disconnects were highlighted. The combined insights resulting
from the value alignment activities described above, coupled with the more detailed and
rigorous analysis using the Object Process Methodology (OPM), served to highlight the
interactions that were present (or lacking) between various elements of the enterprise. By
requiring a clear articulation of what these interactions actually look like, as opposed to
what people often mistakenly took for granted, disconnects between the doctrinal
elements related to flying UAS (what was said) could be contrasted with the activities
that were actually implemented (what was done). These insights provided a rich source
of information for where barriers might exist to moving the UAS AI effort forward.
4. The need for a consolidated position at the GSTF extended enterprise level on the
constraints under which the UAS AI activity should operate surfaced as a major
hurdle to creating value. This insight resulted from the enterprise purpose statement
analysis and an assessment of the vertical alignment in the value structure. This
information, coupled with the explicit interactions described by the architecture OPM,
highlighted the following: the current move to push additional capability onto UAS
platforms is occurring without a clear trade having been conducted on the impact those
platforms' capabilities bring (or don't) to the global strike capability of the larger Air
Force force structure. The research methodology provided clear insights into the need for
this discussion at the GSTF extended enterprise level to specify the resource expenditures
for restoring maneuver to UAS.
5. Rigorous implementation of the methodology provides strong and clear linkage
between the delivery of the GSTF extended enterprise value definition (i.e. global
strike) and the specific, concrete actions the UAS AI enterprise must accomplish to
realize the desired level of maneuverability. The Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
provided a robust approach for translating the GSTF Extended enterprise values driving
the UAS Al enterprise into a concrete, time-phased roadmap grounded in details and
practical implementation considerations. It is through the Enterprise Transformation
Roadmap the transition is made from subjective (but needed) expressions of value
definitions (i.e. restore maneuver) to concrete, specific, and actionable plans that can be
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implemented, assessed, and modified to take into account the relative success of a set of
activities (i.e. implement joint-led teams).
In summary, the methodology as implemented in this research provides a natural interface to the
existing DoD CBA process, yields vertically and horizontally aligned activities, pushes
assumptions and interactions to the forefront of the discussion, establishes the strategic issue(s)
that must be addressed to flow value, and connects subjective values directly to specific,
actionable effort needed to deliver the desired value.
Near-Term Recommendations
With the previous research findings as context, the following "Top 5" describes the near-term,
"tactical" activities needed to move the UAS AI activity in the right direction for realizing the
desired value of both the UAS Al enterprise (restore maneuver) and the GSTF extended
enterprise (enable global strike). The list is in roughly the order of highest-to-lowest priority.
1. The UAS airspace integration purpose statement must clearly link military
capabilities (i.e. global strike), where the principal shortfall is maneuver, and the
need to integrate UAS into the airspace. Solutions will be more difficult to resource if
there is a perception that UAS airspace integration is the end goal as opposed to enabling
the relevant mission area. Unmanned aircraft are national security programs tied directly
to projected military capability, and framing the airspace integration issue in the same
light is important to elevating the discussion to the appropriate level. A proposed UAS
AI purpose statement connecting the desired military capability with airspace integration
is provided as follows:
The purpose of the airspace integration enterprise is to restore the principle of
maneuver to operations by integrating UAS into civil airspace using a full spectrum
approach of policy, procedures and materiel system equipage while enabling needed
UAS training and operational missions and meeting the contextual constraints
(political, cultural, organizational, resource, etc) necessary to successfully deliver
incrementally meaningful levels of value.
2. Implement a senior leadership engagement plan to specify the constraints the Air
Force and DoD have on the effort to restore the principle of maneuver to UAS platforms
(i.e. Non-Recurring Engineering costs, production numbers, limited or niche mission
areas assigned to UAS, the maneuver of the overall force, etc). Elucidating these
constraints within the broader context of "enabling global strike" puts a handle on the
strategic issues for senior leadership to engage on. Communicating the value of restoring
the principle of maneuver will be most effective through an analysis of Air Force
capability delivery and the ramifications of current UAS policy and practices on the Air
Force's ability to deliver "global strike" to the Combatant Commander. Once the
constraints are clearly established, they should be implemented in concert with a "Simple
Rules" strategy of a few key processes and a couple of critical criteria (i.e. decision rules
or processes-see Recommendation #4) to govern the overall enterprise effort across Air
Force, DoD, and FAA decision makers.
3. The enterprise must produce a resource-constrained approach providing an
incremental product delivery the decision makers within the UAS AI enterprise, and the
GSTF extended enterprise will consider worthy of investment, while also meeting the
intent of the limitations brought out in Recommendation #2. This means active
engagement with all of the enterprise decision makers to ensure the development of a
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properly scoped, "revolving" two-year plan, providing an increase in value from the end
user's perspective (i.e. how has global strike capability increased because of these
expenditures of resource?).
4. The absence of clear end-state, performance objectives requires the establishment of
decision criteria and processes to effectively direct UAS AI enterprise activities.
Recommendation #4 expands on the need for enterprise governance decision criteria in
the face of unspecified, final objectives or outcomes (the current condition in which UAS
AI efforts are operating). Day-to-day activities needed for UAS AI enterprise unity of
effort depend on clearly established governance criteria for teams or activities facing
unspecified performance objectives or requirements [17]. More complex systems or
activities require simpler (and fewer) rules for effective decision-making (see reference
[18] for further expansion of this topic). As decisions arise, the only meaningful way to
make consistent progress is to have a consensed set of priorities or criteria against which
the enterprise has agreed to make resource and materiel related decisions. While
seemingly straight forward, this approach is largely absent from past and present efforts.
5. Limit the number of active decision makers on any one given enterprise effort to less
than 10, and preferably no more than six or seven, by segmenting the scope of activities
into specific subsets of the problem the enterprise can work in parallel. Additional
analysis shows the rapid decrease in activity effectiveness with an increase in the number
of decision makers beyond the prescribed six or seven recommended for this effort [19].
One approach to implementing this recommendation would be to have the Air Force
work all of the early operational aspects for the Level 3-5 UAS, have the Army work all
of the early operational aspects for the Level 0-2 UAS, and have the Navy work all of the
broader systems engineering aspects to the problem. These would be accomplished as
largely independent efforts (and consequently involve fewer decision makers), but
lessons learned and process related information would be communicated back out at the
full UAS AI enterprise level. This would also allow each service to conduct activities
within the constraints established by their respective services while still contributing to
the UAS AI enterprise effort.
In summary, implementation of near-term actions include redefining the UAS AI enterprise
purpose, engaging senior leadership to clearly specify constraints, initiating a cyclical, 2-year
plan to operate under these constraints, establishing the appropriate governance decision criteria,
and limiting the total number of decision makers on any one given effort.
Wrap-Up and Future Work
Application of the methodology developed in this research extends beyond the current
application of UAS airspace integration to the DoD CBA process itself. A discussion with
respect to specific recommendations for implementing a rigorous approach to CBA examines the
feasibility of extending the current methodology for use in the CBA process. Additional
discussion is devoted to the challenges of creating an executable model of the framework
developed in this methodology to extend into early conceptual and detailed product design
activities. Emphasis on iterating with the UAS airspace integration enterprise decision makers
to validate the value structures developed in this analysis and to provide a sanity check on
implementation recommendations is foundational to the approach outlined in this research. This
is the next step in putting the results of this analysis to practical use.
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Foreword
The author had the privilege of working the issues surrounding the integration of military
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace system (NAS) from January 2006
through August 2007. The author's role in this effort was as the deputy Air Force lead for the
UAS Airspace Integration Joint Integrated Product Team (JIPT) which is described in some
detail in Chapter 2. In the capacity of deputy lead, the author had the opportunity to manage and
shape the day-to-day strategy, organization, and activities of the JIPT as the Tri-Service UAS
airspace integration effort was launched in late 2005 and early 2006.
This first-hand knowledge of the rationale, motivations and decisions of those engaged in the
airspace integration activity provides a rich context for the analysis that follows. From one
perspective, this thesis can be seen as the author's pursuit of a methodology that provides a more
effective and efficient approach to solving the complex issues surrounding the UAS airspace
integration (AI) challenge. Tied to this desire to address the immediate airspace integration
issues is the broader use context and the intent to align the research methodology to the existing
policies and practices of the DoD's capability-base assessment (CBA) process.
The context in which the UAS AI effort operates is very fluid with few anchor points in which to
ground the activities taking place. There is no reason to think the situation will be any less fluid
moving into the future. The intent of this thesis is to provide an applied framework for
understanding the dynamic nature of the environment in which the UAS AI activity operates,
and, in turn, to recommend an approach to future activities that will be robust to the changing
backdrop of politics, policies, funding, and technological advancements.
Thesis Organization
The content of this thesis is organized into four sections. Section I details the preliminary
information needed to understand the backdrop in which the UAS AI effort is occurring. A
summary of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. Air Force (USAF), and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) strategic drivers provides placement for the airspace integration activity
within the broader national-level context. This is followed by a more in-depth treatment of
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recent UAS airspace integration activities that have occurred over the past five years. Section I
also contains a brief history of UAS development for those that may not have any prior domain
knowledge in this field. Introducing the UAS AI problem in this way provides a concrete
description of the real-world motivation for looking at the issues surrounding UAS AI in more
detail. It also sets the conditions for the search for an appropriate methodology for attacking the
problem.
Section II develops the methodology to comprehensively assess and address the generalized
challenges associated with creating value in complex stakeholder enterprises in a methodical and
rigorous manner. This section starts with a definition of the scope of this thesis, followed by a
literature review of the existing methods and practices for accomplishing the objectives of this
research. A methodology is then developed by which an enterprise can be defined, assessed, and
engineered for maximum value delivery to the key decision makers within the enterprise. Major
elements introduced in this section include value-focused thinking and enterprise architecting.
Section III applies the general method developed in Section II directly to the UAS AI effort. The
section begins with a comprehensive review of the data collected through extensive interviews
with various stakeholders across the airspace integration enterprise, and then launches directly
into the mechanics of how the theory looks in practice. Concrete, specific direction is provided
for how the UAS AI effort should be refocused and scoped to better deliver the value definitions
provided by the enterprise stakeholders.
Section IV concludes by examining future extensions to the methodology as well as the
application space. This includes a discussion on the issues surrounding the creation of
executable models. From an application standpoint, the idea of using the same methodology for
a consistent and rigorous way of doing capability-based assessments is examined, explicitly
integrating the DoD framework of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) into the approach.
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CHAPTER 1 - STRATEGIC BACKDROP
"...There is nothing new under the sun."
-Ecclesiastes 1:9b
Man did not make it past generation number two before Cain killed Abel, and it went downhill
from there. [20] The history of warfare is, in one respect, the history of the human race. The
current times are no exception to this age-old struggle of one people against another. Certain
fundamental principles of war elucidated millennia ago have withstood the test of time. Central
among these tenets is the need to know both yourself and your enemy in order to secure victory.
[21] Advances in technology and innovation have simply provided new methods and tactics for
accomplishing them with more effectiveness and efficiency than the enemy, accelerating the
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop by compressions in time and space. [22]
This chapter lays out the general context against which the UAS airspace integration (AI) effort
is taking place. The military aspects of this backdrop are emphasized, limiting the scope to
addressing the specifics associated with achieving military (specifically Air Force) UAS
integration into the NAS. This chapter is organized by describing the strategic conditions
associated with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), followed by a more detailed look at the
United States Air Force (USAF), the rise of UAS usage, UAS access to airspace challenges, and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) efforts to cope with growing UAS activities.
In a general sense, Chapters 1 and 2 collectively provide the underlying motivation and basis for
the methodology that follows in Section II. It is the combination of the dynamic context
described in this chapter, coupled with the inability of recent efforts (at least to date) described in
Chapter 2 to address the airspace integration complexities well enough to establish a sustainable
approach to the problem that ultimately provided the impetus for this thesis. This introductory
and background material is introduced first because taken as a whole it defines the size of the
problem the methodology must be capable of addressing. What follows in Chapter 1 introduces
five strategic drivers and provides the backdrop for the remainder of the work in this thesis.
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The Global War on Terrorism
The United States military has seen continuous combat action for almost seven years, following
close on the heels of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center in New
York City, NY, the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, and United Airlines Flight 93 which crashed in
Somerset County, PA. The shift in threats from the old Cold War era force-on-force
engagements with another superpower to the current conflict with rogue actors employing highly
asymmetric tactics (e.g. terrorism) created a major change in the way the U.S. military
prosecutes its mission.
The Cold War environment was one in which two major superpowers dominated the political
and military scene. In this contest of wills between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the focus was on
the defeat of a peer competitor with substantial forces of comparable capabilities to those of our
own. The consequence of this environment was the investment of significant resources and
energy in the ability to defeat the enemy in classic, set-piece battle formations (the issue of
nuclear deterrence and the policy of mutually assured destruction notwithstanding).
With the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the rise of terrorism, the emphasis shifted. No longer is
there as much emphasis placed on defeating near-peer competitors. Instead, the focus is now on
neutralizing highly asymmetric threats that avoid direct force-on-force confrontation whenever
possible. In order to be effective against these very small (sometimes a single person), highly
agile and mobile threats, the entire thrust of military resources began to shift to the arduous task
of finding the threat. Once found, the effort to neutralize the threat is usually a relatively small-
scale military operation.
As an illustration of how the focus of energy and resources has shifted from the Cold War to the
current GWOT effort, consider Figure 1-1. "Traditional" forces in this illustration relate directly
to the Cold War era tactics and strategies that were an integral part to the large force structure
buildup previously described. Much was made of postulated Soviet capabilities, and the ensuing
arms race is testimony to the premium that was put on fielding highly capable forces. In
contrast, the "Irregular" warfare depicted in Figure 1-1 is synonymous with the terrorist tactics
favored in the current GWOT conflict. The preponderance of the effort is clearly focused on
"finding" the enemy as opposed to "finishing" him off. [2]
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FIND FINISH Traditional Warfare
*Minimal level of effort to find enemy
(Armored Division masses on border)
*Large, sustained effort to engage and defeat
(Conventional Warfare)
FIND FINISH Irregular Warfare
*Large level of effort to find enemy
(Difficult to find one person)
*Fewer resources required to engage
(Smaller footprint assets)
Figure 1-1. Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare.
From a broader perspective, the 2006 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) classified the
challenges the U.S military would face into four distinct categories: 1) Traditional challenges, 2)
Irregular challenges, 3) Disruptive challenges, and 4) Catastrophic challenges. Figure 1-2
depicts the military's current capabilities within this overarching framework. The existing force
structure is clearly weighted heavily in favor of the traditional, force-on-force challenges that
were associated with the Cold War era threat. [1]
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Irregular Challenges Catastrophic Challenges
AaftL 1
Traditional Challenges Disruptive Challenges
Figure 1-2. Challenges facing the DoD.
The reason for this center of mass in military capabilities is perhaps obvious, but it is worth
discussing in explicit terms because it has a direct bearing on the development of UAS
capabilities described later. The sheer enormity of the investments that were made over almost
five decades continues to exert a significant amount of influence on current military force
structure. This legacy force structure cannot simply be mothballed for the simple reason that the
emergence of another traditional peer or near-peer competitor requiring these assets is not only
possible, but even likely (consider the situation in China, North Korea, or Iran). This kind of
force structure cannot be reconstituted overnight, and consequently, resources must be allocated
to preserving the existing capability at some minimal level of readiness as a safeguard to the
future.
The catch is to consider how best to meet the additional challenges depicted in Figure 1-2 while
maintaining some level of traditional capability without completely bankrupting the nation in the
process. Considering the shift in the focus for combating terrorism, it would seem that specific
attention is needed on the "find" end of the spectrum. This was borne out in spades when the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) went about systematically ascertaining the global
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) needs of the military. Figure 1-3 depicts
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the results of the study, and it clearly demonstrates the need for additional capability within the
ISR (think "find") mission area. [23]
Figure 1-3. Demand vs. Availability for ISR Capabilities.
In a more recent survey, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for a
New American Security conducted a far ranging survey of over 3,400 officers ranging in grade
from Major/Lt Commander to General Officer/Flag Officer ranks. [24] The survey polled both
retired and active duty officers from every branch of the military. When asked what the two
most important things the U.S. government needs to do to win the war on terror, 38% said an
increase in special operations forces and 73% said better intelligence capabilities are needed-
including "more robust diplomacy, developing a force of deployable civilian experts, and
increasing foreign aid programs."
When discussions concerning the need for ISR arise, the military mind naturally goes to "taking
the high ground" as a time tested principle of war. In recent times, this mission has fallen
squarely on the Air Force as one of its primary mission areas, whether accomplished from
airborne assets or from space. With the need for additional ISR capabilities clearly established,
the conversation now moves to the Air Force context specifically, and the issues the service is
dealing with in their efforts to support the combatant commander (COCOM) in the war on terror.
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United States Air Force Context
Against this global ISR need for effectively prosecuting the irregular warfare of combating
terrorism, the US Air Force enters the picture with an aging fleet of aircraft. In fact, the average
age of Air Force airframes is now the oldest it has ever been in the 61 years since the Air Force
became an independent military service, reflecting the wear and tear of 17 years of continuous
combat action. [4] The emphasis has shifted from just providing air superiority (no American
ground forces have been attacked from the air since 1953) to ensuring cross-domain dominance.
Cross-domain dominance is defined as "the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and
through the atmosphere, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum." [4]
Modernization efforts to recapitalize this aging fleet of aircraft are underway. In fact, in the past
year, the Air Force announced source selection results for the next generation of combat search
and rescue aircraft and the next airborne refueling tanker aircraft. The award of the new combat
search and rescue aircraft has been protested, as well as the award of the new air refueling tanker
contract to a Northrop Grumman/BAE partnership by Boeing. In addition, there are also major
cost overruns occurring in several major space acquisition programs, and the Air Force has had
less than its historical good standing with Congress on the fiscal front.
In addition to dealing with an aging aircraft fleet in serious need of recapitalization, the Air
Force is continuing to support operations in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. This results in a high
priority for mission capable aircraft for on-going efforts in both locations. The result is a
continuing acceleration of the rate at which aircraft are wearing out, and this in turn limits the
overall useful life expectancy current force projections and modernization plans are built against.
As substantial as the challenges are to the Air Force, the Army and Marines are in even worse
shape, especially as it pertains to their overall manpower status. In an effort to relieve some of
the operational stress on these two services, Congress authorized a shift in manpower from the
Navy and Air Force over to the Army. This essentially reduces the total end-strength of the Air
Force. To compound this draw down, the Air Force has also attempted to reshape its remaining
force structure to better meet the shifting threats and required expertise to meet them. In fact, the
Air Force stood up an entirely new major command in September of 2007, Cyber Command, "to
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provide combat-ready forces, trained and equipped to conduct sustained operations in and
through the electromagnetic spectrum, fully integrated with air and space operations." [4]
According to Gen Moseley, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), "Our objective is to
provide flexible options to the decision-makers to deter, deny, disrupt, deceive, dissuade, and
defeat adversaries through destructive and non-destructive, lethal and non-lethal means."
In characterizing the current environment in which the Air Force must operate, Gen Moseley
listed the following "salient features of this increasingly complex, dynamic, lethal, and uncertain
environment":
- Violent extremism and ethnic strife-a global, generational, ideological struggle
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and empowering technologies
- Rising peer competitors with voracious appetites for resources and influence
- Predatory and unpredictable regional actors
- Increasing lethality and risk of intrusion by terrorist and criminal organizations
- Systemic instability in key regions (political, economic, social, ideological)
- Unprecedented velocity of technological change and military adaptation
- Availability of advanced weapons in a burgeoning global marketplace
- Exponential growth in volume, exchange and access to information
- Surging globalization, interconnectivity and competition for scarce resources
- Dislocating climate, environmental and demographic trends
The former CSAF goes on to describe how adaptive competitor actions translate into new
warfighting concepts, capabilities and doctrines designed specifically to counter U.S. strengths
and exploit weaknesses.
"The following are illustrative of the advances being made:
- "Generation 4-plus" fighter aircraft that challenge America's existing "4th Generation"
inventory-and, thus, air superiority-with: overwhelming numbers and advanced
weaponry; sophisticated integration of electronic attack and advanced avionics; emerging
low-observable technologies; and progressive, realistic, networked training
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- Increasingly lethal, integrated air defense systems (IADS) that threaten both our Airmen
and aircraft, and could negate weapons used to suppress or destroy these systems
- Proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles with growing range, precision, mobility, and
maneuverability-capable of delivering both conventional and non-conventional
warheads
- Proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capable of conducting low observable,
persistent, intrusive missions in both lethal and non-lethal modes
- Resurgence of offensive counterspace capabilities
- Increasing ability of even marginal actors to surveil the disposition of U.S. and allied
assets through commercially available and widely accessible means
- Attacks through cyberspace are already creating tactical, operational and strategic effects
at low cost and with relative impunity"
In summarizing the Air Force objectives moving into the 21 st century, Gen Moseley provides the
following conclusion: "The Air Force must safeguard our ability to: see anything on the face of
the earth; range it; observe or hold it at risk; supply, rescue, support or destroy it; assess the
effects; and exercise global command and control of all these activities."
The Rise of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Onto this kaleidoscope of shifting threats, ascendant powers, aging platforms, and an economy
that is increasingly fragile comes the next frontier in aviation-unmanned aircraft systems.
While by no means a new development, their widespread use within the military in primary
combat roles is only just beginning to emerge. This is in part due to the advances made in UAS
capabilities and the evolution in strategy and doctrine needed for their effective employment
with the existing force structure.
In discussing UAS, it is important to understand what category of platform is actually under
consideration. The term "UAS" is applied ubiquitously to all types of unmanned platforms,
ranging in size from the Battlefield Air Targeting Camera Autonomous Micro-Air Vehicle
(BATCAM) weighing in at less than 1 pound to the Global Hawk RQ-4 at 32,000 lbs. [3]
Smaller UAS are typically used in various roles supporting ground forces or for local area
surveillance as part of the organic equipment that small units have under their direct control.
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This class of UAS, typically referred to as small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) is defined as
those under 10 pounds and are capable of being hand-launched. [3] For the purposes of this
report, only Level 3-5 Air Force UAS will be considered, specifically, MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4
(See Figure 1-4 below).
MQ-1 Predator
Figure 1-4. Air Force Level 3-5 UAS Considered for Analysis. [25, 26]
OSD reported the results of a survey conducted to prioritize UAS mission areas with respect to
their intended operational use (See Figure 1-5). The telling nature of this summary is that across
all operational contexts, the first and second priorities are in the reconnaissance, and precision
target location and designation mission areas. [23] These are followed closely by signals
intelligence and battlefield management. Already there is a strong degree of correlation between
the types of active UAS mission area operations and Gen Moseley's summary of what the Air
Force must be capable of providing in global operations.
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Figure 1-5. Mission Area Prioritized Across UAS Type.
In fact, the growing use of UAS in reconnaissance and in precision target location and
designation has contributed significantly to their growth in both numbers and the budget
expended to procure more of them in ever increasing quantities. Figure 1-6 depicts the almost
exponential growth seen in both budget and numbers over the past decade. In fact, the combined
UAS assets of the military have flown over 500,000 combat hours in the combined
Afghanistan/Iraqi theaters since the GWOT campaign was launched seven years ago. [23]
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Figure 1-6. DoD UAS Flight Hours (Inset) and Funding Trends.
As the numbers, complexity, and importance of these Level 3-5 UAS have continued to increase,
the quality and operational experience associated with them has also risen. Figure 1-7
demonstrates the continuing decline in the number of Class A and B mishaps per flight hour
reported for a number of different types of UAS. [3] The Air Force categorizes UAS mishaps as
aviation mishaps when the UAS is operating as an aircraft (as opposed to being carried as cargo).
A "Class A" mishap is categorized as any accident resulting in more than $1M in damages
and/or a fatality or permanent total disability. [27] For comparative purposes, the mishap rate for
the comparable number of hours flown for an F-16 Fighting Falcon and U-2 Dragon Lady are
also shown on the graph. The reliability of Air Force Level 3-5 UAS appears to be at equivalent
rates to those of manned aircraft at similar stages of development.
Page 37
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
S00 Shidow i i .
Cumulative Fligh t HourUAS00 were making at the operational level. [28]
Predator .
Page 38
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
As alluded to before, UAS proliferation also provides a much more cost-effective path to
increasing the "find" capability of the Air Force. UAS can be modified and tested much more
easily and rapidly because they represent a significantly lower degree of overall risk in the event
of failure (at least from a military operations perspective). If an asset crashes, there is the loss in
the physical platform, but barring the event that the aircraft actually crashes into a person on the
ground, there is no loss of human life as a result of the mishap.
In conclusion, the Level 3-5 UAS capability is an all-around winner from the Air Force
perspective. It provides a mechanism for rapidly increasing the type of combat capability needed
to realize significant portions of Gen Moseley's vision to "see anything on the face of the earth;
range it; observe or hold it at risk; supply, rescue, support or destroy it; assess the effects; and
exercise global command and control of all these activities." It is no wonder, then, that the
numbers of assets and the budget allocated to their procurement has skyrocketed in the past
seven years. In fact, their use has now gone from the exclusive province of the active duty force
and is now spilling over into Air National Guard units from one coast to the other.
Accessing Airspace
There are two immediate implications from the rapid explosion on the number of UAS and their
growing importance to the DoD: training requirements and operations. Up until 2006, nearly all
of the Air Force UAS training requirements were being met within what is called "segregated
airspace." This segregated airspace is categorized as restricted military airspace by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Air Force provides air traffic management for the
operations being conducted within it. It is called restricted airspace because civil air traffic is
prohibited from flying through the airspace in the course of normal operations. Consequently,
there is only cooperative air traffic within this airspace, allowing the Air Force air traffic
controllers to monitor where everyone is and ensure appropriate separation between manned and
unmanned aircraft operations.
Active duty units receiving UAS assets were historically located within or very near these
chunks of restricted airspace. It was a relatively straightforward matter for them to coordinate
and secure the restricted airspace they needed for training purposes. Two things occurred that
complicated this picture. First, the sheer number of students that needed to be pushed through
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the training pipeline grew considerably as the number of UAS in operation increased and new
operational squadrons and wings were stood up. This stretched the available restricted airspace
capacity to the limits. Second, the decision was made to replace some Air National Guard assets
with UAS units. This decision was made largely within the political context, and not with an eye
toward the limitations of trying to train and operate UAS assets within the broader national
airspace system structure. As a consequence, none of the proposed Air National Guard UAS
units had readily available access to restricted airspace, even if there were still remaining
capacity in the restricted airspace to conduct these additional training missions.
The other inherent problem with the use of restricted airspace for training missions is the lack of
diversity in the environment afforded to the student. This is true from both the pilot's standpoint
as well as the sensor operator/analyst's perspective. To provide more capable crews to the
warfighter, and to shorten the spin-up time once a new crew began actual operations, a
representative target environment is needed to train against. The terrain located within the
available restricted airspace has significant limitations in this regard.
The second major development with respect to the impact on airspace requirements was the
decision to standup a UAS main operating base (MOB) for Global Hawk within the continental
United States (CONUS). This meant UAS would no longer be operating within restricted
airspace, but rather transiting nonsegregated airspace managed by the FAA's air traffic
organization (ATO) en route to the operational objective area. In addition, Global Hawk would
also need to fly through international airspace once it left U.S. airspace, and be capable of
complying with international flight standards agreed to by treaty.
The practical ramification of these events was a significant increase in the number of requests by
the Air Force for access to nonsegregated portions of the NAS. The catch with these requests
was (and still is) the fact that current USAF Level 3-5 UAS are not capable of flying in
compliance with all of the regulatory requirements for flight in the NAS. The most often cited
example of this shortfall is the requirement found in §14 CFR 91. Paragraph b of section
§91.113 requires the following:
"(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained
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by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of
this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft
and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear." [29]
The obvious shortfall is how the person operating the UAS will "see and avoid other aircraft" in
the normal course of UAS operations through nonsegregated airspace. A more thorough
treatment of this challenge is presented in Chapter 2. For the purposes of the discussion here, it
is sufficient to simply point out that the request to operate UAS in their current configuration
outside of restricted airspace presented a problem the FAA needed to address-how to authorize
UAS flights not fully compliant with regulatory requirements.
The upshot of this situation was the decision to use the Certification of Authorization/Waiver or
COA process to provide approvals by exception. Through this mechanism, the FAA can
prescribe operational limitations or put procedural mechanisms in place to mitigate the safety
concerns associated with the UAS operation in nonsegregated airspace. The number of requests
for COAs landing on the FAA's doorstep has increased substantially in the past four years, to the
point where the FAA actually implemented an online COA application process in 2007 for UAS
operational requests to mitigate some of the impact. [30]
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Figure 1-8. FAA ATO Data on Number of COAs Submitted/Forecasted for UAS.
It is worth pointing out that the COA process is intended for non-standard types of approvals,
and there is no intention on the part of the FAA to turn the current COA baseline into a "normal"
mechanism by which to secure operation approval for UAS flights. Published lead times for
COAs are 60 days, and the authorization is only good for a maximum of one year (by law). It
can be revoked at any time by the FAA if there is reason to believe the safety of the operation is
in question, and upon expiration, the COA must be renewed before UAS flight operations can
resume.
In summary, the issue of airspace access for training and operational UAS missions is a growing
area of concern for both the DoD and the FAA, and there is no clear solution in-hand at present.
The system today is handling the current UAS requirement, but it is unclear how long the pace
can be sustained as the DoD continues to increase the operational tempo of deploying UAS
assets, the number of COA requests increases to accommodate the growing requirements, and as
the airspace continues to become more congested in both the segregated and nonsegregated
airspace domains.
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Impact on the Federal Aviation Administration
The growing pressure for more UAS access is only one of the many factors the FAA is
attempting to deal with as it tries to manage the complexities of the NAS. The 2008-2012 FAA
Flight Plan, titled "Charting a Path for the Next Generation," lays out their strategic imperatives:
"These are basic truths: aviation is safer than
ever, capacity must expand to meet demand,
and we must be good environmental stewards.
The FAA's plan to redesign America's aviation
system supports each of these in a way that will
keep things running smoothly to 2025 and
beyond." [31]
A fuller review of the flight plan will reveal
four primary goals the FAA has as it moves into
the future: 1) Increased safety, 2) Greater
capacity, 3) International Leadership, and 4)
Organizational excellence. Of these goals, the
first two dominate the political context in which
the FAA is operating with respect to the UAS
airspace integration effort.
Safety is the North Star that rises above the ranks of all the other considerations on the horizon.
The FAA culture is completely dominated and undergirded by a safety conscious mentality that
has been nurtured and instilled in the institution over decades of operation. It is fundamental to
every aspect of the FAA's ethos, and the word "safely" can be used almost without exception in
describing any aspect of the FAA's activities or intent. Ensuring a safe flying environment
within the NAS is the overriding purpose of the organization.
Within the FAA, the Aviation Safety organization (AVS) is the primary office of responsibility
for ensuring a high-level of safety is maintained in the NAS. According to the Aviation Safety
Fiscal Year 2007 Business Plan, the singular mission of the AVS organization is "to promote
aviation safety in the interest of the American public and the millions of people who rely on the
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aviation industry for business, pleasure, and commerce." In order to fulfill this mission, the AVS
organization directs and manages safety programs that fall into three primary areas: 1) Continued
Operational Safety, and per their own document, this is "AVS's most important function (and
one that AVS will never compromise)...", 2) Standards and Policy, and 3) Certification. [32]
The AVS 2007 Business Plan also lists and comments on the 2008-2012 FAA Flight Plan, and it
specifically calls out the first goal, Increased Safety, as the one for which the AVS organization
as a whole is the goal lead for the entire FAA organization, while it provides a supporting role in
the accomplishment of the other 3 objectives. Thus, the AVS organization collectively is
intensely focused on the issue of aviation safety in every aspect of its operations, and it seeks to
improve the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) through multiple initiatives and
activities.
If the issue of safety dominates the FAA landscape, the question of capacity is gaining rapidly on
the safety position. The statistics reported by the Department of Transportation Bureau of
Transportation Statistics say that for calendar year 2007, a near record 26.58% of all flights by
major airlines in the U.S. were delayed, cancelled, or diverted. [33]
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Figure 1-9. On-Time Arrival Performance, National (January-December, 2007).
Taking up this theme, the New York Times ran an Associated Press article on 6 February 2008
that investigated the U.S. airline industry performance further in 2007. The AP investigation
found that the only year with a worse overall performance for on-time arrivals was in 2000, but if
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outright cancellations are excluded, 2007 was the worst year on record with 24.2% of flights
arriving late. [34]
To the FAA's credit, the difference in the volume of air traffic between 2000 and 2007 is
substantial. In 2000, there were 31% fewer total number of flights than in 2007, and the
demographics are continuing to change as more and more airlines shift to smaller, regional jet
service and fewer larger aircraft. [34] When viewed in this manner, the FAA has had a
herculean task on their hands just to limit the overall performance degradation to as little as it has
been in the past couple of years.
The nation has not been oblivious to the need for an overhaul and revamping of the NAS
infrastructure and enabling processes. In 2003, President Bush signed the "Vision 100"
legislation (Public Law #108-176) that established the mandate for the design and deployment of
an air transportation system that would meet the demands of the nation in the year 2025. The bill
also established the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to carry out this mission.
Out of this activity, the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS or NextGen)
program took shape. [35] The 2005 NextGen Vision briefing articulates eight key capabilities
the new system will need to provide in order to meet the demands of 2025:
- Network-Enabled Information Access
- Performance-Based Services (now Performance-Based Operations and Services)
- Weather Assimilated into Decision Making
- Layered Adaptive Security
- Broad-Area Precision Navigation (now Position, Navigation and Timing Services [PNT])
- Aircraft Trajectory-Based Operations
- Equivalent Visual Operations (EVO)
- Super Density Operations
The JPDO effort is a joint initiative of the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department
of Defense (DoD), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) in the White House. The NextGen goals are to retain U.S. leadership in global
aviation, ensure safety, ensure our national defense, expand capacity, protect the environment,
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and secure the nation. The JPDO's role is to establish a transformation path for the air
transportation system to realize these goals and provide the required capability. [35]
Figure 1-10. The NextGen Operational View.
What makes the FAA's task in all of this so much more difficult is the need to maintain the
safety of the NAS even as it is in the process of transforming it to meet the demands of
tomorrow. This is further complicated by a culture that has traditionally assessed the safety of an
operation or process based largely on their expertise and knowledge of their people as opposed to
an objective performance-based set of measures.
The Safety Management System (SMS) the FAA is in the process of implementing would
change this type of evaluation significantly. [36] The ATC specialist performs the safety
assessment but is now augmented with a team approach when appropriate, coordinated with
impacted organizations, and applying a formal safety risk management process. The results are a
more standardized and complete set of documentation with continuous verification and
monitoring of procedure and any required mitigations.
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In short, the FAA is not only attempting to deal with the rapidly growing number of requests for
military COAs to operate UAS outside of restricted airspace, there is also a tremendous amount
of political pressure on the FAA to maintain the existing rate of accidents (note that this actually
requires an increase in the overall safety of the system as the number of aircraft and flights
continues to rise) and to increase the capacity of the NAS to meet current and future demand
projections. All of this must take place in a safety culture that is attempting move out of
"expert" based judgments and into a more formalized objective performance-driven process.
The stakes for making sure the NextGen effort is accomplished correctly are tremendous, and the
public is becoming increasingly impatient with a perceived degradation in the quality of air
transportation services. And like everyone else, the FAA is underfunded and undermanned to do
the job the way they think they need to.
Chapter 1 Summary
The five strategic drivers just described illustrate the dynamic environment in which the UAS
airspace integration enterprise is operating. These strategic drivers include the Global War on
Terror, the United States Air Force, the Rise of UAS, Accessing Airspace, and the Federal
Aviation Administration. Each of these drivers impacts the issue of UAS airspace integration
directly, and each of them influences and affects the others. The result is a complex set of
interactions that provides the backdrop against which the UAS airspace integration effort
operates. Ultimately, a solution for the UAS airspace integration challenge must address these
broader issues if a sustainable effort is to be launched.
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CHAPTER 2 - INTRODUCTION TO UAS AND AIRSPACE INTEGRATION
"We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may be
fought by airplanes with no men in them at all."
-General Hap Arnold
United States Army Air Forces
VJ Day, 1945
Over 60 years ago, General Arnold had the vision to see the potential impact that aircraft flying
without pilots could have on the face of warfare. The U.S. military is just now beginning to
realize the fruits of General Arnold's vision of the future with the platforms that are being fielded
and the changes in doctrine that are occurring to exploit their capabilities more fully.
Chapter 2 picks up where Chapter 1 left off by diving into the details of the historical
development of UAS and the recent efforts at integrating them into the NAS. The purpose of
Chapter 2 is two-fold. First, it provides the reader with a brief history of unmanned aviation to
ground the methodology and application discussion following in Sections II and III. Second, the
chapter provides a discussion on recent efforts over the past five years targeted at UAS airspace
integration. This overview is intended, in conjunction with Chapter 1, to provide the reader with
a broad sense of the context motivating this research. It should also provide a sense for the
robustness needed in any methodology development to adequately address the scope and number
of issues that must be handled in a full treatment of the subject, not the least of which is a large
number of different organizations engaged on the topic.
A Brief History of Unmanned Aircrafti
"On August 22, 1849, the Austrians, who controlled much of Italy at this time, launched some
200 pilotless balloons against the city of Venice... Some of the bombs exploded as planned but
the wind changed direction and blew several balloons back over the Austrian lines. This is, by
most accounts, the first recorded action of its type." [37]
1 Author's Note: Unless otherwise referenced, this section is taken almost directly and in its entirety from Laurence
"Nuke" Newcome's book, Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and a summary
article he wrote for Defense News in 2003.
Page 49
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
Figure 2-1. Early Schematic of Balloon Use for Dropping Bombs. [37]
And so began the advent of unmanned aerial platforms in a wartime role. What should be
instructive in the above information is the fact that militaries have actively considered how to
employ unmanned systems of all types and sizes for well over the past 160 years. The limitation
has not been on the theoretical application of these assets, but rather, on the technological
capability to realize their full potential. The quote at the beginning of this chapter from General
Arnold demonstrates the extent to which thinking had progressed by the end of World War II
with respect to unmanned aircraft systems. We are only just now, 60 years later, beginning to
understand the true extent of their potential capabilities and uses.
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In its broadest definition, unmanned aircraft systems are those that are capable of aerodynamic
flight without a human on board. As Newcome points out,
"Starting from its roots as an 'aerial torpedo', the forerunner of today's cruise missiles, its
family tree has branched to include guided glide bombs, target drones, decoys, recreational
and sport models, research aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, combat aircraft, and even
exotic astroplanes, aircraft designed to fly in the atmospheres of other worlds. Unmanned
aircraft in these first two branches are widely referred to today as 'precision guided
munitions' (PGMs) and in the last four as 'unmanned aerial vehicles' (UAVs)." [38]
Over the past several years, those class of platforms described by Newcome as unmanned aerial
vehicles have been re-designated as "unmanned aircraft systems" in recognition of the fact that
the air vehicle portion of the unmanned capability is just one subsystem of a whole integrated
suite that enables the air vehicle portion to operate as desired. The broader definition of UAS
explicitly includes the air vehicle, the ground station, the communications, command and
control, and other supporting infrastructure needed for the UAS to carry out its intended
function.
The development of UAS capability hinged on the concurrent development of three critical
technologies: automatic stabilization, remote control, and autonomous navigation. Elmer
Ambrose Sperry was the first person that attempted to address all three in a single unmanned
aircraft design. He delivered his first purpose-built unmanned aircraft to the Navy in 1919.
While the overall effort failed in terms of the Navy context (unmanned aircraft with which to
launch torpedoes), the development leading up to it resulted in the singular accomplishment of
the first successful flight of a powered unmanned aircraft on 6 March 1918-the unmanned
aircraft equivalent to the Wright brothers' flight at Kitty Hawk some 15 years earlier.
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Figure 2-2. Picture of the Sperry Aerial Torpedo, 1918. [37]
By 1924, an aircraft had been launched, operated through a series of 50 different commands, and
landed all by remote control. By the 1930's, target drones were being flown by both the U.S and
Britain as spin-offs of early cruise missile efforts. By the end of the decade, there were hundreds
of these target drones being flown as target practice for anti-aircraft gunnery training. In the
U.S. Army, target drones sprang from the new hobby of RC model planes, introduced by
Reginald Denny, who ran a Hollywood hobby store as a sideline to his acting career. Denny
modified his model plane design to meet the Army's training needs and sold over 15,000 of them
to the Army before and during World War II.
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Figure 2-3. Picture of the Denny RP-1, 1935. [37]
It was Germany's work during the course of World War II that significantly advanced the state
of the art, primarily in the area of precision guided munitions and the development of the V-1
cruise missile. A 1944 British assessment comparing the cost to the Germans of waging the V-1
campaign against the cost of its impact on the Allies concluded the V-1 offered a 4 to 1 return on
its investment, thus cementing the role of cruise missiles in future wars. [39]
Figure 2-4. Picture of a V-1 Rocket from World War II. [37]
The 1950's saw the advent of the reconnaissance drone for military use, and the growth in these
platforms was explosive over the next couple of decades. It was also during this timeframe that
the inertial navigation system was finally perfected, and the third and final technological key to
realizing the full potential of UAS was finally unlocked. Charles Stark Draper of MIT led the
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effort to develop this capability to provide self-contained navigation and guidance from the end
of World War II right up to its use on the Apollo moon flights.
Contrary to popular belief, the recent use of Hellfire missiles from Predators over Afghanistan
and Iraq did not introduce the strike role to UAS. That was done when the Navy's Gyrodyne
QH-50 drone helicopter demonstrated it could carry and employ anti-submarine torpedoes in
1962. This same UAV subsequently carried a mini-gun and dropped an assortment of small
munitions in covert operations over Vietnam in the late 1960s. In 1972, the Air Force's Have
Lemon program demonstrated the delivery of Maverick and Stubby Hobo missiles from
unmanned Firebee UAVs for potential use in the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
role.
Figure 2-5. Picture of Navy Gyrodyne QH-50. [40]
As it approaches its own centennial, unmanned aviation can point to an impressive list of
accomplishments:
- 1918 First flight by a powered unmanned aircraft (Curtiss Sperry Aerial Torpedo)
- 1923 First radio controlled flight (RAE 1921 Target)
- 1933 First UAV used in the target drone role (Fairey Queen)
- 1943 First use of a PGM in combat (Fritz)
Page 54
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
- 1944 First use of a cruise missile in combat (Fieseler Fi 103 "V-1")
- 1946 First UAV used in the science research role (Northrop QP-61)
- 1959 First UAV used in the reconnaissance role (Northrop SD-1 Observer)
- 1960 First untethered flight by an unmanned helicopter (Gyrodyne QH-50)
- 1962 First UAV used in the strike role (Gyrodyne QH-50)
- 1998 First trans-Atlantic crossing by an unmanned aircraft (Insitu Aerosonde)
- 2001 First trans-Pacific crossing by an unmanned aircraft (Northrop Grumman Global
Hawk)
Reference Appendix A for a full listing of the current UAS categorization scheme in use by the
U.S. military for domestic operations. Current UAS capabilities have built on the long-line of 90
years worth of engineering briefly captured in this quick UAS history overview. The capability
of these platforms only continues to accelerate at ever increasing rates. The UAS under
consideration in this thesis, the Predator MQ-1, Reaper MQ-9, and the Global Hawk RQ-4
represent UAS that are in heavy use by the Air Force today. As described in Chapter 1, their
access to a broader category of nonsegregated airspace is quickly becoming a priority for both
training and operational missions.
Recent Efforts at UAS Airspace Integration
Several noteworthy efforts have been undertaken in the past five years to make inroads into the
challenging problem of getting broader UAS access to nonsegregated airspace. This thesis will
refer to these efforts as UAS airspace integration (AI) efforts, and in general, they target the
integration of UAS into the NAS for the purpose of conducting routine operations on the same
general footing as manned aircraft. As a consequence, their general scope of activities and
purpose for being roughly parallel that of the UAS Al enterprise currently "under construction"
in this analysis. Understanding where and how these efforts fit into the picture provides a
detailed and more thorough understanding of the issues associated with airspace integration
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generally, and may provide insight relevant to the enterprise architecting effort for the desired
future state of the effort.
Access 5
The first major UAS airspace integration effort was launched in the spring of 2004 when the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center
announced the launching of a new government-industry program called the High Altitude, Long
Endurance (HALE) Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) in the NAS program. The intent of the
program was "...to recommend the policies, procedures, and functional requirements that will
ensure HALE UAVs operate as safely as other routine users of the national airspace system... We
will initially be limiting our focus to UAVs that routinely operate above 40,000 feet altitude. As
we gain experience, we intend to expand our focus to UAVs that routinely fly above 18,000
feet." [41]
The NASA HALE ROA in the NAS effort was initially funded as part of NASA's Vehicle
Systems Program in the agency's Aeronautics Enterprise, with a planned budget of about $103
million through fiscal year 2008. The effort was to be staged in four sequential steps starting
with the highest flying UAS platforms and subsequently expanding the airspace accessed in each
subsequent phase. The effort built off a previous NASA project called the Environmental
Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) project which focused on the development
of airframe, propulsion and control system technologies for high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs
that could serve as platforms for NASA's Earth Science Enterprise. [41]
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Figure 2-6. Access 5 Focus on HALE UAS Mission.
The effort initially gained critical mass through the efforts of six aerospace firms with a direct
interest in development of civil as well as military uses of uncrewed aircraft - Boeing, Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman, AeroVironment, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and
Aurora Flight Sciences. These six companies formed the UAV National Industry Team, known
as UNITE, in 2002, and were responsible for bringing the joint government-industry proposal
forward to NASA for further consideration. The joint project between NASA, the DoD, the
FAA, DHS and UNITE was called the Access 5 project. [41]
Unfortunately, this effort proved to be short-lived when funding was terminated by Congress in
the 2006 Budget, retroactively cutting the funding off for Access 5 at the end of September 2005.
A final report listing the Access 5 accomplishments was required by February of 2006. There
was some speculation at the time that the NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin, may have
initiated the action as NASA shifted its focus to the Mars mission in an effort to free up
additional budget for the space program. [42]
A major accomplishment of this effort, however, was the relatively wide participation of the
previously named agencies in the Access 5 program. Figure 2-7 depicts the inter-agency
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organizations involved in the effort. The work accomplished by this group provided an initial
point of departure for the efforts that followed.
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Figure 2-7. Access 5 Organizational Structure and Stakeholders.
RTCA-Special Committee 203
Hard on the heels of the Access 5 termination, the FAA's federal advisory committee, the
RTCA, was asked to stand up a special committee to create Minimum Aviation System
Performance Standards (MASPS) for UAS; Command, Control and Communication MASPS for
UAS; and Sense and Avoid Systems MASPS for UAS. [43] The RTCA responded to this
direction by creating the Special Committee (SC) 203 on 19 October 2004. Per the RTCA
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"RTCA, Inc. is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based
recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic
management (CNS/ATM) system issues. RTCA functions as a Federal Advisory
Committee. Its recommendations are used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
as the basis for policy, program, and regulatory decisions and by the private sector as the
basis for development, investment and other business decisions."
Underneath of the RTCA organization, various special committees (SC) are established to pursue
specific, issue-oriented products. These SCs are the primary organizational elements by which
the RTCA carries out its mandate. The SC-203, entitled Minimum Performance Standards for
Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Unmanned Aircraft, has the afore mentioned goals of
developing the associated MASPS for UAS; Command, Control and Communication; and Sense-
and-Avoid.
Per the SC-203 Terms of Reference, "SC-203 recommendations will be based on the premise
that UAS and their operations will not have a negative impact on existing NAS users." [43] The
Special Committee itself is comprised of an incredibly diverse cross-section of interested parties
from across the aviation community (see Appendix B for a complete listing of SC-203
participants). Essentially, nearly all of the work the RTCA does is accomplished by volunteers
that are interested and/or concerned about the subject or issue under investigation. Per the SC-
203 publications the following guidelines pertain to the manner in which the SC-203 operates:
"As with all Federal Advisory Committee activities, Special Committee meetings are
publicly announced and open to participation by anyone with an interest in the topic under
consideration. During Special Committee meetings, volunteers from government and
industry explore the operational and technical ramifications of the selected topic and
develop consensus-based recommendations. These recommendations are then presented to
the RTCA Program Management Committee, which either approves the Special Committee
report or directs additional Special Committee work." [44]
The complexity of the SC-203 task created some initial turmoil on the effort in terms of how to
even frame an approach to working on the myriad of issues associated with the three MASPS the
terms of reference required. The Committee was finally able to settle on an approach, and they
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have since published the Guidance Material and Considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
document with an overarching programmatic framework for moving forward.
The all-volunteer nature of the SC-203 activities is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand,
it provides an excellent forum in which to generate broad community support and consensus for
how the standards for regulating the operation of UAS in the NAS should be pursued and
developed. The result once the process is completed should be a solid base of support the FAA
can point to as it begins its own internal rule-making process. It also provides a richer solution
set from which to draw possible approaches to the problem given the broad diversity of the
participants in the process.
Unfortunately, the effort is not funded. As a volunteer organization, progress can only be made
at the rate people are willing to volunteer time and/or resources to further the effort. This aspect
becomes especially problematic as the effort moves out of the theoretical and into the applied
domain. In order to validate or otherwise substantiate the standards being proposed, some level
of testing and evaluation will be needed. This data collection effort will ultimately require the
expenditure of significant resources for further progress to be made on the SC-203 front.
In an effort to close this shortfall, the SC-203 looked to create a set of relationships with current
UAS operators to coordinate approaches and to eventually get access to data. The primary UAS
operator at this point is the DoD. The SC-203 is looking expressly to the DoD UAS Airspace
Integration Joint Integrated Product Team (JIPT) for help in acquiring the data they need to
continue the MASPS development effort.
DoD UAS Airspace Integration Joint Integrated Product Team
The DoD UAS Airspace Integration Joint Integrated Product Team (referred to hereafter as the
"JIPT") is an effort that was formally initiated in the fall of 2005 by the Navy, Army, and Air
Force UAS materiel program managers. These three O-6s recognized a common shortfall in
their ability to meet user specifications requiring UAS that were capable of operating in a
routine, integrated fashion both in the NAS and in international civil airspace.
The effort was initially sparked by a series of events in which the Global Hawk program spent
considerable resources to integrate the TCAS system on the RQ-4 platform under an agreement
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with the regional FAA offices in Sacramento for operations out of Beale AFB, CA. At that time,
Certificates of Authorization/Waiver approvals, or COAs, were reviewed and approved at the
regional level. Prior to Global Hawk operations commencing at Beale AFB, however, the FAA
decided to pull the COA approval authority back to the FAA headquarters-level over some
concerns about the degree of consistency and insight the FAA had into these operations. [30]
The practical result of this action was that the FAA headquarters review of the Global Hawk
COA resulted in the determination that the procedures and equipment agreed to at the regional
level were not sufficiently safe for the operation to be approved. The review further determined
the TCAS capability was not only insufficient, but the Air Force could not even turn TCAS on
due to FAA concerns over the impact that communication lags might have on the resolution
advisories the system generated and the time required for pilots to actually cause a course change
in the UAS flight path.
This created an understandable degree of consternation and frustration on the Air Force side of
the equation. Shortly thereafter, the Global Hawk program manager was promoted to the job of
managing the entire materiel UAS portfolio for the Air Force. With the events of the Global
Hawk experience still fresh in his mind, the Reconnaissance Systems Wing commander (now
designated as the 303d Aeronautical Systems Wing or 303 AESW) began to consider how best to
go about avoiding another such incident in the future. In this frame of mind, he contacted his
counterparts in the Navy and Army to ascertain the extent to which this was a problem for the
other services. All three found themselves facing the same overarching issues, and they agreed
to tackle the problem jointly.[45]
The JIPT effort was the realization of their combined commitment to resolving the growing
issues they each faced with producing UAS capable of integration with the NAS. The original
charter for this group stated the following as the JIPT mission:
"The JIPT will develop the standards, policy, and enabling technology necessary to; (1)
integrate unmanned aircraft operations with manned aircraft operations in non-segregated
airspace, (2) integrate resources and activities with Industry, and other airspace regulatory
authorities to achieve greater alignment with DoD goals and objectives, (3) ensure
compatibility and interoperability of global access enabling technology and air traffic
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control procedures and (4) provide the necessary documentation to effect changes in the
global air traffic control systems. This mission will be accomplished through establishment
of Sub-IPT's (SIPT's) comprised of appropriate DoD subject matter experts, working
cooperatively with external stakeholders to meet user and airspace controlling authority
goals and objectives." [46]
The effort was led by the three O-6s, and they each appointed a deputy to serve as the day-to-day
managers for the JIPT's strategy and activities (of which the author was one). After an initial
meeting in the fall of 2005, and approval of the charter in December 2005, the overall strategy
for proceeding was agreed to in March 2006. Figure 2-8 depicts this overall strategy. The key
point to this approach is that it employed a two-track methodology. The first track was focused
on developing a common DoD-FAA assessment process for near- to mid-term operations that
would extend the existing COA process. The second track was geared toward the far-term "file-
and-fly" level of integration and paralleled the efforts of the SC-203 in many respects. [47]
r
Figure 2-8. JIPT Two-Track Approach.
This overarching construct found wide, general approval among the participating JIPT
organizations, including the FAA's Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, AIR-160. The FAA
stood up the AIR-160 office in the fall of 2005 to provide an FAA focal point for the growing
UAS activity, and to interface directly with DoD and Industry to address the growing needs and
requirements of these types of aircraft. The AIR-160 office also provided the needed UAS
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expertise to assist the AIR-200 office with conducting the appropriate UAS experimental aircraft
certification inspections required civilian industry to obtain approvals to operate UAS in the
NAS.
The organizational structure of the JIPT is depicted in Figure 2-9. The primary organizational
structures, as called out in the JIPT charter, were the SIPT's and their focus on specific aspects
of developing airspace integration performance standards. These SIPT's were assisted and
integrated in their activities through various Activity Centers (AC's) that would collect the
individual needs and requirements from each SIPT and synthesize an integrated plan for that
particular activity set. Note that the number of external stakeholders involved in the JIPT
activities was fairly manageable; however, the number of internal organizations rapidly grew to a
significant number of different activities that proved to be both unwieldy and inefficient given
the "virtual" environment in which the activity was attempting move forward.
As in the other cases, the funding for this effort was an issue. In essence, the three 0-6's leading
the effort collectively decided they needed to take the required dollars "out of hide" since the
effort had not been specifically funded in the existing budget. The requirements existed for the
work, but up to this point, there had been no allocation of money to the problem of airspace
integration-at least at the materiel solution provider's level. All told, the JIPT planned an
initial budget of -$3M in 2006 (of which they actually received on the order of $550K). The
funding did begin to pick up in 2007 with the previously requested amount of $3M, and in
addition, there were more funds applied from an international source that brought the total up to
approximately $6M in funding for 2007.
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Figure 2-9. JIPT Organizational Structure.
In the course of attempting to develop the appropriate solution space, however, the JIPT ran into
a series of issues that led them to a broader problem set. Things finally came to a head at a
leadership meeting held in Atlanta, GA, in May of 2007 where the deputy leads discussed the
need to make a decision to either turn the JIPT into a simple coordination function, in which case
the effort was significantly over funded, or to turn it into a full-fledged program to tackle the
issue of airspace integration in its entirety. If this were the case, the effort was woefully
underfunded to achieve the desired ends.
The result of this meeting was the decision to cost out and brief the need for a full-fledge
program to complete the airspace integration activities. The initial cost estimates used
comparative analysis with other technology standards development efforts with the FAA
resulting in cost figures in the billions of dollars. This information met with considerable
resistance from both the internal and external JIPT stakeholder community, and this course of
action was subsequently killed by combined OSD and service-level direction (see below
discussion regarding the USD(AT&L) effort).!!!!i , !! ! !,i!!i$E, Ana _ _._tt
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Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, UAS Task Force
On 13 September 2007, Under Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, signed a memorandum
standing up an USD(AT&L) led effort to address various aspects of the UAS challenge. [48] The
organization of this UAS Task Force is depicted in Figure 2-10. [23] One of the Task Force
IPT's was the Airspace Integration IPT. With the emergence of this Task Force and the specific
standup of an airspace integration IPT, the previous JIPT effort could now be dovetailed into this
effort. Initial plans were put in place to formally transition the leadership of the JIPT effort
under this new task force. Those plans came to an abrupt halt the last week of March 2008 when





















Figure 2-10. USD(AT&L) UAS Task Force Organization.
In February 2008, the JIPT was part of an update briefing to the UAS Senior Steering Group
(SSG) in which the overall JIPT approach, cost, and structure was once again briefed, this time
to a combined two-star level review. As a result of the briefing, Mr. David Ahern, the
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USD(AT&L) Portfolio Systems Manager, redirected the UAS Task Force IPT and the JIPT to
begin looking at a point solution approach to the problem rather than one that attempted to solve
the problem generally for all types of Level 3-5 UAS. At this time, the outcome of how this will
ultimately play out in funding and direction for the airspace integration effort is unknown.
Implications of Past and Current Efforts
With the backdrop provided in Chapter 1, and the preceding discussion concerning the recent
UAS AI activities, it should be apparent that the context in which this issue is being addressed is
both varied and under a constant state of change. The fluid nature of the problem has largely
frustrated the efforts of those attempting to move the issue forward. The situation is further
complicated by a slow but steady shift in the expectations of those employing UAS for broader
and less restrictive mechanisms for securing access to wider chunks of airspace.
From a comparative analysis standpoint, the JIPT effort is the closest activity to the airspace
integration enterprise defined later in this report. A detailed assessment of the most recent JIPT
efforts reveals several important aspects of the context element in the UAS AI arena. First, the
JIPT expended a considerable amount of resources against the accomplishment of systems
engineering tasks. Figure 2-11 illustrates the overall systems engineering requirements flow-
down model the JIPT used to organize the work it accomplished, and it also provided the basis
for the analytical framework that was formulated for moving the technical aspects of the program
forward.
While this activity was, and is necessary, it is not sufficient for a successful bounding of the
current problem. As Norman and Kuras of the MITRE Corporation point out in their analysis of
system of systems engineering, the traditional systems engineering approach requires that "The
specific desired outcome must be known a priori, and it must be clear and unambiguous (implied
in this is that the edges of the system, and thus responsibility, are clear and known)." [50] In the
case of both the JIPT and the earlier Access 5 effort, this boundary condition for successful
systems engineering was never ultimately established. In the fluid context in which the UAS AI
activity is occurring, the traditional systems engineering effort is a necessary, but not sufficient,
activity for a workable solution. This observation is one of the driving motivations behind the
need for a full enterprise architecting effort described in Chapter 3.
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Figure 2-11. JIPT Requirements Flow-Down Process.
This is not to diminish or otherwise trivialize the significant technical hurdles that must be
overcome in order for UAS airspace integration to become a reality. If the current assumptions
concerning policy and regulation remain in force, there will need to be substantial investments in
additional research and development (R&D); modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A);
prototyping; testing and evaluation (T&E); and production article verification and validation
before UAS airspace integration becomes "routine" rather than by exception. Traditional
systems engineering will be central to this portion of the effort. In fact, the JIPT had an excellent
model for pursuing this path within the systems engineering activity. Figure 2-12 depicts the
activity model that by design mirrors the integrating activities from the organizational structure
of the JIPT (reference the far left Activity Centers in Figure 2-12). [47]
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Figure 2-12. JIPT Activity Model.
Finally, there are also huge differences in the cultural aspects the organizations involved in this
activity bring to bear in their interactions. There are three major communities engaged in the
dialogue for moving things along: the materiel provider, the UAS operator, and the regulator.
All three of these decision makers bring a unique perspective and understanding of the problem
that shapes the way they approach the issues and the activities undertaken to reduce their
uncertainty in the outcomes. These cultural differences are fundamental, and they drive behavior
in a pathological fashion on many of these airspace integration challenges. What one
organization does to reduce its own uncertainty in many cases increases it for one, or even two,
of the other decision makers. As a result, actions of any one decision maker tend to work at
cross-purposes to the objectives of the broader enterprise. These differences show up in spades
when the organizational objectives and processes are compared to one another (see Chapters 8
and 9 for a detailed discussion of these factors).
Chapter 2 Summary
The detailed review of recent airspace integration activities presented in this chapter provides the
specifics for understanding how the strategic backdrop described in Chapter 1 plays out at
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specific organizational levels with respect to the airspace integration topic. Specifically, the past
shortfalls and lessons learned from these efforts provides a significant degree of insight into the
issues and tensions that must ultimately be resolved for a practical solution to take hold. The
brief treatment of UAS history augments this understanding by grounding the discussion in a
clear historical context and providing further clarity on the highly technical nature of UAS
evolution over the past 160 years.
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The task now shifts to an understanding of how the UAS AI effort should be scoped and a
decision made on the methodology to be employed for a solution. The results must suffice for
the purpose of both the methodology development as well as the application of that methodology
to the UAS AI problem.
Specifically, Chapter 3 discusses the manner in which the context presented in Section I will be
assessed to determine the boundaries of the UAS AI enterprise (to be defined) and a brief review
of the more relevant literature on the challenge of formulating a solution in complex stakeholder
enterprises. The approach must also conform to the DoD capability-based assessment (CBA)
process. Chapter 4 begins the development of the methodology in earnest by formally
developing the framework for arriving at an enterprise purpose statement and conducting a
stakeholder analysis to identify the key decision makers in the enterprise. Chapter 5 builds the
tools for assessing the degree of value alignment in the enterprise to provide direction to the
enterprise architecting effort that follows in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 anchors the method with a
rigorous development for building alternative enterprise architectures and evaluating them
collectively for the best overall approach. Section III concludes by putting forward an approach
for transforming the enterprise from the current state to the one described by the preferred
architecture developed through the process described in Chapter 7.
The objective of Section III is to clearly lay out the theoretical basis for the analysis of the UAS
AI enterprise that is detailed in Section IV. Aggregating the methodology together independent
of the application provides for a more generalized context and a better way to discuss future
research and application extensions in Section V. It also keeps the application in Section IV
tightly focused on the key operational aspects needed to make the UAS AI activity successful
without the distraction of having to concurrently develop the method as it is applied. In other
words, either specific interests in the methodology or the detailed application to the UAS
airspace integration problem can inform where you jump to next in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3 - THESIS SCOPE & LITERATURE REVIEW
"A mind once stretched by a new idea never regains its original dimension."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
The value in a literature review is the uncovering of possibilities, alternative approaches, and
different ways of structuring information or data to help frame an issue or problem. The curse is
sifting through the information, collecting the occasional nugget, and assembling them into an
approach that will bear the fruit of solutions or opportunities to approach problems from a
different direction. The preceding two chapters have outlined the context and nature of the
problem. This chapter seeks to assemble the tools needed to weigh the relevant factors, create
alternatives, and select an optimal solution.
Things rarely proceed in a linear fashion. The development of an analytical framework for this
thesis was no exception to this observation. In fact, in some ways the methodology presented in
this thesis is the result of the past three years worth of work and experience in several different
fields. Much like life that has a tendency to happen to you while you are in the midst of planning
something else, the structure for this thesis emerged almost as the result of several sidebar
conversations and tangents the author had over the course of investigating and researching other
approaches that ultimately didn't make the cut.
In something of a departure from the classical literature review in which the inquiring mind
enters without preconceived solutions, the assessment outlined in this chapter is targeted at
solving the very specific problem outlined in Chapter 2 with the additional constraint that
whatever method is ultimately implemented for this portion of the problem needs to be
consistent, at least in principle, with the current DoD approach to assessing and selecting
programs to add to the force structure. The net effect is a set of specific constraints on the search
for a methodological approach that is broad enough to treat the full spectrum of issues facing the
UAS AI enterprise (a definition for the UAS AI enterprise will be defined shortly) while aligning
well with current DoD methodology for program planning and selection (the CBA process).
Two key insights inform the literature review task in light of the above criteria. First, traditional
systems engineering needs to be supplemented with a more robust way of accounting for the
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context changes that occur while also doing a better job of connecting the product development
process with the broader value structure (or need) of the UAS Al enterprise (recall the discussion
from Chapter 2 concerning the JIPT systems engineering effort). Second, a thorough analysis of
the DoD capability-based assessment (CBA) process reveals a value-focused process hidden
under the cloak of other terminology. The literature review hunt will therefore concentrate on
uncovering methodologies that will provide a way to gain more insight into the dynamic
enterprise context, directly link product development with enterprise value, and conform to a
value-focused approach for dealing with the issue in the broadest sense.
Before plunging headlong into this pursuit, however, two issues need to be nailed down in more
detail to bound the problem to something manageable without compromising the usefulness or
applicability of the result to the UAS airspace integration problem. The first is a discussion of
the scope of this thesis as it relates to both the extent of UAS platforms and activities considered
as well as the organizations involved. The second is to explain how the DoD CBA process
works and its underlying connection with value-focused thinking. These two issues are each
addressed in turn before turning to the literature review itself.
Thesis Scope
Enterprise Identification Framework
Clearly, the UAS airspace integration activity is set against a very rich and complex backdrop of
organizations, national priorities, politics, and processes. In addition, the scope of UAS
capabilities represents an extremely diverse and broad range of performance parameters, ranging
in size from just a few ounces to those coming in at over 32,000 lbs. The scope of stakeholders
discussed further in Chapter 4 can arguably range from individual units within the DoD, to each
of the Services, to intergovernmental agencies, to industry, and even international airspace
management organizations. A framework for considering how to address this scope is required.
The approach used for defining the enterprise in this report is the one developed by Murman et
al. in Lean Enterprise Value (LEV). [6] LEV categorizes enterprises in the following manner:
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"We identify three distinct levels of aerospace enterprises based upon the level of entity
being considered: program enterprises, multi-program enterprises, and national and
international enterprises. Not surprisingly, they are interconnected and interdependent."
"...The most elemental unit of aerospace business activity is the program, a collection of
activities that produce a particular product, system, or service that is delivered to the
customer and that generates revenue...A distinguishing characteristic of program
enterprises is that they have accountability for cost, schedule, and performance of the
product, system, or service."
"...Business organizations and government agencies responsible for executing multiple
programs are multi-program enterprises. Such enterprises provide the leadership and
enabling infrastructure necessary for program execution."
"...the collection of all entities that contribute to the creation and use of aerospace
products, systems, or services can be seen as a national or an international enterprise."
As Figure 3-1 illustrates, each enterprise level can be thought of as a crosscutting entity through
the value-creation framework. From a scoping perspective, this report will address the issue of
UAS airspace integration at a multi-program level. As pointed out previously, the three specific
programs that will be addressed for this report include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and the
RQ-4 Global Hawk. Limiting the scope of the enterprise in this fashion reduces the overall size
of the enterprise to a single class of UAS being operated by a single military service. A more
formal statement of the UAS AI enterprise will be developed in Section III; for now, the UAS AI
enterprise definition can be generally described as the organizations and activities needed to
integrate the MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4 UAS platforms into the NAS.
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Figure 3-1. A Synthesis of the Lean Enterprise Value Framework.
In addition, these platforms are also the most technologically mature, are in current operational
use, and have the greatest degree of capability of any UAS in routine use today. As such, they
represent the first platforms on which a more integrated UAS airspace access capability is likely
to be implemented and assessed. In this regard, they provide "pathfinder" activities for Level 3-
5 UAS that will follow. Also, their current use provides a concrete way to translate the
theoretical development of the UAS AI enterprise value structure into a specific set of actionable
recommendations for these platforms moving into the future, making the future vision state and
transformation plan both tangible and grounded in current realities.
At this juncture it is appropriate to address the fact that the LEV methodology used to scope this
effort is not the only framework for considering how best to approach this problem. The
problem could have been scoped just as well by addressing any number of other criteria. The
advantages that accrue from using the LEV approach are two-fold. First, the programmatic basis
of the distinctions is a natural fit to the way in which DoD conducts business, which is program
focused. The services budget and plan around programs, the President's budget is submitted
largely on a program-centric structure, and perhaps more to the point, Congress authorizes and
appropriates funding based on a program perspective. As a result, the program is "king" when it
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In the second instance, the LEV methodology is also a lean, value-focused approach to scoping
the problem, providing an overarching framework for integrating the results back into the DoD
CBA process and minimizing the potential for disconnects in the proposed methodology in this
thesis and the practical implementation constraints within the DoD context. This aspect of the
LEV method will become clearer in the discussion on the CBA process later in this chapter.
Enterprise Organizational Scope
In the specific case of this effort, the organizational scope will be exclusively on the interactions
between Air Combat Command (ACC), the Air Force acquisition community, and the FAA and
their attempt to arrive at a state in which value delivery to each stakeholder organization is
sufficiently high to warrant continued participation in the UAS AI enterprise. Within each of
these organizations, there are several key offices that are directly and actively working the issues
highlighted in the previous chapters. These specific offices will be further detailed in the
stakeholder analysis section of Chapter 9. The enterprise as a whole is referred to as the
"airspace integration" enterprise throughout the remainder of this thesis, and it necessarily
includes each set of stakeholders from ACC, the Air Force Acquisition community, and the
FAA. The basis for scoping the thesis content to just examining these three major stakeholder
organizations is also detailed in the stakeholder analysis section of Chapter 9.
As an on-going effort, the airspace integration activity (as embodied in the JIPT) has a history
and de facto process for accomplishing tasks. What complicates the picture is while the JIPT is
focused on the integration of UAS into the NAS, these same organizations also interact at an
operational level (but in different roles) to get actual UAS missions in the NAS off the ground
and into the air. This can be somewhat confusing to both participants and those looking in from
the outside because while the organizations are the same, and because the end result of the
airspace integration effort should result in an operational mission, the methods and purposes for
which an activity is being undertaken are very different and are controlled by different offices
within each of the above organizations.
Thesis Scope Summary
In summary, the scope of this thesis can be described as the development and application of a
suitable methodology for the purpose of creating a viable UAS AI enterprise that is flowing value
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to all of the key decision makers in the enterprise where the enterprise is constrained to only
addressing the needs of ACC, the Air Force acquisition community, and the FAA with respect to
the operation ofMQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4. The specifics on the enterprise purpose are taken up in
Chapter 9 where the UAS AI enterprise will be rigorously defined and the purpose and
participants detailed.
Department of Defense Capability-Based Assessments
Before looking into the literature for appropriate methods and tools for assessing the issues laid
out in Chapters 1 and 2, the additional constraint for a method that is compatible with the DoD
CBA process is enumerated. This section is a very brief overview of what the DoD CBA process
looks like for informing the literature review effort that follows. From a purely theoretical
standpoint, imposing this constraint on the methodology upfront restricts the space in which
solutions are sought. While this may in fact be true from a purely academic or theoretical
standpoint, it fails to address the realities associated with actually implementing solutions in an
existing framework that mandates conformance for an organization the size of DoD. For the
specific issues addressed in this thesis, the time sensitivity for solutions dictate the practical
approach to the issues because the time associated with changing DoD policy and infrastructure
required for an entirely new or different approach to how DoD does planning and procurement is
measured in decades.
The Rationale for Considering Capabilities-Based Assessments
As the title for this research suggests, the focus is on the application of value-focused thinking
and enterprise architecting approaches. The decision to use these two methodologies (developed
and defended in the next section of this chapter) is tied into the system architecting principle for
design selection that Crawley articulates as the need to ensure that "decomposition of form maps
to team, stations, and flow." [51] In other words, the architecting of the analysis should result in
a product that is congruous with the existing structures in which the results will need to be
assimilated and ultimately affected.
The issue that naturally arises with the application of this system architecting principle is "What
is the structure I need to accommodate in the architecting of the solution?" In the case of the
DoD, the approved structure for accomplishing the kind of analysis associated with the questions
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of this thesis is the Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) process as implemented through the
Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS). This means formulating the
results of this analysis in such a manner that the methodology and results will be compatible with
the CBA and JCIDS constructs to maximize the potential for implementation.
Again, the question may arise with respect to how important this aspect of alignment to existing
"teams, stations, and flow" really is to the broader application of value-focused thinking or
enterprise architecting. As alluded to in the previous section, if the objective of this research
were focused on expanding the theoretical foundations for either of these topics, then the author
will readily admit the above discussion has little bearing on the problem; however, the objective
of this thesis is much more focused. As detailed in the previous section, the thesis scope is an
assessment of the various factors contributing to the UAS airspace integration endeavor
associated with MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4, and to recommend an approach that will provide the
highest likelihood of delivering value to the UAS AI enterprise.
The practical ramifications of this objective is the need to ensure the theoretical methodology
employed in the analysis will produce results compatible with the practical realities for how DoD
mandates the assessment and execution of programs. If the issue is thought of as one in which
the academic thesis approach needs to be interlaced with the DoD analytical framework, then the
question is how to accomplish this interface resulting in a theoretically sound analysis on the
academic front and at the same time produce results transferable to the DoD for implementation.
This provides the rational for understanding the CBA process before proceeding further with the
development of the theoretical basis of this thesis.
Capabilities-Based Assessment Overview
A brief description of the CBA process follows. The reader is referred to the appropriate
references for a more in-depth treatment on the subject. Specifically, the following are provided
for DoD guidance on the JCIDS process and conducting a CBA: CJCSI 3170.01F [52]; CJCSM
3010.02B [53]; CJCSM 3170.01C [54]; JROCM 062-06 [55]; DODAF Vol 1: Definitions and
Guidelines [56]; White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Under the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) [57]; and the CBA User's
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Guide, Ver 2 [58]. Additional information on the motivation behind the JCIDS process can be
found in the Joint Defense Capabilities Study Final Report. [59].
The CBA User's Guide version 2, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-8 Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate in December 2006 [58], references the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) [52], when defining the structure of a CBA.
According to CJCSI 3170.01F:
"The CBA is the JCIDS analysis process that includes three phases: The FAA [functional
area analysis], the FNA [functional needs analysis], and the FSA [functional solutions
analysis]. The results of the CBA are used to develop a JCD (based on the FAA and FNA)
or ICD (based on the full analysis)."
While this definition certainly describes what a CBA is with respect to its structure, it does not
provide insight into what it is intended to accomplish.
To get at the underlying basis for why the JCIDS process uses CBA, the origins of the current
analysis structure must be examined. Before the implementation of CBA, the DoD operated on a
requirements-based approach to determine needs. [58] The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) was the ultimate body in this system for deciding what went forward in system.
The system was revamped under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld because of widespread
dissatisfaction with this process. The effort that ensued as a result of a March 2002 memo (see
Figure 3-2) from Secretary Rumsfeld to General Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
produced three principles that formed the basis of JCIDS: 1) Describing needs in terms of
capabilities, instead of systems or force elements, 2) Deriving needs from a joint perspective,
from a new set of joint concepts, and 3) Having a single general or flag officer oversee each DoD
functional portfolio (emphasis added). By the summer of 2003, JCIDS was up and running. See
the Joint Defense Capabilities Study Final Report for further information on the motivations
behind JCIDS. [59]
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Figure 3-2. Rumsfeld Memo Initiating Current CBA Process.
The governing instruction for JCIDS was revised six times in the first three years of operation,
and the debate continues on what exactly a "capabilities-based approach" is; however, the three
basic principles upon which JCIDS was established have remained constants in this evolving
process. The emphasis in this research is on Principle #1 because it provides the basis upon
which the linkage between the CBA process and the methodology in this research is built. While
capability has yet to be defined (see the next paragraph), notice that it stands in contrast to
systems or force elements. In a broader sense, Principle #1 is also an indictment against an
"alternatives-based" approach to determining needs. As previously mentioned, the shortfalls
associated with this approach were the primary drivers for change in the previous system that
gave rise to the CBA process.
The CBA User's Guide [58] elaborates on the first foundational principle with the following
commentary:
"One of the major frustrations of the previous requirements processes was that solutions
were introduced to the system without any higher-level rationalization. The intent was to
replace statements such as 'we need a more advanced fighter,' with 'we need the capability
to defeat enemy air defenses.' The latter statement provides the rationalization for needs,
and also allows for competition among solutions."
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TO: Gen. Pace





As Chairman of the JROC., please think through what we all need to do nidhidually or
c lectivelhy to get the requirements system fixed.
It is pretty clear ikis broken, and t is so powerful and inexorable that it invariably
continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that
need to be required.
Please screw your head into that, and let's have four or five aof us meet and talk about it.
Thanks.
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Two aspects of this commentary are worth pointing out with respect to bringing better definition
to the idea of a "capabilities-based approach." First, the focus and weight of the effort is on the
elicitation and rationalization of the needs associated with the execution of military operations.
The second is that the articulation of the need is the basis for assessing and selecting solutions.
By inference, this means that a capabilities-based approach will not be predicated on an
alternatives-based methodology. Alternative-based approaches jump directly into the solution
space (e.g. "we need a more advanced fighter"), and as just pointed out, the focus in CBA is on a
needs-based definition (i.e. "we need the capability to defeat enemy air defenses"). It is only
after the needs are adequately defined and prioritized that the quest for solutions should begin.
With the understanding of the underlying motivations behind CBA, the CJCSI 3170.01F [52]
definition of a capability is as follows:
Capability - The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions
through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. It is defined by an
operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of a joint or initial
capabilities document or a joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation. In the case of
materiel proposals/documents, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF
performance attributes identified in the capability development document and the
capability production document.
Parsing the above definition, capabilities can be summarized as the ability to achieve a desired
effect expressed in an operational context (specified standards and conditions) using the full
DOTMLPF performance attributes through any combination of means and ways to perform a set
of tasks.
The CBA definition previously given "as the JCIDS process by which an FAA, FNA, and FSA
are accomplished," can now be broken down into the steps required to define the appropriate
effect, operational context, performance attributes and tasks. Figure 3-3 provides a simplified
view of how the CBA process breaks down by FAA, FNA, and FSA. [58]
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Figure 3-3. Simplified Diagram of Major CBA Inputs, Analyses, and Outputs.
The CBA User's Guide sums up these steps as follows:
The FAA synthesizes existing guidance to specify the military problems to be studied. The
FNA then examines that problem, assesses how well the DOD can address the problem
given its current program, and recommends needs the DOD should address. The FSA takes
this assessment as input, and generates recommendations for solutions to the needs.
The end-result of this process is a clear linking of the military need expressed in terms of the
required effect and operational context, and the alternative solutions by which the need can be
met. The merit of each solution is judged on the extent to which it produces the performance
attributes defined across the full DOTMLPF spectrum.
For the purposes of providing alignment between the CBA process and the analytical method
used in this research, the quest is for a theoretical approach focused on defining the desired effect
(think intent) articulated within an operational context (think scenario) and defined by a full
spectrum of performance attributes (think definition of success). Once these are in hand, a
methodology is needed to populate the solution space (think concept generation) for ways and
means of meeting these performance attributes and selecting the best overall design (think
assessment criteria).
Capability-Based Assessment Summary
The upshot of the above discussion is the need for a methodology that will focus on the
elicitation of needs, context, and attributes. This is the underpinning strength of the CBA
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process and the thrust behind the first principle of the JCIDS framework. The search for an
appropriate methodology for this research can now be summarized as the pursuit of appropriate
frameworks and tools that will meet the intent of the JCIDS CBA process while providing
sufficient scope to address the full breadth of the UAS AI enterprise activity set.
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an investigation into the literature for a
methodology that will meet the above stated requirements. As was pointed out previously, this
approach deviates somewhat from the standard literature search, but the objective is to produce
an immediately viable approach that can be implemented quickly within the existing framework.
Sorting and Categorizing Approaches
The literature review is attacked on two sequential fronts. The first is to narrow down the
relevant methodologies on the broader CBA requirements that focus on the need and use context
space, and then hit the second gate of needing the exercise of the methodology to be robust
enough to handle the full scope of the UAS AI enterprise challenges. The CBA requirement
leads straight to the door of value-focused thinking.
As Keeney points out in Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, the
manner in which a person looks for a way to meet a need can be categorized as either
alternative-focused or value-focused in the way the problem is approached. [5] Keeney
describes the typical situation as follows:
"Many books have been written about decision making. They tell us how to solve decision
problems. They do not tell us how to identify potential decision opportunities. They tell us
how to analyze alternatives to choose the best one. They do not tell us how to create
alternatives. They tell us how to evaluate alternatives given some quantitative objective
function. They do not tell us how to articulate the qualitative objectives on which any
appraisal of alternatives must rest." Preface, pvii
This observation goes to the very heart of the problem Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was
driving at in his memo to General Pace detailed in the previous section on the CBA process. To
delve into the details further, Keeney describes alternative-focused and value-focused thinking in
the following way:
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"Most people do not like problems, and since decisions are problems to most people, they
typically do not create their own decision problems. Instead, decisions problems are
usually thrust upon them by others or by happenstance...Once the decision problem is
imposed from outside, the so-called solving begins. Typically, the decision maker first
focuses on alternatives, until either an appropriate set of alternatives or one acceptable one
is found, and only then begins to concentrate on objectives or criteria to evaluate the
alternatives. I refer to this general problem-solving approach as alternative-focused
thinking. Focusing on alternatives is a limited way to think through decision situations. It
is reactive, not proactive...This standard mode of thinking is backward, because it puts the
cart of identifying alternatives before the horse of articulating values."
"It is values that are fundamentally important in any decision situation. Alternatives are
relevant only because they are means to achieve your values. Thus, your thinking should
focus first on values and later on alternatives that might achieve them. Naturally, there
should often be iteration between articulating values and creating alternatives, but the
principle is "values first." Such thinking, which I refer to as value-focused thinking, can
significantly improve decision making because the values guide not only the creation of
better alternatives but the identification of better decision situations. These better decision
situations, which you create for yourself, should be thought of as decision opportunities
rather than as decision problems." Preface, p vii-viii [5]
This excerpt from Keeney's preface clearly draws the line between these two methods of
approaching a problem. It is just as clear that the approach required by the CBA process is a
value-focused thinking approach. Keeney goes on to describe the most important characteristics
of value-focused thinking as follows:
"...value focused thinking suggests a different paradigm for addressing decisions from the
standard alternative-focused thinking paradigm. It is different in three important ways.
First, significant effort is allocated to articulating values. Second, this articulation of
values in decision situations comes before other activities. Third, the articulated values are
explicitly used to identify decision opportunities and to create alternatives. A value-
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focused orientation will help you to create better decision situations with better alternatives,
which should lead to better consequences." Preface, p ix.
"Value focused thinking essentially consists of two activities: first deciding what you want
and then figuring out how to get it." Chapter 1, p4
"Values are principles used for evaluation. We use them to evaluate the actual or potential
consequences of action and inaction, of proposed alternatives, and of decisions. They
range from ethical principles that must be upheld to guidelines for preferences among
choices." Chapter 1, p6 -7
"Ethics, desired traits, characteristics of consequences that matter, guidelines for action,
priorities, value tradeoffs, and attitudes toward risk all indicate values... Thinking about
values is constraint-free thinking. It is thinking about what you wish to achieve or what
you wish to have. Thinking of desirable alternatives is also constraint-free thinking.
Selecting among alternatives, however, is constrained thinking." Chapter 1, p7
Value-focused thinking, then, provides the rich methodological basis for a general approach that
will satisfy the CBA constraint for "describing needs in terms of capabilities, instead of systems
or force elements. " The task now becomes one of finding an implementation of value-focused
thinking that will provide the breadth needed to fully address the UAS Al enterprise challenges.
Value-Focused, Lean Thinking
Arriving at Lean Thinking
As it turns out, there is a large body of literature and a host of vying methods for actually
implementing a value-focused methodology. The various methods that were examined for this
research that make claims of one sort or another concerning their ability to "transform" an
enterprise included such methods as Lean Thinking, Six Sigma, Total Quality Management,
Agile Manufacturing, and Reengineering. A full review of these various methods with respect to
one another is developed in detail by others. For a published comparison of Lean Thinking and
Six Sigma, Lean Six Sigma for Service by Michael George provides a good compare and
contrast. [60] For a fuller analysis across the entire waterfront of tools, the reader is referred to a
paper in progress by Dr. Kirkor Bozdogan entitled "A Comparative Review of Lean Thinking,
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Six Sigma and Related Enterprise Process Improvement Initiatives" available through the Lean
Advancement Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for an in-depth comparative
analysis of these alternative approaches. [61] Dr. Bozdogan reaches the following conclusion in
his analysis:
"A main conclusion of the paper is that Lean Thinking provides an overarching intellectual
architecture for the various systemic change initiatives, wherein they share common roots,
augment each other in significant ways, and generally comprise mutually-complementary
approaches. The various differences among them are dwarfed by their common
characteristics. Taken together, under the overall umbrella of Lean Thinking, they are
rapidly merging into a unified framework for bringing about fundamental enterprise-wide
change." [61]
Dr. Bozdogan concentrates specifically on the relative strengths and complementary aspects of
lean Thinking and Six Sigma (complementing the perspective by George in Lean Six Sigma)
with the following observations concerning the two methods:
"In particular, Lean Thinking and Six Sigma share important common features. These
include focusing on the customer, reducing variation, continuous improvement,
collaborative relationships, proactive leadership and data-and-fact-driven management...
There are also some differences between Lean Thinking and Six Sigma. Lean Thinking
strives to optimize the entire enterprise value stream, by providing a holistic perspective.
Such a holistic 'systems' perspective provides an important unifying framework guiding
specific improvement initiatives. Lean Thinking encompasses a unified, mutually-
reinforcing, set of enterprise-wide principles and practices at all levels, linking the board
room to the factory floor and providing an end-to-end view of all enterprise operations
spanning a defined enterprise's entire value stream. By contrast, Six Sigma, despite efforts
in recent years to evolve it into an integrative management system, largely stresses a
generic problem-solving approach employed to implement discrete improvement
projects... In the final analysis, however, Six Sigma complements Lean Thinking. This is
already being recognized by a growing number of companies that have adopted integrated
Lean-Six Sigma change initiatives, combining Six Sigma quality with lean speed." [61]
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The result of this comparative analysis for the purposes of this research is the conclusion that
Lean Thinking provides the broadest, most holistic approach to addressing enterprise-wide value
considerations. As was previously pointed out in the "Thesis Scope" section of this chapter, the
additional advantage in using the Lean Enterprise Value (LEV) framework is the program-
centric perspective. This provides an additional degree of alignment with the DoD CBA process
that many of the other methods lack since most are focused on specific improvement initiatives
instead of the broader program-level considerations.
Detailing the Lean Enterprise Value Model
It is appropriate at this juncture to describe the LEV framework in some additional level of
detail. The synthesized framework used in this research is reproduced in Figure 3-4 for
convenient reference. When this framework was discussed previously, only the left-hand,
vertical axis was discussed (recall the previous discussion was centered on scoping the content of
the thesis). The top, horizontal axis is the current focus.
V~~~ie
Figure 3-4. A Synthesis of the Lean Enterprise Value Framework.
The first thing to define more specifically is the word "value." The best place to start in these
instances is to consult the dictionary on the common meaning of the word itself. The American




Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
val-ue: (vil'y6i) n.
1. An amount, as of goods, services, or money, considered to be a fair and suitable
equivalent for something else; a fair price or return.
2. Monetary or material worth: the fluctuating value of gold and silver.
3. Worth in usefulness or importance to the possessor; utility or merit: the value of an
education.
4. A principle, standard, or quality considered worthwhile or desirable: "The speech was
a summons back to the patrician values of restraint and responsibility" (Jonathan
Alter).
To get a better sense for the use of the word in our current context, consider several definitions
from various sources within the Lean Thinking community. These definitions will build on what
Keeney provided for the concept behind value within a value-focused thinking framework.
Womack and Jones in Lean Thinking point out that "value can only be defined by the ultimate
customer. And it's only meaningful when expressed in terms of a specified product (a good or
service, and often both at once) which meets the customer's needs at a specific price at a specific
time." Liker in The Toyota Way puts it more simply by saying, "The first question... is always
'What does the customer want from this process?"' (emphasis in the original). [63] Murman et
al. in Lean Enterprise Value define value as "how various stakeholders find particular worth,
utility, benefit, or reward in exchange for their respective contributions to the enterprise."
(emphasis in the original) [6] For the sake of moving forward with a common definition of
value, the Murman et al. definition will be used through the remainder of this thesis as a concise
statement for what is meant by "value". The remainder of the value-creation framework from
Lean Enterprise Value (denoted hereafter as simply "LEV") can now be addressed with a
consistent definition of value established.
LEV begins the discussion of value identification with the following observations:
"The first phase in our framework involves identifying the stakeholders and their value
needs or requirements - what negotiation theorists sometimes refer to as underlying
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'interests.' Economists might see 'utility functions' here. Importantly, many aspects of
value identification in this stage involve reciprocal 'exchanges' that must take place
between stakeholders even to identify the desired value. This is where determining the
'right job' begins."
"The process commences with the identification of stakeholders...After the stakeholders
have been identified comes a first attempt to understand what part of the project or process
adds value for them and what kinds of exchanges are required to provide that value. This is
quite complex."
The actual implementation of a method for accomplishing this task is the subject of Chapter 4
and it encompasses the job of defining the enterprise purpose and conducting the appropriate
stakeholder analysis to determine who the relevant decision makers are within the defined
enterprise. Looking ahead to the issues surrounding the formulation of an operational model to
exercise alternative enterprise architectures (to be defined in the next section), it is worth
pointing out that Keeney and LEV overlap directly in this phase of the LEV value-creation
framework, especially with respect to the idea that values can be captured using 'utility
functions'. This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 6, but from a methodology
development standpoint, this is worth drawing the reader's attention to at this point to strengthen
the intellectual tie between Keeney and LEV.
Once the value identification phase is complete, the LEV framework moves on to describing the
value proposition phase. A description of this phase in the value creation framework follows:
"The objective of the value proposition phase is to structure value streams based on the
stakeholders' value propositions so that people, groups, and enterprises will contribute
their efforts or resources to the value streams in those ways from which they can, in turn,
derive value. This is critical to value delivery, since stakeholders will probably
discontinue contributing when they receive no value."
"During this phase, different stakeholders structure explicit or implicit 'value exchanges'
- sometimes referred to as 'agreements' or 'deals'... The agreements in themselves mean
nothing until they are put into a structure to deliver on the promises. The fields of
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sociology, psychology, and economics tell us that the incentives in these agreements are
pivotal... Stakeholders need to be able to see that their value needs are met."
Creating a value proposition that allows value to flow to each of the UAS AI enterprise decision
makers is perhaps the most challenging aspect of this entire endeavor. To address these
complexities in the most holistic manner possible, enterprise architecting techniques will be used
in a rigorous architecture creation and tradeoff analysis approach to generate alternative value
propositions that provide the required tradespace to flow value within a highly constrained set of
formal boundaries (formal in the sense of the "form" the solutions must interface with). As an
emerging field of research, the enterprise architecting literature is still developing out of its
history in the information technology domain. The next section in this chapter introduces the
enterprise architecting subject to familiarize the reader with the overarching concepts and
approach. The key point to remember is that this research employs enterprise architecting as the
means by which to develop the value propositions (especially the 'structure') as described by the
LEV framework.
The final phase of the LEV value-creation framework is 'value delivery.' This phase is
summarized as follows:
"The implementation phase, value delivery, is the most familiar in the context of lean
practices and principles. Here is where value is delivered both to the various
stakeholders who participate in the value stream and to the end user when the product,
service, or improved capability is received. This is where all of the promises, both
explicit and implicit, are kept."
"Delivering value by conveying benefits to stakeholders requires the interconnected chain
of activities that we call the 'value stream'. Excessive focus on delivering value to the
end user or any other single stakeholder creates 'dysfunctional' value streams that ignore
other stakeholders. Value delivery as we mean it depends on adding value at every step
along the value stream."
Chapter 7 discusses how the methodology in this phase is implemented using the Enterprise
Transformation Roadmap developed by the Lean Advancement Initiative. Ultimately, execution
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of this Roadmap delivers the aforementioned value to the enterprise decision makers. At the
conclusion of the analysis, the results must be actionable and produce the attributes valued by the
enterprise.
An Eye Towards Executable Models
The scope of this research was previously described in terms of the program extent (i.e. different
UAS platforms addressed) and the organizations involved in the UAS AI enterprise. A further
word on scope is appropriate at this point. In addition to the number of UAS platforms and
organizations, this research is further limited in the extent to which the methodology developed
will be implemented into an executable model. In other words, the research will take the
methodology to a rigorous, qualitative level, but a working, executable model is beyond the
resources available for this thesis.
With that said, Chapter 12 will describe methodology extensions that need to be made to the
approach developed in the remainder of this section. This is where the observations on the
overlap between the LEV value-creation framework and the Keeney value-focused thinking
framework come to the forefront. As an application of the methodology developed by Keeney,
multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) is used to build models of the value space to assess
alternatives. A specific implementation of this approach is the Multi-Attribute Tradespace
Exploration (MATE) methodology as developed and articulated by Ross. [9, 64] For additional
applications of the MATE methodology, see references [65-68].
The use of MATE to this point has been limited to an examination of the tradespace surrounding
the early conceptual design of products. There is current research underway that seeks to extend
the use of MATE to the full programmatic concerns of cost, schedule, and risk in addition to the
technical performance of the product. Unfortunately, this work will not be complete in time to
inform this research; however, it is worth projecting forward in time to anticipate a situation in
which MATE could reasonably be extended to the domain under investigation in this research.
With this in mind, the value-creation framework from LEV is modified slightly to conform to the
needed information for a MATE analysis. Although not all of this information will be collected
for this research, putting the collected data in an easily digestible MATE format will facilitate the
creation of a crude model presented in Chapter 12.
Page 9211____111____ ___
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
This rounds out the discussion on the quest for a methodology that conforms to the DoD CBA
process and way of thinking. As described, the value-focused thinking approach advocated by
Keeney, with specific implementation direction using the value-creation framework described in
LEV, focuses the effort on a clear understanding of the end needs to be addressed. Only after a
clear understanding of these needs and the characterization of value from the perspective of each
enterprise stakeholder does an examination of possible solutions occur. The only remaining task
prior to the development of the specific instantiation of an approach that weaves these two
frameworks together is the introduction of enterprise architecting principles.
Architecting as a Means to an End
Recall that enterprise architecting is the means by which the value propositions described in LEV
are generated in this research. The driving motivation behind the use of enterprise architecting in
this role is the need to address the second constraint of the methodology development activity,
namely an approach that would be sufficiently robust for the full spectrum of issues the UAS AI
enterprise needs to address. While the LEV value-creation framework provides an excellent
overarching approach to this problem, it lacks the rigor needed to fully address the complexities
of the airspace integration problem in a systematic fashion. Fortunately, the enterprise
architecting method has grown directly out of the research conducted by the Lean Advancement
Initiative, motivated by the need for a holistic, end-to-end enterprise perspective on value
creation. As a result, it already fits neatly inside of the existing LEV value-creation framework
and Enterprise Transformation Roadmap process.
Enterprise architecting (EA) is admittedly a field in the nascent stages of development, and the
reader may be inclined to consider the context for the term within the relatively narrow confines
of information technology (IT). Despite the historical roots to IT, EA is a much broader field,
encompassing everything from external political motivations, to strategy, to product or service
development activities. Before proceeding further, a definition of EA is needed to focus the
discussion and remove ambiguity about what EA encompasses.
Definitions
Consider first the word 'enterprise' as a modifier to 'architecture.' Consider the following
definitions:
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American Heritage Dictionary: en-ter-prise (6n'tor-prTz') n.
1. An undertaking, especially one of some scope, complication, and risk.
2. A business organization.
3. Industrious, systematic activity, especially when directed toward profit: Private
enterprise is basic to capitalism.
4. Willingness to undertake new ventures; initiative: "Through want of enterprise and
faith men are where they are, buying and selling, and spending their lives like serfs"
(Henry David Thoreau). [69]
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law [70]
: an economic organization or activity; especially : a business organization
Black's Law Dictionary [71]
:one or more persons or organizations that have related activities, unified operation or
common control, and a common business purpose
Lean Enterprise Value [6]
A lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for its multiple
stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices.
From these definitions, an enterprise is clearly composed of multiple entities that are at least
tangentially aligned for some common purpose that is of some scope and complication. While
the common dictionaries typically orient around a business organization, the LEV definition
provides the more generalized concept by focusing on value delivery as the basis around which
the enterprise functions with the additional distinction that it functions as an integrated entity.
Nightingale and Rhodes [11] shed additional light on the nature of the 'enterprise' by defining
the basic components of the enterprise as structure, behavior, and value. Figure 3-5 illustrates
these components as the various dimensions defining the enterprise 'cube'.
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Figure 3-5. Graphical Depiction of Enterprise Dimensions.
The complexity of an enterprise begins to emerge as the full range of the potential values along
each of these three axes is considered. It is precisely for this reason the enterprise architecting
approach is employed for the UAS airspace integration challenge. The EA methodology, while
still an emerging field, deals explicitly with the kind of complexity brought about by the
interactions of these three dimensions, two of which (behavior and value) can be very 'soft' and
hard to define in any quantitative sense. Nightingale and Rhodes go on to define the 'enterprise
problem space' by enumerating the major variables considered in each of the dimensions (see
Figure 3-6). [11]
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Figure 3-6. Enterprise Problem Space.
With an appreciation for the definition, scope, and potential complexity all tied up in the word
'enterprise', the second element of EA can be explored, that of 'architecting'. The richness of
the literature surrounding this aspect of EA is as deep as it is broad. The following definitions
are provided for architecting, architecture, and architect:
Rechtin and Maier [72]
Architecting: the art and science of designing and building systems.
American Heritage Dictionary [73]
ar-chi-tec-ture (ir'ki-t6k'chor) n.
1. The art and science of designing and erecting buildings.
2. Buildings and other large structures: the low, brick-and-adobe architecture of the
Southwest.
3. A style and method of design and construction: Byzantine architecture.
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4. Orderly arrangement of parts; structure: the architecture of the federal bureaucracy;
the architecture of a novel.
5. Computer Science The overall design or structure of a computer system, including
the hardware and the software required to run it, especially the internal structure of
the microprocessor.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary [74]
ar-chi-tect. 1: one who designs buildings and advises in their construction 2: one who
plans and achieves a difficult objective
ar-chi-tec-ture. 1: the art or science building; specif: the art or practice of designing and
building structures and esp. habitable ones 2 a: formation or construction
as or as if the result of conscious act b: a unifying or coherent form or
structure 3: architectural product or work 4: a method or style of building
Several aspects emerge with respect to the idea of architecting or architecture. Almost all of the
definitions contain some element of both 'art' and 'science'. All of them also contain the ideas
of structure, design, or purpose. Enterprise architecting's closest parallel is that of systems
architecting. Rechtin and Maier get at the dual art/science nature of system architecting by
describing art as that part of the process that "is nonanalytic, inductive, difficult to certify, less
understood...It is a process of insights, vision, intuitions, judgment calls, and even 'tastes'." In
contrast, the science side of system architecting is "analytic, deductive, experiment-based, easily
certifiable, well understood, and widely taught in academia and industry."
Rechtin goes on to enumerate architecting and the role of the architect in the following way:
"The essence of architecting is structuring ...bringing form to function, bringing order out
of apparent chaos, or converting the partially formed ideas of a client into a workable
conceptual model.... key techniques are balancing the needs, fitting the interfaces, and
compromising among the extremes."
"The system architect's task is to bring structure in the form of systems to an inherently ill-
structured unbounded world of human needs, technology, economics, politics, engineering,
and industrial practice. The architect, therefore, is not a 'general engineer,' but a specialist
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in reducing complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity to workable concepts. The systems
engineer, in contrast, is the master of making feasible concepts work." [75]
Crawley brings the concept of architecting and the role of the architect home with the following
observations [76]:
"Architecting occurs at three identifiable scales:
- Architecting a product to transfer to a customer (the reference scale)
- At a smaller scale, architecting an element of a product (i.e. a system for an
internal 'customer')
- At a larger scale, which encompasses considering the product within a family, and
in the context of the technology, design and manufacturing competence of the
enterprise."
"Architecting is universal:
- It applies to products (the reference case)
- It applies to technical design and manufacturing processes
- It applies more generally to process and organizations
- It applies to any endeavor in which humans participate as a creative force"
"The Role of the Architect:
1) The architect drives ambiguity from the upstream process by defining the
boundary of the "product/system" which constitute the system and its design and
implementation process.
2) The architect creates the concept for the system, consisting of internal function
and form.
3) The architect manages the evolution of complexity so that goals are met and
function is delivered, while the system is comprehendible to all during its design,
implementation, operation and evolution.
Both Rechtin and Crawley bring out the innate sense of how fuzzy things are in the architecting
space. Both hit on the key concepts of complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty as well as the
inherently creative aspects of the architect's role. Crawley provides an additional degree of
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tangibility to these concepts by explicitly calling out both the scale at which architecting is
accomplished, and the specific role the architect plays in the design process.
Enterprise Architecting Framework
With the above discussion as background, 'enterprise' and 'architecting' are melded together
into a single construct called 'enterprise architecting'. For this research, the definition and
framework advanced by Nightingale and Rhodes will be used as the basis for defining EA and
the activities that surround it [ 11]:
"Applying holistic thinking to design, evaluate and select a preferred structure for a
future state enterprise to realize its value proposition and desired behaviors."
Notice how cleanly this definition of EA fits within the broader value-creation framework
detailed previously. Recall that the EA approach is the primary mechanism by which to create
and evaluate alternative value propositions. This corresponds directly with the definition
proposed by Nightingale and Rhodes. Also note that this definition includes the complexity of
the previous definitions for enterprise and architecture by rolling these elements up into the idea
of a "holistic" approach to the problem. In addition, all three dimensions of the enterprise are
explicitly captured in the way structure, value and behavior interact in the definition.
What follows is a very brief overview of the EA framework developed by Nightingale and
Rhodes. The overarching framework is depicted in Figure 3-7. There are eight predominant
"views" or aspects from which the enterprise as a whole is seen.
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Figure 3-7. Enterprise Architecting Framework and Views.
Each of these views is defined as follows:
Strategy: This view represents goals, vision and direction of the enterprise and includes
the business model and competitive environment. [77]
Process: This view represents the core processes by which the enterprise creates value for
its stakeholders. [77]
Organization: This view represents organizational structure as well as relationships,
culture, behaviors, and boundaries between individuals, teams and organizations. [77]
Knowledge: This view represents the implicit and tacit knowledge, capabilities, and
intellectual property resident in the enterprise. [77]
Policy/External Factors: This view represents the external regulatory, political and
societal environments in which the enterprise operates. [78]
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Information: This view represents the information needs of the enterprise, including
flows of information as well as the systems and technologies needed to ensure
information availability. [78]
Product: This view represents the products produced by the enterprise. [78]
Services: This view represents the services of the enterprise, including services as a
primary objective or in support of products. [78]
It is important to note that while each of these views can be considered independently, this
defeats the intent and purpose of the "holistic" approach to EA. Nightingale and Rhodes provide
the following direction on how to integrate each of the views in concert with one another [79]:
"Architectural Views CAN NOT be developed separately!
- Their organic structure is different when separated and developed individually
- Must be analyzed collectively rather than individually
Interrelationships Among Architectural Views
- Some views directly influence (drive) other views
- Some views directly interact with one another and drive performance in both
directions
Other views serve as the performance enablers
- Alignment across views is critical to achieve Enterprise performance"
The effect of applying this methodology is to view the entire enterprise "through" or from the
perspective of that particular view. In other words, the 'strategy' view assessment is not done
from the perspective of how the strategy is viewed from the enterprise, but rather what the
enterprise (and the other views collectively) should look like when viewing it through the lens of
strategy. This is a fundamental distinction, and one that is easy to lose conducting the analysis.
The final point to bring out is that the EA activity should be directed towards achieving the
desired interaction states between the views, not as an effort to design the views in and of
themselves. This requires an additional level of abstraction in the mind of the architect because
the interactions are the effects caused by the design choices in each of the views. Further, these
interactions are an emergent property of the enterprise as a whole. The extent to which any one
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view impacts the broader enterprise behavior depends heavily on how coupled that particular
view is to other views for the problem under consideration. The bottom line is the architect
should be architecting for a desired behavior or outcome of the enterprise, not to achieve some
specific structure or form.
Pulling It All Together: The Overarching Analytical Approach
The remainder of the methodology section details the specifics of how the LEV value-creation
framework is implemented in this research. Each chapter builds more or less on each major
phase of the value-creation framework introduced in this chapter: value identification (Chapter 4
and 5), value proposition (Chapter 6), and value delivery (Chapter 7). As a roadmap to the
methodologies incorporated in each phase of the value-creation framework, Figure 3-8 provides
a visual reference for how the remainder of Section II is laid out.
Figure 3-8. Methodology Roadmap.
In the most general sense, the objective of the methodology is to provide a concrete linkage
between the value structure and the engineering of the enterprise with explicit treatment of the
context. Figure 3-9 provides the most general view of these interactions.
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Figure 3-9. Generalized Model for Value Creation.
In this construct, the 'blue' box represents the classic role of the architect in turning functional
needs into a form that can meet the needs. The degree of functionality is ultimately the basis on
which the benefit of the system is perceived, and the form drives the cost associated with the
delivery of the associated function through the particular concept the architect has chosen.
Whether or not this benefit-to-cost result creates 'value' from a stakeholder perspective will
depend to a significant degree on the context in which both the system and the stakeholder are
operating, and the perceived 'value' will shift as the context changes, effectively capturing the
dynamic nature of value delivery.
Chapter 3 Summary
The scope of this thesis is limited to addressing the issues of three specific Air Force UAS
platforms, the MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4, comprising a multi-program enterprise level of analysis.
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Organizationally, the research will focus on three primary groups of stakeholders: Air Combat
Command, the Air Force acquisition community, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The methodology development effort is informed by two primary drivers: 1) The need to
integrate with the existing DoD capability-based assessment process as implemented by the Joint
Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and 2) The need to address the full
spectrum of factors influencing the UAS airspace integration activity. The result of the literature
review, constrained by these two factors, resulted in a value-focused approach that is
implemented using the three-phased value-creation framework detailed by Murman et al. in Lean
Enterprise Value. This framework is further strengthened using enterprise architecting principles
to create a robust set of alternative value propositions from which to select a preferred value
exchange mechanism.
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CHAPTER 4 - BUILDING THE ENTERPRISE VALUE STRUCTURE
You can keep a few people happy all of the time, some of the people happy most of the time, but
you can't keep everyone happy all of the time.
-Anonymous
The thrust of this chapter is to lay out the specifics for identifying enterprise value.
Complicating this task is the realization that the enterprise value definition is a function of the
enterprise stakeholders who collectively define the purpose of the enterprise and its principle
aims (hence the rational for the opening quote of the chapter-make sure the "few" you decide to
keep happy all of the time are the right stakeholders!). Unfortunately, the enterprise stakeholders
cannot be definitively defined until the enterprise purpose is well-articulated. The coupled
nature of this problem requires regular and consistent feedback in the method employed to
generate both the enterprise purpose statement and the list of relevant stakeholders. The iterative
nature of the methodology proposed in the following chapters is a fundamental aspect to
ensuring the value definition is captured correctly. Without this consistent feedback from
enterprise stakeholders, the enterprise architect can quickly wander off the path to value delivery.
From a chapter organization standpoint, a method for building an enterprise purpose statement is
examined first, followed by the implementation of a method for conducting stakeholder analysis.
Once the enterprise purpose statement and stakeholders is defined, the enterprise value definition
(referred to as the enterprise 'value structure' to convey the idea that it must be assembled from
individual stakeholder perspectives) can be articulated and described. These value definition
descriptions take the form of attributes a particular stakeholder associates with the delivery of the
desired value, and by which the stakeholder measures the degree to which value is provided by
the enterprise.
Building Enterprise Purpose Statements
Enterprise Purpose Statements: Motivation and Definitions
The approach adopted for ensuring the development of a meaningful enterprise purpose
statement is one advance by Crawley as part of the system architecting activity. [7] The key
distinction is that while Crawley articulates the following approach for product systems, the use
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in the current research context is at the enterprise level. Crawley articulates the motivation for
what he calls 'system problem statements' (and what this research will refer to as 'enterprise
purpose statements') with the following comments:
"The identification of a single or a small (concise) set of humanly solvable, representative
(of true success), attainable (within resources & technology), consistent and complete goals
is vital to resolving ambiguity and creating a path for enterprise2 success."
This statement for why enterprise purpose statements are important needs to be unpacked a bit
further by examining what is meant by the following words: humanly solvable, representative,
attainable, consistent and complete. The following definitions provide clarity to what is intended
by adhering to these enterprise purpose statement qualifiers:
Humanly Solvable: "Solvability" implies that the goals are comprehensible by the person
reading them. The purpose statement should enhance the problem solver's ability to find a
right solution by providing enough information without constraining creativity (in other
words, the "The Problem Statement should not design internal systems").
Representative: A purpose statement or goals are representative when the delivery of the
purpose statement or goals results in an enterprise declaration of 'success'. This only
occurs if the enterprise purpose answers a real need (in the context in which it is operating)
and ultimately determines if the enterprise will be a success in reality. If the enterprise
purpose statement is in fact representative, then the delivery of the enterprise purpose or
goals is a tradable surrogate for success.
Attainable: Implies that all enterprise goals can be reached within technology limitations,
and also meet development schedule, resource, and risk goals. This requires a concept and
(at least crude) models of all metrics which appear in the enterprise purpose statement to
test in "analytical" verification. Attainability has a large risk component, and in general, is
much easier to assess for derivative products and much more difficult for clean slate
2 Author's Note: The word 'enterprise' has been substituted for Crawley's original word of 'system' in this
definition. Otherwise, the definition is unchanged from Crawley's original statement.
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designs. When goals are not attainable there are two options: de-scope goals or add
resources. The option chosen depends on the context and the enterprise.
Consistent: A measure of whether product goals are internally contradictory or not. Can
sometimes be checked by thorough logical examination (requirements review, walk
through, etc), but in other cases, consistency can only be checked analytically with
reference to some model. In these cases, automation of the enterprise purpose and goals
can help. This check on enterprise purpose statements often requires a concept to resolve,
since enterprise purposes or goals which are contradictory within one concept may still be
consistent.
Complete: An assessment of whether the enterprise purpose statement has adequately
captured all of the significant stakeholder value definitions. The enterprise purpose
statement should provide for the delivery of all of the key value attributes of the enterprise
stakeholders. If there are important value attributes missing from the enterprise purpose
statement, the purpose statement is incomplete and no longer representative, putting
"success" a risk.
In adapting the Crawley criteria for use within the value-focused thinking construct outlined in
Chapter 3, it is apparent that both the 'humanly solvable' and 'representative' criteria described
above should be accounted for simply as an outgrowth of using a value-creation framework. In
other words, attention to detail while eliciting the value and attribute characterizations from
enterprise stakeholders should result in the creation of an enterprise purpose statement that is
both humanly solvable and representative. If it fails either of these tests, serious reconsideration
of the validity of the value characterization itself should result, and stakeholders re-engaged to
ensure value definitions are accurately characterized (i.e. that the values are correct and the
attributes describing them are in fact what the stakeholder uses to assess the extent of value
delivery).
The practical ramification of the above observations is to limit the enterprise purpose statement
evaluations to primarily an assessment of the statement's attainability, completeness, and
consistency. With this understanding of how to assess the validity of an enterprise purpose
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statement, a framework for understanding the context and framework for an enterprise purpose
statement can be addressed.
The Enterprise Purpose Statement Framework
Putting the enterprise purpose statement into the appropriate context is a key aspect to getting the
enterprise activities scoped to the appropriate level. There is also a need to understand how the
enterprise purpose statement connects to both the broader context above it and the details of the
enterprise activities below it. Crawley describes the approach to arriving at an understanding of
these contexts as "1 up, 1 down". [7]
I Ll p
OW.. c~1I down
Figure 4-1. Determining Enterprise Purpose Statement Context.
In this construct, the Enterprise Purpose Statement is the dominant objective of the enterprise,
but it may not capture all of the detail needed to completely describe the interfaces with the
objectives one layer deeper in detail. This additional layer of detail is captured in the 'Below
Origin' box labeled "1 down." An investigation at this more detailed level of granularity may
bring aspects of the Enterprise Purpose Statement to light that were not considered previously
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but that may be important for the enterprise to move forward. In contrast, the 'Above Origin'
box labeled "1 up" provides the contextual information in which the enterprise is operating. It
sheds light on the motivation and pressures the enterprise must address and resolve in order to be
successful in the "big picture". It is in the process of examining this "1 up" level that many of
the political and organizational constraints come to light. This should also help capture any other
major upstream influence on the enterprise to ensure that the enterprise adequately captures and
addresses these issues. To frame the assessment in a different metaphor, the 'Origin Goal' can
be thought of as a single stock, the 'Above Origin' as the portfolio of stocks of which the
enterprise is just one of many, and the 'Below Origin' as the detailed financial statements
describing the health or transaction details of the enterprise.
Putting the enterprise into its appropriate above/below context is perhaps the most important and
oft overlooked step to ensure the enterprise purpose statement is appropriately scoped and the
value structure is vertically aligned. If the enterprise purpose statement is too narrow, there will
not be enough tradespace in which to architect a set of value propositions that will sufficiently
satisfy all of the stakeholders. On the other hand, if the scope is too large, the focus of the effort
runs the risk of dilution and the opportunity for real impact at the desired level may be lost. If
the enterprise context is understood in both the up and down directions, the enterprise purpose
statement can be modified appropriately to either include additional scope when needed or to
restrict the enterprise purpose statement further to better focus the effort. This entire effort can
be described as aligning the enterprise value structure in the "vertical dimension."
In practice, getting the enterprise purpose statement right can make up for a host of missteps later
in the analysis or in the execution of a transformation plan. A strong, properly focused enterprise
purpose statement is even more pivotal when the enterprise is distributed organizationally,
geographically, or culturally. On the other hand, a poorly scoped enterprise purpose statement
that fails the three tests of attainability, completeness, and consistency will wreak havoc on even
the best functioning teams with all of the appropriate tools. Research by Katz suggests that one
of the most critical factors to a team's success is having a common definition of the problem they
are supposed to be solving. [19] In essence, a good enterprise purpose statement is just that-a
definitive response to the all too frequently asked question of "Why are we here again?"
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The Enterprise Purpose Statement Form
Advancing a formal method of writing an enterprise purpose statement helps capture all of the
above considerations in a consistent manner that addresses the primary evaluation criteria of
attainability, completeness, and consistency. Figure 4-2 captures the major elements of a system
purpose statement as advanced by Crawley and adapted to the enterprise purpose statement.
Figure 4-2. Enterprise Purpose Statement Form.
It should be noted up front that the entire enterprise purpose statement outlined above cannot
actually be written down until the enterprise has been architected. At a minimum, the enterprise
intent must be specified based on the enterprise stakeholder inputs. It may also be possible to list
the major constraints or other important goals the enterprise must address in the course of
parsing the purpose statement. A formulation of the function and form of the enterprise is
actually the point of conducting the analysis that follows. The tendency is to postulate the
function and form up front in the analysis, but this defeats the entire purpose of what follows. It
is far more effective to leave these as open as possible at the initial phase of the analysis and to
iterate through the entire methodology until convergence results across all four dimensions of the
purpose statement. Once again, the importance of placing the enterprise within the appropriate
context boundaries to get a solid grasp of the enterprise scope is emphasized. Without a good
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position from which to start, achieving convergence on the enterprise purpose statement across
the stakeholder community will require more iterations than time or money will allow. If done
correctly, good convergence should result after just two or three passes through the analysis
framework. A deeper domain knowledge and/or a stronger feedback loop with the enterprise
stakeholders could reduce the iteration count further. Figure 4-4 provides an example of the
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Figure 4-3. Example Set of Analysis Iterations with Inputs and Outputs Identified.
Note that in the case of the initial stakeholder analysis, there are also internal iterations within
that portion of the analysis to achieve the outputs specified for the overall iteration. This will be
developed more fully in the next section.
As a tool to help assess and evaluate the extent to which the enterprise purpose statement fulfills
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Figure 4-4. Enterprise Purpose Statement Verification and Validation Model.
Given the current state of the research, conducting a full validation assessment is not possible
beyond a mental walk through of the results since the area of building and implementing
executable models of enterprise architectures is still in development. If the process outlined
above is followed, the enterprise purpose statement should at a minimum comply with the events
around the verification loop.
Summary on Enterprise Purpose Statements
In conclusion, Crawley provides several general guidelines to help formulate better purpose
statements. These recommendations include the following:
- Challenge, expand, contract and think creatively about enterprise purpose statements
- State enterprise purpose statements in need-goal-function format
- State enterprise purpose statements clearly, concisely, in solution neutral form, and
aligned with human problem solving strategies
- Capture intent, so people understand why
- Define the enterprise boundary consistent with the enterprise purpose statement
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Consistently applying the framework developed in the previous discussion, coupled with a
dogged determination to get this portion of the analysis correct, will pay dividends time-and-
again as the effort advances.
Conducting Stakeholder Analyses
An important aspect to account for in a methodology development effort attempting to put
structure into an inherently soft and fluid context such as defining enterprise purpose and
stakeholders is the need for a flexible approach. This comes to the forefront when the interaction
between the enterprise purpose statement and stakeholder analysis are considered. Because these
two aspects of the enterprise are so tightly coupled, they need to be pursued in tandem, not in a
serial process. Unfortunately, the limitations of the written word require them to be presented in
a sequential manner. Ideally, the enterprise purpose and stakeholder analysis begin as parallel
efforts with some initial understanding of both to help converge on an appropriate scope and
bound to both issues. With the enterprise purpose statement framework in place, the stakeholder
analysis methodology is now addressed.
Defining Stakeholder Saliency
To understand and assess the stakeholders associated with an enterprise, it is helpful to employ a
methodology that allows for a consistent categorization and treatment of various kinds of
stakeholders as it relates to their ability to influence or control enterprise activities. The model
that will be used in this report will be one developed by Ignacio Grossi in his 2003 thesis entitled
"Stakeholder Analysis in the Context of the Lean Enterprise." [8] In particular, the stakeholder
salience model that Grossi developed (an extension of the model presented by Mitchell, Agle,
and Wood [80]) will be used to assess the relative ordering and ranking of stakeholders as they
relate to the airspace integration framework (See Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5. Stakeholder Identification and Salience Framework.
Grossi makes use of the stakeholder model developed by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood that ascribes
the dimensions of power, legitimacy, and criticality to the stakeholder analysis space. The
interactions between these three dimensions are depicted in Figure 4-5. The following excerpt
from Grossi provides additional clarification on what is meant by each of these terms:
"A stakeholder demonstrates power in its relationship with an enterprise when it has or can
gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or symbolic means to impose its will (or the will of
others) in the relationship. Coercive power is that related with the use of physical resources
of force, violence, or restraint. Utilitarian power is that based on the exchange of material
or financial resources. Symbolic power is that based on symbolic resources - normative
symbols, like prestige and esteem; and social symbols, like love and acceptance."
"Legitimacy is defined as 'a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
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norms, values, beliefs, and definitions' (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997; cf. Suchman,
1995). Legitimacy and power can exist independently or can be combined to create
authority (power that is attached to a position that others perceive as legitimate)."
"Urgency, according to Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, is the necessary attribute to provide
their stakeholder identification model with dynamic characteristics. Urgency exists when
two conditions are met: (1) when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and
(2) when that relationship or claim is important or critical to the stakeholder operations
and/or strategies. Instead, we prefer to identify this urgency attribute as criticality since this
term involves both urgency (time sensitivity) and importance sub-attributes. In this way,
some claim that is perceived as important but still not urgent can be considered as relevant,
and vice versa. This distinction will allow us, for example, to identify and incorporate
stakeholders with whom an enterprise defines long-term strategic issues (e.g. strategic
alliances) that are of keen importance to the entire enterprise system."
"Any of the attributes of power, legitimacy, and criticality are dynamic in nature, each one
constituting a variable that can adopt different values according to the environment and the
particular circumstances an enterprise is traversing. Also, all these attributes are socially
constructed, not objective reality - meaning that they are subject to multiple and different
perceptions. Moreover, the actual presence of one or more of the attributes does not mean
either that the stakeholder or the managers are conscious of the level of those attributes, or
that they are willing to act on the inferences that are possibly made from them." [8]
This model provides a detailed approach for identifying and categorizing each enterprise
stakeholder. The task now moves to the need to indentify who these stakeholders are that need
to be classified.
Identifying Stakeholders
Grossi presents a stakeholder identification model in his work that is illustrated in Figure 4-6. [8]
Notice that the entry point for this model is the identification of the "enterprise system level
value" definition. For the purposes of this analysis, this block is the enterprise purpose statement
from the previous section.
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Figure 4-6. Stakeholder Identification Methodology.
The only modification to the Grossi model that should be made is an additional check beyond
just the "focal organization" to include a re-assessment of the enterprise purpose statement as
previously described. In this way, the stakeholder and enterprise purpose statement can be
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rapidly iterated to achieve the desired convergence between the enterprise purpose statement and
the stakeholders considered internal to the enterprise.
Once the enterprise stakeholder set is fully enumerated, the saliency of each stakeholder must be
assessed. To accomplish this stakeholder evaluation, Grossi developed a detailed set of
considerations to help quantify each stakeholder's score on the power, legitimacy and criticality
scale. Appendix C provides the detailed assessment criteria for completing the saliency index
score for each stakeholder. Table 4-1 provides a template for recording and tabulating the results
of this analysis. Depending on the size of the potential enterprise stakeholder pool, an initial
qualitative screening may be appropriate to bound the problem to a reasonable number of








Table 4-1. Stakeholder Saliency Evaluation.
The enterprise stakeholders are categorized and ranked based on their saliency index. This
provides a powerful tool for rigorously identifying which stakeholders are the most important
within an enterprise context. It also provides a way to interface a large pool of enterprise
stakeholders to the methodology used by Ross in the MATE value elicitation process. [9] The
current MATE arrangement implements the construct depicted in Figure 4-7. By focusing on a
narrower subset of the most important stakeholders in an enterprise, characterized by Ross as
"decision makers", the analysis focuses on those stakeholders with the highest saliency to
enterprise success. Extending the MATE approach to a larger number of stakeholders is an area
of active research.
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Figure 4-7. MATE Decision Maker Role Hierarchy.
Ross provides the following description of the decision maker categories depicted in Figure 4-7:
"Level 0 decision makers are classified as External Stakeholders. These stakeholders have
little stake in the system and typically have control over policies or budgets that affect
many systems. An example of an External Stakeholder for a space system is Congress or
the American people."
"Level 1 decision makers include the Firm and the Customer. The Firm role includes those
who have organizational stakes in the project and manage the Designers. This decision
maker may have stakes in multiple projects, but has specific preferences for the
system in question. An example of a Firm is an aerospace company. The Customer role
includes those who control the money for financing the project. According to (Martin
1997) [81], the Customer 'is an individual or organization that (1) commission the
engineering of a system, or (2) is a prospective purchaser of an end product.' This decision
maker typically contracts to the Firm in order to build the system and provides
requirements to the Designer."
"Level 2 decision makers include the Designer and the User. The User role has direct
preferences for the system and typically is the originator of need for the system. (Need can
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originate within an organization, such as the Firm, as well)... An example of a User is a
scientist or warfighter. The Customer typically has preferences that balance product
performance meeting User needs, cost of the system, and political considerations. The
Designer role has direct interaction with the creation of the system and tries to create a
product that meets the preferences of the Firm, Customer, and User roles. An example of a
Designer is the system engineer within the aerospace company building the system. The
arrows in the figure [Figure 4-7] depict the predominate direction of information flow,
though some reverse flow does occur (requirements push-back, for instance)."
With the joining of methodologies from Grossi and Ross, a robust framework for a large number
of enterprise stakeholders can be assessed in a straightforward fashion and then the most
important stakeholders in the enterprise (referred to hereafter as simply "decision makers) can be
matched to the Ross model. This opens the door for direct use of the extended work already
available in structuring the value elicitation and attribute definitions from the enterprise decision
makers.
Building the Value Structure
With a clear understanding of the enterprise purpose and decision makers resulting from an
initial iteration through the above-described process, construction of the value structure is
possible through a structured data collection process. As mentioned previously, the term 'value
structure' as used in this research refers to the value definition, attributes, metrics, and ranges the
enterprise decision makers consider in their evaluation of "success". Books have been written on
the nuances of eliciting individual value definitions. Even a cursory treatment of the social
sciences literature on this is well beyond the scope of the current effort. The bottom line is the
need for an approach that is implementable. As alluded to in the previous section, MATE
provides that framework for this research.
A detailed, step-by-step approach for constructing the enterprise value structure can be found by
referring to Appendix A of Ross's 2003 master's thesis. [9] For the sake of brevity, the outline
of the MATE value elicitation approach is provided below.
1. Identify Need
2. Define Mission
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3. Define Scope
4. Identify All Relevant Decision Makers
5. Identify Constraints
6. Propose Attribute Definitions (User, Customer, Firm)
7. Nail Down Attribute Definitions (User, Customer, Firm)
Note that the MATE framework extends fully into the analytical model space for the design of
technical systems. These additional steps are not included in the above list. In the case of the
enterprise architecting challenge, executable models are not currently available, so this portion of
the MATE framework is not used in the approach implemented in this research.
The specifics of the MATE value elicitation methodology provide the basis on which to structure
the data collection effort. This is important because without a framework for exploring
enterprise decision maker value space, the individual attempting to arrive at an understanding of
the decision maker value definition can quickly become overwhelmed with data that may or may
not be suitable for a value assessment. Using a semi-structured interview process that takes the
MATE framework and contextualizes the questions being asked of the decision makers, a
specific set of questions can be generated that can help focus the data collection effort and peel
back the information layers to reveal the core value definitions of a decision maker. Further
observations with respect to the data collection aspects of the methodology are addressed in
Chapter 8.
Chapter 4 Summary
Starting down the value creation path involves a highly coupled assessment between the
enterprise purpose and the enterprise stakeholders. In order to converge on the appropriate
enterprise purpose statement and stakeholders, these two efforts must be undertaken together and
then iterated to ensure they produce a clearly defined enterprise intent and set of decision
makers. To ensure sound enterprise purpose statements result, an approach is adapted from
Crawley to structure and assess enterprise purpose statements. Grossi's approach to determining
stakeholder saliency is used to bring order to potentially large enterprise stakeholder pools, and
then connected to the approach advanced by Ross using the MATE methodology. The value
structure is elucidated by implementing the front end of the MATE process.
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CHAPTER 5 - ASSESSING ENTERPRISE VALUE ALIGNMENT
"You can't push on a rope."
-Persian Proverb
With a clear understanding of the individual enterprise decision maker value definitions resulting
from the process described in Chapter 4, the challenge moves to understanding how these values
are either aligned or misaligned within the enterprise. An enterprise with misaligned values is an
enterprise trying to "push on a rope"-a whole lot of energy can be expended by the individual
decision makers with no apparent result at the enterprise level.
This chapter provides an overview of the process used for assessing the degree of enterprise
decision maker value alignment, correcting misalignments, and using metrics to understand and
drive enterprise behavior. This portion of the analysis provides critical insights for what follows
in Chapter 6, and the information gleaned in this portion of the analysis is used directly in the
enterprise architecting effort that follows. Without an understanding of how the enterprise value
structures between decision makers are aligned, it is difficult, if not outright impossible, to
construct enterprise architectures that have any significant hope of creating lasting enterprise
value.
A Lean Perspective on Flowing Value
One way to think through the enterprise value alignment challenge is to treat value as a quantity
that should 'flow' through the various decision maker organizations. Womack and Jones [82] as
well as Murman et al. [6] discuss the idea of value flowing continuously through an organization.
They describe the idea of "value streams" within an enterprise and highlight the importance of
eliminating waste through the use of value stream maps. Womack and Jones describe a value
stream map in the following way:
"A value stream map identifies every action required to design, order, and make a specific
product. The actions are sorted into three categories: (1) those that actually create value as
perceived by the customer; (2) those which create no value but are currently required by the
product development, order filling, or production systems; and (3) those actions which
don't create value as perceived by the customer and can be eliminated immediately."
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"Make Value Flow Continuously. Once the third type of wasteful actions along the value
stream have been eliminated to the maximum extent possible, the way is clear to go to
work on the remaining, non-value-creating steps through the use of flow, pull, and
perfection techniques."
The value-creation framework described in Chapter 3 is designed expressly for creating this
value flow in an organization. As Murman et al. point out in LEV, "...mapping the value stream
is not the complete story in value creation. Focusing value stream mapping on one process area
or program rather than at the enterprise level can lead to optimization of a part at the expense of
the whole." Specifically, the value definitions between decision makers may be such that what is
classified as "waste" by one decision maker in the process may be adding value from another's
perspective--one man's junk may potentially be another man's treasure. Indiscriminate waste
elimination at the local process level may result in a local improvement that actually reduces the
overall value flow in the enterprise as a whole. An approach is needed for understanding the
enterprise objectives, values, attributes and metrics in a way that provides for an assessment of
the extent to which decision makers' views of value align.
Using the X-Matrix to Assess and Create Value Alignment
The tool of choice used in the methodology presented in this research is an adaptation of the "X-
matrix". The X-matrix is a tool developed by Stanke and Nightingale to aid in conducting value
stream mapping exercises described in the previous section. [10] Essentially, the X-matrix
provides a way of assessing the degree of correlation between an enterprise's strategic
objectives, values, attributes 3 and metrics. Essentially, the X-matrix is a sequence of Quality
Functional Deployment Matrices connected together where the value of a cell is determined by
the overall degree of correlation that exists between the two variables that meet in that cell.
Figure 5-1 provides an example of the X-matrix structure. The primary axes lay out the principle
elements of the enterprise value structure. The boxes between the axes are coded white, yellow
and blue to depict the qualitative assessment of the strength of the correlation between the two
variables that meet in that square. For instance, the box that maps "Strategic Objective 1" to
3 For this analysis, the original X-matrix dimension of "processes" as described by Stanke and Nightingale has been
replaced with "attributes".
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"Value 1" is coded blue in Figure 5-1. This means an assessment was made between the
enterprise strategic objective and the value under consideration, and a high degree of correlation
is believed to exist between that value and the extent to which the enterprise successfully meets
that strategic objective. Correspondingly, a yellow box indicates a weak correlation, and a white
box no correlation.
Figure 5-1. X-matrix Structure.
It is important to point out for the purposes of the analysis that the entries made to the X-matrix
should be those assessed as primary drivers for each of the enterprise stakeholders. In other
words, they represent a "superset" of the objectives, values, attributes and metrics for the entire
enterprise. If there is some doubt as to the importance of a particular variable, include it in the
analysis.
Practically speaking, the X-matrix is used in several different ways to evaluate enterprise value
alignment. For the analysis in this research, the following convention is observed. The analysis
starts by examining the value structure data elicited as part of the activities described in Chapter
4 and pulling out the primary enterprise purpose and/or goals as they are identified in the
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enterprise purpose statement and enumerating them on the top, vertical axis. These should
represent what the enterprise values should be based on the data collection effort, not what they
might be currently within the organization. Next, the values articulated by the enterprise
decision makers are listed on the right, horizontal axis of the matrix. Once again, these should be
derived directly from interview data. Right or wrong, these are the values each decision maker
indicated as primary in their assessment of what they care about in the enterprise outcomes. The
attributes follow on the lower, vertical axis, and they should correspond directly to the things
each decision maker indicated as a means by which they assessed the degree of value delivery
previously articulated. Again, these attributes should flow directly from the data elicited during
value interviews with the decision maker. The final axis on the left, horizontal axis contains the
metrics used for measuring the extent to which the attributes are present in the enterprise. To the
extent possible, these should also conform as closely as possible to those provided by the
decision makers.
Once this initial pass is made through the data, a review is warranted. Focus attention on the
consistency of the metrics used to evaluate the presence of one or more attributes in the
enterprise. Because all of these entries are the result of individual decision maker preferences,
there is a high possibility (especially in enterprises with diverse decision makers) that two or
more of the metrics collide. It is also probable that before the data elicitation interview, the
decision maker did not consciously considered the metrics in use within the enterprise. As a
result, metrics may not exist or be very casual in their relationship to the attributes and strategic
objectives.
As a result of metrics often being overlooked or poorly engineered for the desired behavior or
output of the enterprise, the enterprise architect will often need to harmonize the metric inputs.
When the harmonization results in a change in a metric, there should be a strong feedback loop
with the impacted decision maker to ensure the change is acceptable. The problem becomes
more challenging if there are contradictory attributes or values. If this occurs, the enterprise
architect should consider how the enterprise scope or boundary can expand or contract in a way
that would allow a resolution of the apparent contradiction. Regardless, a change in either the
attribute or value definitions will require detailed and explicit discussion with the affected
decision maker since the architect does not "own" these quantities.
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Resolution of any potential disconnects between decision maker specified value structures
provides the opportunity to flow value in the enterprise. Without this resolution, creating
enterprise-wide value will be extremely difficult if not outright impossible. Each of the four axes
on the X-matrix represents what "should be" if the enterprise is to successfully flow value. The
extent to which value flows is tied to the correlation information for the "As-Is" state of the
enterprise. For value alignment to occur, there should be at least one or more paths around the
entire sequence of objective - value - attribute - metric axes that is strongly correlated. If this
strongly correlated path does not exist, the value flow through the enterprise will be weak at best,
and non-existent at worst. In this way, the value structure of the enterprise is established in the
"horizontal dimension" much as the enterprise purpose statement ensures value is aligned
vertically.
The creation of the "As-Is" X-matrix provides a very simple visual for understanding what is
typically a complex set of interactions between each aspect of the value structure within an
enterprise and between decision makers. By implementing the desired set of inputs to each of
the four X-matrix axes, the architect can rapidly identify those aspects of the enterprise that need
focused attention versus those that appear to working. The assumption made at this point is that
the existing condition of the enterprise is a result of its current architecture. To create an aligned
enterprise that will flow value across the decision makers, the enterprise will need to be
architected in a way that addresses the shortfalls and continues to emphasize the strengths of the
current enterprise architecture. The mechanics of how this is accomplished is in the next
chapter.
As an aside, for those instances in which an existing enterprise is being examined to try to
improve operations that are already on-going (vice standing up a 'clean slate' enterprise), the
Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA) methodology put forward by Stanke
and Nightingale should be used to understand and evaluate the existing enterprise value state.
[10] Once a clear picture of the existing enterprise value stream is laid out, much of the upfront
work with enterprise purpose and stakeholder analysis will be addressed, and the assessment can
pick up at the value alignment step detailed here.
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Driving Value Alignment with Metrics
Metrics are critically important in driving value in an enterprise. The choice of enterprise
metrics will completely dominate many other decisions made further upstream in the value
context. Metrics provide the most basic mechanism for evaluating enterprise value delivery.
They represent the day-to-day encounter of measured value. As important as metrics are in
driving enterprise behavior, a brief aside on how to use metrics to align enterprise value is in
order.
In one sense, you can think of the attribute-metrics pair as analogous to the carrot-and-stick
approach if the metrics are not carefully thought out and implemented. The attributes the
enterprise desires as characteristics of the value definition provide the positive motivation for
expending the energy needed to secure them. On the other hand, the metrics that are employed
for measuring those attributes become the ruler by which people are measured, and because the
metrics tend to be much more concrete than attributes, human behavior will naturally default to
optimizing on what is measured, not necessarily on the intended attribute the metric is supposed
to measure. Modifying a now well known adage, Lou Gerstner, former CEO of IBM responded
to a question about major drivers in enterprise change by saying, "People don't do what you
expect, they do what you inspect." [83]
In practice, selecting good metrics for an enterprise can be extremely difficult. To aid in this
task, the Goal-Question-Metric approach is presented as a method that is consistent with the
value-focused perspective taken in the methodology for this research. According to Basili et al.
[84], the method can be described as follows:
"The Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach is based upon the assumption that for an
organization to measure in a purposeful way it must first specify the goals for itself and its
projects, then it must trace those goals to the data that are intended to define those goals
operationally, and finally provide a framework for interpreting the data with respect to the
stated goals. Thus it is important to make clear, at least in general terms, what
informational needs the organization has, so that these needs for information can be
quantified whenever possible, and the quantified information can be analyzed as to whether
or not the goals are achieved."
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Table 5-1 provides an example of how the Goal-Question-Metric approach is implemented in a
situation in which the enterprise desires to see better timeliness in their change request
processing. Notice this model fits nicely in the value-focused approach by substituting "goal"
for "values", "question" for "attributes", and "metrics" are common to both frameworks. For
additional details on implementing the GQM approach see reference [84].
Goal Purpose Improve
Issue the timeliness of
Object (process) change request processing
Viewpoint from the project manager's viewpoint
Question What is the current change request processing
speed?
Metrics Average cycle time
Standard deviation
% cases outside of the upper limit
Question Is the performance of the process improving?
Metrics Current average cycle time * 100
Baseline average cycle time
Subjective rating of manager's satisfaction
Table 5-1. Example of Goal-Question-Metric Methodology.
Tying the GQM approach directly to the research at hand, consider the development of the
metrics associated with the attribute of "Meets Safety Thresholds" introduced in the X-matrix
shown in Chapter 9 for the UAS airspace integration enterprise. Using the GQM approach, the




Viewpoint From the FAA's viewpoint
Question How is the current threshold measured?
Metric # of accidents per flight hour
Question What would provide a leading indicator for how safe
operations are before there is an accident?
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Metric # of deviations from Air Traffic Control Directions
# of exceptions to standard aircraft performance
requirements
In the above example, the goal of the effort was to meet a given threshold safety level. To
accomplish this objective, the manner in which the threshold is established had to be determined
(# of accidents per flight hour) and then the question of how we could measure safety without
having an accident (a leading indicator) was asked with the resulting metrics of # of deviations
from ATC direction and # of exceptions to standard aircraft performance requirements. These
metrics are now directly tied to the attribute they are intended to measure in a concrete and
systematic manner.
McGarry et al. provide additional practical guidance from the software community on
implementing an effective measurement framework. [85] They provide the following
measurement principles that should be considered when implementing metrics efforts:
- Use Information Needs and Objectives to Drive the Measurement Requirements
- Define and Collect Measures Based on the Technical and Management Processes
- Collect and Analyze Data at a Level of Detail Sufficient to Identify and Isolate Problems
- Implement an Independent Analysis Capability
- Use a Systematic Analysis Process to Trace the Measures to the Decisions
- Interpret the Measurement Results in the Context of Other Project Information
- Integrate Measurement into the Project Management Process Throughout the Life Cycle
- Use the Measurement Process as a Basis for Objective Communications
- Focus Initially on Project-Level Analysis
McGarry et al. call their approach the Practical Software Measurement or PSM framework for
establishing an effective measurement system. Figure 5-2 (adapted from McGarry et al. 2002)
provides an overview of the overarching PSM framework.
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Figure 5-2. PSM Measurement Activity Framework.
In the above construct, the "Technical and Management Processes" loop represents the external
framework in which the measurement is conducted and it provides the context for what the GQM
approach called the "Goal". In the PSM framework, this gives rise to specific "Information
Needs" that the "Measurement Process" elements are attempting to respond to. Within the
"Scope of PSM" dashed line, the actual measurement process takes place. To be effective,
leadership needs to understand the value and contributions a good measurement process can
provide to the enterprise, hence the "Establish and Sustain Commitment" block as an input to the
"Core Measurement Process". Within the "Core Measurement Process", an iterative loop is set
up between the "Plan Measurement" activity and the "Perform Measurement" activity. This
feedback is intended to communicate what needs to be measured and why in the forward
direction, and what the problems or insights were in performing the measurement in the return
direction. Once both of these activities are accomplished, the results of the effort need to be
evaluated in light of their impact on the information needs driving the measurement process in
the first place, and on the measurement plan to address any shortfalls the analysis of the
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measures may indicate. The iterative nature of the process with regular feedback from the
information need user provides an effective and targeted process for implementing a solid
measurement approach.
The important take away from this general discussion on metrics and measurement processes is
the need to start with a desired end-state in mind. In the case of both the GQM and PSM
methods, a significant amount of effort is invested up front to understand the context and the
desired result before attempting to implement a measurement system. In this methodology, the
work that has gone into the identification and creation of the enterprise value structure serves the
same purpose. Within the approach developed in this research, these goals (GQM) or
information needs (PSM) are defined as the enterprise value definitions. The subsequent
questions that are asked of these values are 1) How does the decision maker characterize the
delivery of value? and 2) How does the decision maker know how much value is being
delivered? These correspond to the attributes and metrics needed for a complete value structure
to be built for the enterprise.
Chapter 5 Summary
Value flow through an organization is a direct function of how well the enterprise is aligned.
Alignment is needed in terms of the actual attributes used by enterprise decision makers as well
as the alignment between enterprise attributes and metrics used to assess value delivery. The X-
matrix provides a useful tool for evaluating the existing state of alignment within an enterprise as
well as a powerful mechanism for understanding how to restructure specific aspects of the
enterprise objectives, values, attributes or metrics that do not align. Metrics themselves play an
integral role in driving enterprise behavior and should be carefully constructed to ensure the
desired enterprise behavior is inculcated into enterprise operations minimizing unintended
consequences.
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CHAPTER 6 - CREATING AND SELECTING ENTERPRISE VALUE
PROPOSITIONS
"Ideas are like rabbits. You get a couple and learn how to handle them,
and pretty soon you have a dozen."
-John Steinbeck
This chapter lays out the core elements for creating value propositions. As Steinbeck suggests in
the above quote, once a couple of ideas are understood and some experience in applying them is
obtained, the possibilities for how they might be adapted or modified for other uses begins to
multiply rapidly. In a sense, this is the hope for the methodology that follows. A working level
knowledge of frameworks and tools provides insight into applications beyond those in which the
knowledge was gained or the framework was first used.
This chapter describes the use of enterprise architecting (EA), object process methodology
(OPM), and the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) to rigorously define, develop
and rate alternative enterprise architectures. The discussion begins with a description of the
challenges associated with conducting full tradespace exploration activities and the impact this
has on the value proposition phase. This is followed by a discussion of how value propositions
explicitly and rigorously connect between the enterprise purpose statement, the desired attributes
and the concrete mechanisms by which the desired attributes can be delivered. The chapter
concludes by presenting a framework by which to evaluate alternatives using a value-focused
methodology to select the options with the highest level of value delivery to the enterprise.
As a reference point in the discussion, recall that Chapters 4 and 5 cover the subject of value
identification. Figure 6-1 reproduces the overarching framework employed in the methodology
development. With the conclusion of Chapter 5, the Value Identification phase is fully
developed, and the discussion moves into the value proposition phase.
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Figure 6-1. Methodology Roadmap.
The shift in phase between value identification and value proposition is an important one in the
value-creation framework. The value identification work is oriented around largely known
values (at least once the major enterprise decision makers have been identified), and the
difficulty lies in scoping and aligning the enterprise value structure to flow value. This requires
insight on the part of the architect. In the value proposition phase, the challenge is significantly
different. In this phase, the task-at-hand is a methodical and structured approach to creating
potential value propositions that could create more favorable value exchanges between the
enterprise decision makers-and having some confidence that once the job is "finished" the
approach didn't leave out better alternatives to the one that was selected. This requires creativity
executed in a systematic fashion. It is this "systematic creativity" exercise that is captured in the
idea of "tradespace exploration". This concept lies at the heart of this research approach by
applying enterprise architecting techniques as a way of fully exploring the possible tradespace
options and implementing it through OPM to explicitly capture and systematically structure the
interactions between various components.
Understanding and Bounding the Tradespace Challenge
A major issue in the pursuit of alternative architectures is the ability to generate a wide variety of
architectures that will span the full space of viable alternatives, ensuring that significant portions
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of the tradespace are not left unexplored. At the same time, the sheer number of alternatives and
complexity of managing them must be addressed to keep the architect from drowning in the
volume of information that could result from a totally exhaustive search process.
To appreciate how quickly this type of analysis can blow up computationally, one has only to
consider the growth in the possible number of combinations that would result if there were a jar
of marbles and a jar of jacks. For the sake of the analogy, consider the various enterprise
architecting views as the marbles. That puts eight different and unique marbles in the jar. Think
of the jacks as the number of unique attributes the enterprise value is measured against. For the
sake of argument, assume there are five unique attributes. For simplicity, assume that each
enterprise architecting view connects an average of three different attributes. That means each
individual view will have a potential number of different attribute combinations of 10 (See
Equation 6-1) assuming that the order in which the attributes relate to the enterprise architecting
view is not important.
= n! 51 5! 5X4
b i-nomiC co efficient = _ _ - - = -_ = 10bnomal coeficient ! (n - m) 3! (5 - 3)! 3! 2! 2 x 1
where n = number of elements in the set
m = number of elements chosen
Equation 6-1. Binomial Coefficient Equation.
Summing this up over the entire eight views yields a potential number of 80 different
combinations. While this is a fair number of alternatives to examine, it is not an unreasonable
number. Unfortunately, there is a third jar to consider, the mechanisms by which the attributes
are delivered. Again, for simplicity, assume that each attribute has an average of 5 different
mechanisms used to arrive at the desired attribute, and again, an average of 3 mechanisms will be
chosen to generate the desired attribute. This means that each attribute has a total number of
potential combinations of 10 as well. Taking the number of views, the average number of
attributes, and the average number of mechanisms into account to provide for a full architectural
description of the possible value propositions results in a total number of unique architectures of
8 x 10 x 10 or 800 architectures.
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The above example assumes the enterprise architecture views themselves remain constant. In
fact, this is an overly simplistic view, and the views themselves should also be considered in the
mix, in which case the total number of alternatives quickly reaches into the 10's of thousands of
potential combinations. The generalized equation for the total number of potential combinations
is provided in Equation 6-2.
# of Total Possible Architectures =
(# of views) X (# of attributes) X (# of mechaniss) =
X, X Xma! (na -ma) ! m! (np - ,)!
Where Xv = Number of Views
na = Total Number of Attributes
ma = Average Number of Attributes per View
n, = Total Number of Mechanisms (or Points of Leverage)
mp = Average Number of Mechanisms (or Points of Leverage) per Attribute
Equation 6-2. Generalized Equation for Computing Number of Architectures.
In the case where there are 7 views, 9 attributes, and 9 potential mechanisms (as Section III
enumerates, this is the condition for the UAS AI enterprise) in which no a priori judgments are
made concerning the potential number of view-to-attribute and attribute-to-mechanism
connections, the total number of possible combinations is 9.22x1011 . If the total number of
average connections between views & attributes and attributes & mechanisms is restricted to
three, the total number of possible combinations falls to 49,392.
Clearly an approach is required that will provide a method for ensuring the full scope of possible
designs is considered without having to fully enumerate the entire population of possible
combinations. The method developed for this analysis attempts to balance the competing
demands of completeness versus time and resources by using a Quality Functional Deployment
(QFD) approach for assessing the most important enterprise architecting views with respect to
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the desired attributes, only expanding the tradespace in those views that have the highest degree
of relevance to attribute delivery.
The QFD approach provides a convenient method for systematically applying subjective criteria
to a ranking or ordering problem. In this case, the intent is to determine how important each
enterprise architecture view is with respect to delivering the desired value attributes articulated
by the enterprise decision makers. A template for this analysis is provided in Figure 6-2. The
methodology for thinking through the QFD scoring is very similar to that already described for
the X-matrix. In this case, the interaction between the enterprise view running down the left-
hand column and the attribute running across the top column is scored a 9, 3, 1, or 0 to indicate
the importance of that view's contributions to the delivery of the attribute. A strong interaction
is scored a 9, and moderate interaction a 3, a weak interaction a 1, and no interaction a 0. Each
attribute-view interaction is scored independently and the totals summed across the row for the
views and the columns for the attributes. A comparison of the total scores for the views provides
insight into which views are likely the most important to consider for the enterprise in question.
The scores for the attributes provide insight into how well each attribute is represented.
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Figure 6-2. Attribute-to-Enterprise View Mapping (QFD) Matrix.
From the example in Figure 6-2, the QFD analysis suggests the most important views to consider
in some depth are the Policy, Process and Product views. More insight from the value elicitation
data is needed to conclusively treat the others as more or less constants for the enterprise
architecting challenge, but the QFD analysis provides a solid point of departure for down-
scoping the tradespace analysis to a manageable size.
Tying Architecture Development to Value Definition
The underlying premise in the methodology is to filter out alternative architectures that do not
provide a value exchange proposition before they are even considered. The way this is
accomplished is by using the value attributes themselves as the objectives the architecture must
enable. For this to be effective in "weeding out" architectures that do not provide the necessary
value exchange to the enterprise, a rigorous implementation approach is needed to connect the
enterprise purpose, attributes, and structure to flow value from start-to-finish.
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Combining the information derived from the X-matrix and the QFD analysis just discussed for
the enterprise views, the structure for such an analysis begins to emerge. The X-matrix provides
the means for ensuring alignment between the enterprise objectives, values and attributes.
Presumably, a well-aligned X-matrix means that the ability to produce the desired attributes will
result in the enterprise defining the activity as "value added" in the course of execution. The
QFD analysis of the enterprise views against these same attributes provides the connection
between the type of actions that can be taken (the views) with the desired attributes.
The merging of these two perspectives into a single, end-to-end, integrated model that rigorously
preserves these interactions should result in an enterprise architecture that by definition produces
a viable value proposition. The methodology employed in this research for combining and
extending the information gleaned from the X-matrix and the QFD analysis is the Object Process
Methodology (OPM) developed by Dori [12] and adapted by Crawley for the purpose of systems
architecting [13]. This approach is detailed in the next section.
The geometrical growth in numbers underpins the entire remainder of the analysis that follows.
The full combinatorial analysis would have to be undertaken if the assumption that the value
proposition can be down scoped is rejected. The methodology described in the next section is
certainly robust enough to handle this full expansion; however, without a way to automate the
analysis with modeling or other automated tools, this level of analysis is impractical. This is
where reality meets theory. The OPM development in the next section will be for the general
case, but the scoping method employing the QFD approach is used in practice to reduce the
problem set to something manageable.
Putting Rigor into Enterprise Architecture Development
With the foregoing discussion as preamble, the task of implementing the enterprise architecture
framework to generate alternative value propositions can now be addressed directly. This starts
with a simple extension to the enterprise architecture framework advanced by Nightingale and
Rhodes [11], and then dives into the specifics of implementing OPM for the approach to
generating alternative enterprise architectures (this research treats "alternative enterprise
architectures" and "alternative value propositions" as synonymous based on the value-creation
framework from LEV implemented at the outset of Section II).
Page 139
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
Adapting the Enterprise Architecting Framework
The first element in alternative architecture generation is to make a relatively straightforward
adaption to the enterprise architecting model developed by Nightingale and Rhodes that was
presented in Figure 3-7. The original model is extended one layer down to capture the key role
that context plays in the consideration of both the enterprise as a whole as well as the local
environment in which each of the various "views" operate. This extended model is illustrated in
Figure 6-3.
Figure 6-3. Adapted Enterprise Architecting Framework.
In this model, the "views" of strategy, policy, process, organization, knowledge, and
product/services arise out of the specific, local context in which they operate. Information
technology is shown "in-plane" with the context as a way of illustrating the critical role it tends
to play as an interface mechanism between the internal enterprise environment and what goes on
in the external context. Taken collectively, all the views together represent the sum total
"footprint" of the enterprise in the broader environment (the entire "blue" backplane). The
implication is that each view must be architected in such a way that it functions appropriately in
its local environment (the box around each view) while at the same time contributing the
necessary attributes needed for the proper functioning of the enterprise that it supports (the
portion represented by the blue backplane).
The enterprise architecting framework is used in two principal ways. The first is to provide a
systematic way of looking at alternative architectures to minimize the risk that important design
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factors are missed or not considered as the architecture is created. The second is to help manage
the complexity of the tradespace by providing a way of selecting the most critical elements of the
architecture that are driving the delivery of the enterprise attributes without having to go through
a full expansion of all of the views. This has already been fore shadowed with the discussion in
the previous two sections and the use of the QFD method to correlate views to attributes. This
second task is accomplished by taking the enterprise purpose statement and the X-matrix
information and explicitly drawing the relationships between the enterprise purpose, the
enterprise architecture views, and the desired enterprise attributes. This is accomplished using
object process methodology (OPM).
Object Process Methodology Development
Object process methodology (OPM) [12] is a system development methodology that integrates
many system attributes into a single model. It explicitly describes elements as objects, processes
or the links that interconnect them. It is especially useful for the enterprise architecting arena
because it provides a framework for rigorous qualitative system thinking, and possibly provides
an avenue to quantitative modeling and analysis. [13] The application of this methodology to the
alternative architecture development process provides a method for integrating the enterprise
purpose, architecture framework, and X-Matrix information into a single, cohesive approach.
The reader is referred to Dori's work as the definitive reference on describing the mechanics of
the methodology. [12] The approach taken in the development of the architecture generation
model is an adaptation of OPM articulated by Crawley as the fundamental language in which he
espouses the system architecting discipline. [13]
Short of a complete tutorial on OPM, the simplest approach is to present the general model and
then explain the principles used to construct it. Figure 6-4 illustrates the four-layer architecture
generation model developed for this analysis. The model is labeled on the top with the
equivalent terms used in this research. For comparison purposes, the OPM terminology is
provided along the bottom of the figure. To avoid confusion, the terminology introduced in this
research will continue to be used (vice that of Dori). The reader is encouraged to consult Dori
[12] for full development of OPM and to compare and contrast the application made in this
analysis with those presented by Dori.
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The first layer, the far left "stack" labeled "Enterprise Scope and Purpose" encapsulates the
overall enterprise purpose and scope by explicitly focusing the entire effort on the delivery of the
enterprise purpose statement and value definition with the scope of the enterprise activities
(recall, these were all developed under the "value identification" phase). The enterprise purpose
is further characterized with any critical attributes or constraints. Stack 1 one can be described
as the enterprise intent and scope communicated in OPM language.
The second layer, the "Enterprise Views" stack, is just that-the seven/eight "views" represented
by the enterprise architecting framework. Each view is connected to the enterprise purpose
through an interaction link. In the case of the example in Figure 6-4, these links are represented
as simple effect links, but specific data collected on the enterprise may allow these to be
specifically categorized to capture the context in which the enterprise purpose and enterprise
view are interacting. Note that in the Figure 6-4, the "Strategy", "Organization", "Knowledge",
and "Information Technology" boxes are grayed out. For illustration purposes, these correspond
to the views in the QFD analysis presented in the previous section that all had low attribute score
totals. "Policy", "Process", and "Product/Service" views were all scored highly on the QFD
assessment, so these views will be considered in the most detail as part as the analysis moves
forward. The other views will be set and recorded for the purpose of establishing a baseline
should it be determined later that one or more of these views should be included as the problem
is looped through subsequent iterations.
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Figure 6-4. Architecture Generation Model using Object Process Methodology.
Stack 3, "Value Attributes," is taken from the X-Matrix key attributes column, and "put into
action." In other words, the X-matrix describes "states" that characterize the enterprise. In the
architecture generation model described here, these states are transformed into processes with
verbs. The result of accomplishing these processes will be the desired state annotated in the X-
Matrix and explicitly defined by the OPM in the "Enterprise Scope and Purpose" objects and
processes.
Stack 4, "Points of Leverage", are the concrete mechanisms needed by the attribute processes in
order to enable their processes. They are classified as either agent objects involving human
interaction (connected with a filled black circle), or as instrument objects (connected with an
open circle). It is at this layer that the architect's creative task begins in earnest since this
represents the layer at which the previous work at the enterprise purpose and scope level, as well
as the X-Matrix information, more or less ends. The enterprise architect must apply the needed
domain expertise (or go out and solicit it) to begin to connect the means to the ends. How this is
accomplished in practice will become clearer with the application that follows in Section III. To
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design a next generation vehicle, and suppose that "Attribute 1" was a vehicle with high fuel
economy. If the enterprise view is defined as the "Product" view, a possible set of
"Mechanisms" that might enable the delivery of high fuel economy would be an efficient engine,
lighter body frame, or alternative power generation. If the view is switched to "Policy" then a
"Mechanism" might be regulations for higher average miles per gallon for the vehicle fleet.
As discussed previously, the number of different permutations goes up geometrically with each
additional layer in the architecture, hence the motivation for implementing an approach that
would help the architect scope the problem better on the front end. The "inactive" views can be
retired from active consideration with explicit documentation concerning the assumptions under
which they were moved out of the active design space so that if conditions change in the future,
these decisions on the applicability of any single view can be revisited and another assessment
done as to the relevance of the view under the new circumstances. This is what makes the use of
the QFD analysis described earlier such a convenient tool. It concisely sums up the overall
perspective of the architect with respect to the particular views dominating the tradespace, and
with some additional documentation, serves as a way to capture thoughts and perspectives on the
decisions about which views should be actively considered in the tradespace.
Two points should be made at this juncture. First, the decision as to which views play a driving
role in the enterprise architecture value delivery is still a subjective assessment. The intent with
coupling the QFD and OPM approaches is that it institutes a degree of structure and rigor into
the qualitative nature of the decision by providing a way for the architect to consistently
visualize and assess the importance of the interactions between the processes and the objects.
Ultimately, the interactions themselves are what the architect should be attempting to drive
through the design process. The OPM approach provides a rigorous approach for bringing these
interactions into the foreground and then characterizing them in a consistent language and
representation so the architect can do better than just go on his or her "gut" for what views are
important or which can be removed from active consideration.
The second point to make is that while certain views may be set aside as less dominant design
mechanisms within a given enterprise context, they still need to be architected with the other
active views. In other words, just because they are "grayed out" on the model does not mean the
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architect does not design them into the overall enterprise. It just means that a prescribed form
will be used in their implementation, or that they depend so much on one or more of the other
views for a particular case that there is really no point in independently trading that particular
view on its own.
The result of this exercise is the production of any number of specific "Mechanisms" to enable
the attribute processes. These "Mechanisms" become the building blocks of the enterprise
architect for crafting the details for how the architecture concept will translate the function
(attribute processes) into form (the supporting objects in Stack 4). This is at the heart of the
architect's responsibility. The advantage OPM provides is a structured way in which to generate
these alternative objects that puts the problem back into bounded rationality space. Without this
layering in the OPM approach, the complexity in both numbers and interactions would quickly
overwhelm even the most robust efforts at keeping everything straight.
The "Mechanisms" set of objects within the OPM structure also play a significant role in that
they end up defining the interface between the enterprise and the external environment.
According to Rechtin and Maier, "The greatest leverage in system4 architecting is at the
interfaces. The greatest dangers are also at the interfaces." [86] They go on to describe the
impact when the components (or in this case, the "mechanisms") are highly interdependent:
"When the components of a system are highly independent, operationally and
managerially, the architecture of the system is the interfaces. The architect is trying to
create emergent capability. The emergent capability is the whole point of the system; but,
the architect may only be able to influence the interfaces among the nearly independent
parts. The components are outside the scope and control of an architect of the whole."
This condition is a precise description of the enterprise architecting challenge and serves to
highlight why the OPM approach is so important. It is through this rigorous framework for
developing the architecture that the interactions mentioned in the above quote can be clearly, and
consistently, identified and "architected" to achieve the desired emergent behavior in the system.
4 For the purposes of this research, the same heuristic Rechtin and Maier apply to the 'system' problem can also be
applied to the 'enterprise' challenge.
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In addition, the problem can also be "farmed-out" to local expertise in a given domain for
additional insights, ideas, or brainstorming sessions to ensure the full space of alternative options
is adequately explored. By segmenting the problem down the dual lines of both the enterprise
architecture view and the attribute processes, others engaged in the process can be provided with
a clear context in which to generate inputs. It also provides a way to organize and interface
inputs back into the architecture from what could be largely disparate groups. The result of this
end-to-end alternative architecture development method should be a clear sense that the
tradespace of interest has been thoroughly saturated, and the architect can begin evaluating the
alternatives with a high degree of confidence that no stone was left unturned in the quest for the
best possible set of value propositions.
Once the "Point of Leverage" stack is declared "complete," the overall architecture can once
again be assessed, and the "Mechanisms" ranked with respect to how critical they are to one or
more attribute processes. The ATAM method described under the architecture selection
approach (see the next section in this chapter) takes this next step. The ATAM identifies what it
calls sensitivity and tradeoff points within an architecture [14]. The ATAM describes these as
follows:
"We term key architectural decisions sensitivity points and tradeoff points. A sensitivity
point is a property of one or more components (and/or component relationships) that is
critical for achieving a particular quality attribute response... Sensitivity points tell a
designer or analyst where to focus attention when trying to understand the achievement of a
quality goal. They serve as yellow flags: 'Use caution when changing this property of the
architecture'. Particular values of sensitivity points may become risks when realized in an
architecture... Sensitivity points use the language of the attribute characterizations."
"A tradeoffpoint is a property that affects more than one attribute and is a sensitivity point
for more than one attribute. For example, changing the level of encryption could have a
significant impact on both security and performance. Increasing the level of encryption
improves the predicted security but requires more processing time. If the processing of a
confidential message has a hard real-time latency requirement then the level of encryption
Page 146__~
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
could be a tradeoff point. Tradeoff points are the most critical decisions that one can make
in an architecture, which is why we focus on them so carefully."
The alternative architecture generation model provides a convenient method for the architect to
understand and identify which of the "Mechanisms" in a given alternative architecture are likely
to be sensitivity or tradeoff points based on what they are connected to and their relative
importance to an attribute process successfully delivering the desired characteristics. It is for this
reason this last column in the model is labeled "Points of Leverage". By consciously mixing and
matching enterprise views, attribute processes, and mechanisms together, the architect should
have a considerably wider degree of latitude in designing out damaging sensitivity or tradeoff
points and building on those that reinforce the desired enterprise performance or behavior. The
sensitivity and tradeoff points within a given architecture provide the basis on which to begin
building the transformation plan described in Chapter 7.
With the tools now in place, the enterprise architect is in a position to work with some
confidence toward the goal of fully expanding the potential value propositions that will provide
the required value delivery to the enterprise decision makers. The next issue addressed is the
means by which these alternatives are assessed and a specific enterprise architecture selected as
the best overall approach for value delivery.
Enterprise Architecture Selection Approach
The general approach applied to the development and implementation of an architecture
evaluation method is a model taken from the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM)
developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). [14] This framework provides a
straightforward approach for combining all of the key enterprise attribute characteristics,
architectural evaluation criteria, and risk assessments together in a single approach. The ATAM
provides an explicit method for directly tying the enterprise attributes to the architectural
evaluation criteria. This preserves the integrity of the value structure through the evaluation by
keeping the attributes of the desired value delivery at the forefront of the evaluator's mind when
scoring alternative architectures. In corresponding fashion, risk is defined as the overall
confidence of the evaluator in the ability of the architecture to deliver the level of attribute
performance specified.
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High-Priority Attribute-Specific Questions Architectural
Scenarios Approaches
Analysis
Sensitivity Tradeoff Points Risks
Points
Figure 6-5. Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method Framework.
The methodology already developed to this point provides the inputs to the "Attribute-Specific
Questions" and "Architectural Approaches" with the corresponding outputs from the OPM
structure for the "Sensitivity Points" and "Tradeoff Points". High-Priority Scenarios have not
been explicitly developed or treated in the discussion up to this point. For the purposes of this
research, these scenario dependent aspects of the problem are embedded in the utility space for a
given context. If the scenario is changed, these utilities will need to be revisited, and the analysis
will potentially have to be re-accomplished to accommodate major shifts in decision maker
attribute value ranges. To be practical, this level of dynamic analysis needs computational
modeling to be tractable. Risk is the remaining element that is undeveloped at this point, and it
will be addressed as the third set of architecture evaluation metrics.
The following discussion is broken down into three specific sets of evaluation criteria. The first
section discusses the enterprise value metrics (which the ATAM approach addresses explicitly).
These are a direct measurement of the desired enterprise attributes the architecture should
deliver. The second set of criteria concern themselves with an evaluation of the architecture
itself. These metrics are intended to assess the logical relationships, coherence, and adherence to
architecting principles of the architectural structure. The final set of criteria is for the evaluation
of the enterprise architecture risk defined above.
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A Brief Word on Selection Criteria and Frameworks
Before diving into the specifics of the evaluation method, a brief word on methods for
accomplishing evaluations in the more general sense is in order. For the sake of space, the
discussion that follows is based almost entirely from the MATE short course material developed
by Rhodes, Ross, and McManus. [87] As part of this course, a summary of various multi-




- Score alternatives with natural units; (normalize scores)
- Alternative with highest score in most important attribute is selected; if tied, tie-break
with second most important attribute score, etc.
- Pugh
- Choose baseline alternative
- Determine comparison of each alternatives' criteria to baseline: +/S/-
- Sum +/S/- for each alternative; clear best alternative ranked first, etc.
- QFD
- Rank attributes
- Score alternatives with 1,3,9
- Alternative with highest score summed across attributes is selected
- Modified decision matrix
- Rank attributes
- Score alternatives with natural units; normalize scores
- Alternative with highest weighted sum across normalized attribute score is selected
- Multi-Attribute Utility
- Elicit single attribute utility curves
- Elicit multi-attribute weights
- Score alternatives with single attribute utility curves
- Alternative with highest multi-attribute utility is selected
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A key point to remember in a discussion of alternative ranking methods is that each of the
methods listed above can result in a different ranking. In these instances, the question that
naturally comes to the forefront is "Which method is best?", and the answer is "It depends!"
There is a direct correlation in the effort required to conduct an analysis with each of these
methods and the resulting confidence typically achieved in the result. Figure 6-6 provides a
purely qualitative assessment on the author's part for what the tradeoff in effort vs. confidence
may look like and where each of the above methods falls in this space (the assessment is made
having conducted ranking exercises implementing all five types of approaches).
Figure 6-6. Notional Relationship between Ranking Method, Effort and Confidence.
It is worth noting that the "Multi-Attribute Utility" method collapses into the "Modified decision
matrix" method when the utility curves for each attribute are neutral across the entire range of
the attribute metric. Further analysis by Ross has found that when the shape of the utility
function is not known or was incorrectly inferred, the use of a neutral utility curve actually
provides a better overall mapping. This suggests that if time or resources are constrained, the
best place to start may be to collapse the full "Multi-Attribute Utility" scoring into a "Modified
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Decision Matrix" since this will likely result in the least impact to the overall confidence in the
results while significantly reducing the total level of effort required to perform the analysis.
Enterprise Attribute Criteria
The first and principle mechanism by which alternative enterprise architectures are evaluated
will be through the metrics developed as part of the X-matrix exercise. Recall that the X-matrix
provides an explicit mapping between the enterprise attributes and the metrics used to measure
their delivery (Figure 6-7 is provided for quick reference). In essence, the enterprise architecture
ranking method will use the estimated total delivery of each metric as a means of estimating the
relative extent to which each architecture delivers the desired enterprise value. This ranking is
obviously the one of primary importance in any final determination of "architectural goodness"
since this is ultimately what the enterprise architecture is intended to deliver-enterprise
attributes defining value.
Figure 6-7. General X-matrix Template Revisited.
A note with respect to the ATAM approach is worth making. The ATAM framework builds a
"utility" tree with the same kind of information captured in the X-matrix. When an architecture
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is evaluated using the ATAM approach, each metric is assessed based on its importance to the
delivery of the attribute (and the risk rating which will be discussed later in this section).
Unfortunately, this evaluation method misses the important consideration that metrics may in
fact be applicable to more than one attribute. For the sake of completeness, an example of the
ATAM "utility" tree is provided in Figure 6-8. For comparative purposes, the stack after
"Utility" correspond directly to the desired enterprise attributes, the second stack corresponds to
the attribute metrics, and the last set of "descriptions" corresponds to the metric range or desired
performance. The two letters in parentheses correspond to the importance of that metric in
delivering the associated attribute and the overall confidence in the architecture delivering the
associated level of performance respectively.
ML) Minimize storage latency
Lorata atency D -aton customer DB to 200 ms.
Performance o(H,M) Deliver video in real time
Throughput
New product (L,H) Add CORBA middleware
Modifiability categories in < 20 person-months
Change COTS ( Change web user interface
in < 4 person weeks
Utility- (L,H)Power outage at Site 1 requires
traffic re-direct to Site 2 in < 3 sees
Availabili H failure- (MMRestart after disk failure in < 5 mins
COTS S/W (H,M)Network failure is detected and
failures recovered in < 1.5 mins
Data (LH) Credit card transactions are
Security confidentiality secure 99.999% of timeData (L,H)Customer database authorization
integrity works 99.999% of time
Figure 6-8. Example of an ATAM Utility Tree Analysis.
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In those instances were a relatively large number of alternative architectures need to be
evaluated, using the utility tree approach within an X-matrix evaluation may provide for a
relatively fast way of filtering out the lower performing architectures and reserving the more
detailed analysis for the "quarter finalists."
Architecture Evaluation Criteria
The second set of evaluation criteria used to assess alternative architectures are metrics on the
overall quality of the architecture itself. Some consideration may need to be given as to whether
the enterprise attribute evaluation criteria should be applied first, followed by the enterprise
architecture evaluation criteria or vice versa depending on which will be the quicker of the two to
assess. Failure to pass through either set of criteria should fail a potential architecture. If a large
number of architectures need to be evaluated, using the ATAM method just described may
provide the simplest and fastest way to quickly down select to the top set of highest performing
architectures. Once these are filtered out, the next best thing may be to apply the architectural
criteria described below before conducting the more detailed enterprise attribute assessment
detailed in the previous section. Regardless of the approach taken, the general principle is to
filter the alternative architectures through the set of criteria that will be the simplest and quickest
to evaluate, moving to the progressively more time consuming and detailed assessments as the
total number of alternatives shrinks.
The architectural evaluation metrics used in this assessment are a synthesis of criteria developed
by Crawley and Wagenhals. Crawley specifically calls out criteria related to the relative
"elegance" of the proposed architecture. [7] He describes this assessment by evaluating the
following criteria:
1. Some subjective criteria re: whether solution is simple and pleasing
2. Decomposition of form matches function
3. Decomposition of form maps to team, stations and flow
4. Decomposition allows easy Integration and Verification
5. "Adherence to Architectural Principles"
Page 153
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
Augmenting the criteria from Crawley is work done by Dr. Lee Wagenhals, Dr. Sajjad Haider,
and Dr. Alexander Levis at George Mason University. [15] The primary architecture evaluation
metrics proposed in their model are as follows:
1. Is the architecture logically correct?
2. Does the architecture exhibit the desired behavior?
3. Do instantiations of the architecture exhibit the desired performance characteristics?
4. Do systems built in conformance to this architecture provide the desired capability?
5. Can we analyze alternatives?
It is important to note that this second framework for architecture evaluation was developed as a
broader effort, namely the desire to build executable object-based architectural models and using
them to evaluate alternatives through modeling and simulation. The overall system proposed by
Wagenhals et al., is depicted in Figure 6-9. Notice that the evaluation of the architecture is the
last step in the creation of a verified, executable model used to evaluate alternatives. As
previously mentioned, an executable model is currently out of reach in the current research, but
any thoughtful consideration of desired future ends recommends an approach that can be
extended into an executable framework with as little re-structuring as possible. With this as the
underlying intent, the activity in this analysis will end at the point where the model would
actually be created and exercised.
Required $Svlavior amd Porftorm
Evaluation
I l AA_ ToTsA frARCHCMCTUR E!XUTABLE EV ALUO un  _V
Figure 6-9. An Architecting Process from Wagenhals et al.
used in thisGN MODEL evaluation are as follows:andFigure 6-9. An Architecting Process from Wagenhals et al.
If the validation aspects of the above criteria are set aside, the result is a significantly shorter list
of architecture evaluation metrics for verification purposes. The final synthesized set of criteria
used in this evaluation are as follows:
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1. Does the architecture exhibit the desired behavior?
2. Does decomposition of form map to team, stations and flow?
3. Does architecture adhere to Architectural Principles?
Risk Evaluation Criteria
The third category of evaluation criteria considered in this analysis is the ATAM risk factor
introduced earlier in this section. This criteria is perhaps the most subjective of all, but the
exercise is nonetheless an important one, especially as a means of closing the feedback loop with
the enterprise architect and the enterprise decision makers. The ATAM approach is a general
assessment of an architecture's risk in a "high, medium, low" approach where, once again, the
factor being addressed is the overall confidence in the architecture delivering the desired
attributes. This is a bit of an inverse of the way in which risk is normally considered. In other
words, a high confidence would result in the risk for that particular architecture being scored
"low".
Selection Approach Summary
The result of assessing each alternative architecture through the three sets of criteria described
above should be a final architecture that provides a high-level of value delivery at an acceptable
level of risk. This will ultimately be a qualitative decision, but it can be made in a rigorous
fashion by implementing the methodology put forward in this chapter. Establishing a rigorous
method of evaluation is the first step on the road to defining an analytical approach to this
problem that can be implemented through executable models.
The enterprise architecture evaluation process should be tightly coupled and integrated with the
enterprise decision makers. Ultimately, it will be the decision makers themselves who will
provide the resources and motivation whereby the changes will take place. In this regards, the
enterprise architect is well-served in extending the evaluation to the broader enterprise
stakeholders at an appropriate juncture in the analysis. Fostering a sense of ownership on the
part of the decision makers for the final value proposition selected to move forward is a
significant advantage for implementing the needed transformation activities described in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 6 Summary
A rigorous method for developing alternative value propositions is needed for a thorough
treatment of the value-creation framework implemented in this research. This method deals with
the large number of potential architectures developed in the course of the assessment by creating
a system that a priori filters out non-value added architectures. The method is instantiated
through the OPM language to explicitly tie together the enterprise purpose statement, scope,
architectural views, attributes and mechanisms in a rigorous, structured approach to ensure the
full tradespace of alternatives is considered. The results are evaluated through three sets of
criteria that ultimately result in a "best of breed" architecture selected for the enterprise value
delivery mechanism.
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CHAPTER 7 - DELIVERING ENTERPRISE VALUE
"Obstacles are what you see when you take your eyes off the goal."
-Vince Lombardi
Delivering value is the final phase in the value-creation framework implemented in this research.
It is here that the theory of the proceeding four chapters is turned into concrete reality for there to
be any enduring consideration of the ideas advanced to this point. The execution phase of any
endeavor often proves the undoing of an idea, and in the case of an enterprise, there are a host of
forces all conspiring against the successful implementation of the value proposition. The only
sure way to see clear of the issues is to stay focused on the objective-or the obstacles will
overwhelm you.
Much has been said in the literature concerning transformation in recent years. It is not the intent
to rehash this information here, but it is worth pointing out that without a strong motivating
factor to drive change, making a successful transformation from one state to another is all but
impossible. [88] It is also clear that a structured approach to planning and implementing
transformation is essential. This chapter lays out the methodology for accounting for these
factors by combining the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap put forward by Nightingale with
the insights on points of leverage from the ATAM model.
Getting from Here to There: The Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
At the heart of delivering value is the need to move the enterprise from its current architecture to
the new one developed in the preceding discussion. The mechanism by which this is achieved is
called an enterprise transformation plan that describes in concrete detail the actions and results to
be achieved to move the enterprise from its current position to the one envisioned by the future
enterprise architecture. This requires actions that are specific, actionable, and accountable to
individuals to perform and report.
The framework for building the enterprise transformation plan is that described by Nightingale
and Srinivasan called the "Enterprise Transformation Roadmap." [16] Through a consistent
application of the process depicted in Figure 7-1, many of the activities and details needed to
build a successful enterprise transformation plan are called out explicitly. A detailed explanation
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of this roadmap process will not be undertaken here. For details on the execution of the
Enterprise Transformation Roadmap, see [16].
Figure 7-1. Enterprise Transformation Roadmap.
Two important points should be emphasized in Figure 7-1. The first is the Enterprise
Transformation Roadmap describes an iterative process in which the actions that are undertaken
to change the enterprise are continuously reviewed and assessed against the desired outcomes,
and the plan is updated to account for the actual extent to which the enterprise changes based on
a given activity or event. The second is that the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap provides a
convenient framework for operationalizing the enterprise architecture framework from Chapter 6
by providing a clear set of inputs within the "Planning Cycle" within which the enterprise
architecting inputs and outputs can be collected up and transferred into the enterprise
transformation plan. The Enterprise Transformation Roadmap is an implementation of the
value-creation framework used in this research. The effort in this thesis is to create a rigorous
method by which the "Strategic" and "Planning Cycle" tasks outline in Figure 7-1 are addressed
Page 158
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
and integrated. The use of the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap methodology fills in the
remaining gap in the current research by providing a structure for the "Execution Cycle" and the
block that connects the "Execution" and "Planning" cycles--creation of the transformation plan
itself.
The remaining task is to connect the output from the enterprise architecture analysis and
selection activity described in Chapter 6 with the broader framework for enterprise
transformation. Fortunately, the ATAM approach used as the backbone for the alternative
architecture assessment methodology results in the identification of sensitivity and tradeoff
points within each architecture. Taken collectively, these are labeled "Points of Leverage" in the
OPM model. These points of leverage focus the transformation plan development onto the
mechanisms with the highest potential for change.
Connecting the Dots: Using Points of Leverage to Focus Transformation Efforts
The point of interface between the OPM developed for the enterprise architecture description and
the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap occurs between the "Points of Leverage" in the OPM
and the "Align Enterprise Infrastructure" box in the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap. Figure
7-2 illustrates this point of connection explicitly. It is worth noting that although the "Points of
Leverage" from the OPM correspond most directly to the "Rationalize Systems & Policies"
action under "Align Enterprise Infrastructure", the precursor tasks in both the "Planning Cycle"
and the "Strategy Cycle" of the Enterprise Transformation Plan are all accounted for in the
methodology for constructing the OPM representation of the enterprise architecture. The
Enterprise Transformation Roadmap provides a number of additional activities that provide
additional insight into the current enterprise state and operations, but the overall information
content is very similar, to include the "Align Metrics" activity that occurs immediately after the
"Rationalize System & Policies" activity.
The advantage gained from completing the ATAM assessment is the focus it provides for
building the transformation plan that follows as the next step in the Enterprise Transformation
Roadmap process. By explicitly calling out the sensitivity, and in particular, the tradeoff points
in the architecture, the highest leverage mechanisms within the enterprise will become the
natural focus of the transformation plan.
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Figure 7-2. Interfacing the OPM Model with the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap.
To create the enterprise transformation plan, Nightingale and Rhodes specify the following
considerations that should be addressed in the transformation planning stage [89]:
- Determine how the enterprise transformation story needs to be told
- Provide incentives for change that are aligned with stakeholder values
- Do you have the people and/or organizational capabilities needed to transform?
- Are the appropriate structure and governance processes in place?
- Communication should flow from the enterprise leadership
- Align performance metrics with architecture (also with vision strategy) 5
- Plan for removal of obsolete/extraneous enterprise artifacts
By identifying the tradeoff points from the ATAM analysis, the above issues focus on
developing a plan that will target the highest leverage mechanisms within the selected
5 For the case of implementing the OPM model of the enterprise architecture as developed in this research, the
alignment between performance metrics (called attribute metrics in this research) and the architecture will have
already occurred through the use of the X-matrix analysis leading up to the OPM build.
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architecture. In this manner, the two frameworks complement one another well. The OPM
analysis narrows the transformation planning scope to the highest payoff factors, and the
transformation planning provides the additional breadth needed to fully account for the wide-
range of issues to be addressed for the transformation plan to be effective.
In addition to the specific planning items called out by Nightingale and Rhodes, the Enterprise
Transformation Roadmap details the following actions that should also be accomplished:
- Identify Key Enterprise Improvement Project Areas
- Determine Impact Upon Enterprise Performance
- Prioritize, Select and Sequence Project Areas
- Publish Communication Plan
Taken collectively, these activities provide a solid basis on which to initiate an enterprise
transformation plan to achieve the objective state characterized by the selected enterprise
architecture. Once accomplished, the effort moves into the "Execution Cycle" within the
Enterprise Transformation Roadmap, and feedback on the effectiveness of the transformation
plan is incorporated to make the appropriate adjustments or changes to produce the desired
outcomes. It is in the "Execution Cycle" that the enterprise architecture will be "validated"
against the value delivery achieved to the enterprise decision makers. Without an executable
model of the enterprise architecture, this is the first instance the architect has the opportunity to
receive feedback on the enterprise design, but even so, this must be taken with a large measure of
circumspection since by definition the future architecture is still in the making. Final judgment
as to the validity of the objective enterprise architecture is only possible full implementation and
the value delivery assessed by the enterprise decision makers.
Making Progress: Metrics and Stable Intermediate Forms
This brings us back to the issue of metrics and the importance they have in driving the enterprise
in the desired direction. As mentioned previously, if these metrics are not aligned appropriately,
both vertically and horizontally through the enterprise, achieving the desired changes to the
enterprise architecture will be next to impossible. Achieving alignment through the
transformation process is especially challenging as old mindsets and ways of conducting
business are in transitory states. Often the direct business practices that need to be changed are
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obvious enough, but many times the metrics that have been driving enterprise behavior are
second order effects that do not come to light until the enterprise is put into a change state. It is
only then the behavior induced by the previous metrics may actually be recognized as the source
of behavior counter to the direction leadership is taking the enterprise.
This is one reason why it is important to design what Rechtin and Maier call "stable intermediate
forms". [86] According to this collaborative systems heuristic, "Complex systems will develop
and evolve within an overall architecture much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate
forms than if there are not." Rechtin and Maier go on to elaborate by saying the following:
"Stability means that intermediate forms should be technically, economically, and
politically self-supporting. Technical stability means that the system operates to fulfill
useful purposes. Economic stability means that the system generates and captures revenue
streams adequate to maintain its operation. Moreover, it should be in the economic
interests of each participant to continue to operate rather than disengage. Political stability
can be stated as the system has a politically decisive constituency supporting its continued
operation."
The implications for transformation planning are significant. The insight from Rechtin and
Maier suggest that a transformation plan sequenced in stages that are stable, incremental
improvements over the previous enterprise architecture will ultimately provide a faster path to
full enterprise capability. Designing a transformation plan at this level of sophistication requires
a tremendous level of insight into the interactions between every component of the enterprise
architecture and a willingness to postulate possible future states in which the enterprise will have
to successfully operate in these intermediate forms (perhaps indefinitely) before reaching the
desired objective architecture.
Chapter 7 Summary
Do not be deceived by the relative brevity of this chapter. The importance of building a solid
enterprise transformation plan cannot be over-emphasized. Fortunately, solid frameworks
already exist in which to conduct this portion of the analysis. The Enterprise Transformation
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Roadmap is the approach implemented in this research, and further details on executing this
model are referenced appropriately. The primary task of this chapter is to draw the connection
between the OPM construct of the enterprise architecture and where the outputs of this analysis
provide inputs into the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap methodology. Further assessment of
the transformation plan and the "Execution Cycle" of the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
highlighted the continuing importance metrics play in shaping and motivating enterprise
behavior. This in turn led to a discussion of creating stable intermediate forms and the need to
integrate these 'way points' into the transformation plan to speed the overall enterprise
transformation process and boost the probability that the objective enterprise architecture will
actually be realized.
This concludes the methodology development section of this thesis. An end-to-end framework
for rigorous value-creation is now in place and available to apply to the UAS airspace integration
challenge introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. Furthermore, the methodology development process
implemented in this research has ensured the framework to be robust to the scope of the UAS
airspace integration activity as well as compliant with the broader DoD CBA process. In theory,
the tools are assembled for conducting the needed analysis of the UAS airspace integration
challenge and emerge with a viable set of recommendations.
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With a framework now in place to address the issues identified in Section I, the UAS airspace
integration challenge is assessed using the methodology from Section II. A side note on the
scope is warranted. Each enterprise architecting view is a thesis all by itself with very timely and
appropriate insights into the UAS airspace integration issue. For the sake of time and space,
these details are not developed as any number of different approaches could be implemented
within each view for arriving at logical and implementable frameworks. Within the discussion in
Section III, approaches developed by the author for each of the views are presented. The reader
is encouraged to consider these as potential ways of tackling the practical assessment of the
various enterprise views, but the methods presented are by no means the only (or perhaps even
the best) means for addressing each view.
There is also the issue of data collection. Chapter 8 goes into some detail on both the method
and results of the data collection effort undertaken as part of this analysis. This chapter was not
included in the general methodology section primarily because the lessons or heuristics presented
may not be fully extensible to a broader context. Additional research is required to make a
broader statement as to the applicability of the insights gained from the data collection effort;
however, as a descriptive assessment, the lessons learned and the approach to structuring the data
collection should be both informative and helpful for future data collection efforts that attempt to
implement the prescribed methodology.
Section III is organized into three chapters. Chapter 8 discusses the data collection and analysis
results providing the specific context for implementing the value-creation framework in Chapter
9. Chapter 9 systematically goes through the three-phased value-creation framework outlined in
Section II, up to the point of developing the transformation plan. In contrast to the methodology
section, the application of the transformation plan is a significant element of the work involved
in the analysis, and consequently, Chapter 10 will be devoted entirely to developing and
recommending an approach to moving forward with the UAS airspace integration effort.
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CHAPTER 8 - DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
"You have more data than you think, and you need less data than you think."
-Douglas Hubbard6
At first blush, the prospect of trying to elicit a decision maker's value definition and exchange
proposition may seem a daunting task. The subject is squishy, the questions are often open
ended and ill-defined, and the decision maker will likely have to be redirected to a value-focused
paradigm with active facilitation by the individual conducting the data collection interview. This
is to be expected; however, once the task begins, it turns out to be much simpler in some ways
than previously imagined.
Once the decision maker figures out they are not being asked for the answer, but instead being
asked to describe the problem and the characteristics of a good solution, the dialogue opens up
quickly. With some forethought on the part of the individual conducting the interview, a rich
understanding of the decision maker's underlying values and attributes can be had for the asking
- literally! Regardless of the specific outcomes from any one interview or data collection
attempt, Hubbard's observation in the above quote is a good perspective to have during the data
collection and analysis phase. It turns out there is more information in the data than anyone ever
thought possible, and the task is trying to figure out how to make sense of it all. You almost
never need all of the information you collect. In fact, the challenge it usually to sort through the
volumes of data to find the two or three gems of insight that are buried and waiting to be dug out.
Chapter 8 is organized in roughly the sequence of how the data collection and analysis for the
UAS AI effort occurred. There are often feedback loops and iterations that are necessary to
converge on the right set of final enterprise decision makers and purpose statement (reference
Chapter 4 and 9), but for the sake of needing to start somewhere in the process, the enterprise
analysis and decision maker analysis results will be presented briefly to provide some sense for
how an initial list of interviews was generated. The chapter then moves on to a discussion on
6 Quote is taken from Hubbard's book entitled How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of "Intangibles" in
Business. See reference [90] for full biographical listing.
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how the interview was structured, and then an assessment of the data collected and knowing
when enough data was available for a solid analysis. The chapter concludes with an analysis of
the data and the implications for the enterprise value structure.
Knowing Who to Talk To: Iterating on Purpose and Stakeholder Identification
Without having to nail down the specifics discussed in the next chapter, a general sense for the
UAS AI enterprise emerges from both the literature, the recent efforts in this domain, and first-
hand knowledge of the players and organizations involved in these current or recently completed
efforts. It is worth noting that this initial stage of iterating on the enterprise purpose and decision
makers is considerably easier if the architect has domain knowledge of the area under
investigation. Some care must be exercised to avoid unintentional grounding on the part of the
architect, but overall, the data collection exercise suggested that extensive domain experience is
a major advantage at this stage in the analysis.
Using the iterative approach detailed in Chapter 4, the enterprise purpose and stakeholders were
iterated on for several cycles before a solid sense of convergence was reached. This 'sense' of
convergence emerges as interviews were conducted and the individuals being interviewed begin
to identify the same values, attributes, metrics, and ranges as previous interviewees. This can
also be assessed by asking who the interviewee believes the critical decision makers are in
developing the solution they described. When the answer to this question no longer results in
additional organizations or individuals identified beyond those already elicited, the data set can
be considered 'saturated' from the standpoint of revealing any new information, and the data
collection effort is considered complete.
In the case of the UAS Al enterprise, this exercise in enterprise purpose and stakeholder analysis
resulted in the identification of the organizations and individuals in Figure 8-1 being identified
for value elicitation interviews.
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Figure 8-1. Organizations & Individuals Interviewed for Data Collection Effort.
Note the scope of the enterprise and the nature of the enterprise purpose both play a significant
role in shaping the extent of the data collection effort and the number of different organizations
and individuals to be interviewed. In addition, while other data elicitation methods could be
used for collecting the value structure information (such as questionnaires, online surveys,
teleconferences, etc), experience with the above process suggests that getting at the underlying
value structure with an interviewee is a dynamic process with a high degree of communication
on things that do not fit easily into a quantifiable framework. In these instances, research has
shown the most effective communication occurs in face-to-face meetings, especially when it
comes to picking up the non-verbal elements of communication that can be at least as important
(and in some cases, more so) than what is actually said. [91] Other types of data collection may
be effective once the initial interviews are conducted and the architect has a better understanding
of the nature and language of the enterprise, but this level of refinement was not found to be
necessary in the data collection effort conducted for the UAS AI effort.
Knowing What Questions to Ask: Structuring the Data Collection Interview
With the specific organizations and decision makers identified, the process of conducting the
interviews needs to be addressed. Do not underestimate the volume of data that a single
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interview is capable of generating. The interviewer needs to have a structured approach for how
the data will be elicited and recorded. This is important for two reasons. First, a structured
approach to the interview helps ensure important information is not inadvertently overlooked in
the questions that are asked. Second, a structured interview provides a consistent framework for
recording answers. This makes the data analysis significantly easier. Despite these efforts to
cover the spectrum of issues, the interviewee will likely provide information, insights, or
observations that do not fall into any pre-assigned category. If a structure is already in place to
bin 85% of the other information, figuring out what to do with this "unsolicited" information is a
much more tractable challenge. In addition, it is often the "unsolicited" information that
provides the deepest insights into the value structure of the organization or decision maker.
For the purposes of the UAS airspace integration data collection interviews, the questions were
structured around the template proposed by Ross (see Chapter 4). [9] The key distinction,
however, is the interviewer needs to elicit the information described in the MATE approach
using language that is native to the person being interviewed. This requires a considerable
amount of insight and knowledge on the part of the interviewer, but the results warrant the
additional work on the front end.
The interview questionnaire for the UAS airspace integration data collection effort is provided in
Appendix E for reference. A comparison of the interview questions and the approach outlined
by Ross demonstrates how the information requirements from MATE were translated into the
context of the UAS AI enterprise. Leave plenty of room on the interview data collection sheet to
write additional observations and inputs. In addition, the interviewer needs to realize that the
interaction with the interviewee is only semi-structured. In other words, having the questions
and knowing what information is needed is valuable going into the interview, but the flexibility
for pursuing an angle the interviewee introduces that may not have been part of the original data
collection set is important and the interviewer needs to adjust accordingly. Sticking rigidly to the
interview questions will result in some of the most insightful information from the interviewee
being missed altogether.
As a point of reference, the average interview using the set of questions in Appendix E took an
average of 1 hour and 45 minutes. It is also important to note that the interviewee was not given
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the list of questions. This was done deliberately to keep the conversation flexible and to allow
the interviewer to tailor the "superset" of questions on the list to just those that would be most
relevant to that particular interviewee. Having all of the questions together in a single document
however, facilitated the analysis that followed by providing a consistent framework between
interviewees, even when the area of expertise or concern was divergent.
In total, 20 different individuals were interviewed from 10 different organizations. Almost all of
the interviews were conducted between 24 March and 4 April 2008. Figure 8-1 provides the
specifics on the individual backgrounds and experience as well as the organizations they
represented or provided perspective on the issues. All told, over 80 pages of notes resulted from
the interview process and an additional two weeks of applied effort was required to reduce the
data into a distilled set of information that could be analyzed and interrogated for value structure
insights.
Knowing When to Stop: Evaluating Data Saturation
An important part of the data collection effort is knowing when there is sufficient data to
accurately capture the enterprise value structure. The method employed in the UAS airspace
integration effort is depicted in Table 8-1. In this analysis, the primary structure of the data
collection interview is represented in the first seven columns of the table, labeled "Primary
Interview Topics". The second set of data, labeled "Unstructured Inputs", captures the
unsolicited inputs that did not fall cleanly into any of the predefined data categories. For the
purposes of estimating completeness of the data collected, the information was examined from
two different perspectives. First, did each organization collectively have good representation in
the data from across the full range of structured interview topics depicted in the first seven
columns? If so, that organization was considered to be "saturated", especially if the interview
data revealed that multiple interviews within that organization produced significantly
overlapping data sets. To help with interpretation, each individual with whom an interview was
conducted was tabulated under their organizational affiliation and their inputs assessed relative to
these first seven categories. If data was evident in a given category, that box was colored yellow
and the organization row above that individual was turned green. In this way, a visual pattern
could be established for how saturated a given individual's inputs were as well as the overall
organization. On the initial pass through the data, the only additional information that was
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recorded was whether or not the individual included unsolicited information in the interview. If
so, the "Unstructured Inputs" box was also colored in yellow and flagged for further analysis at a
later point in time.
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Table 8-1. Data Collection Saturation Analysis.
The second aspect of saturation evaluated was whether or not the full spectrum of enterprise
decision makers was represented in the total pool of interviewed decision makers. In this case,
the assessment was subjective, but the intent was to ensure that at least two different
organizational layers in the management structured were interviewed to capture differences in
the value structure induced by relative organizational position with respect to the UAS airspace
integration effort. An assessment in this dimension revealed good saturation levels on the DoD
side of the enterprise, but only moderate saturation on the FAA side. With the specific resource
limitations of the current research, however, this moderate level of saturation was estimated as
having provided at least an 85% data set at a high level of confidence.
Note there were several organizations that were interviewed that did not achieve full saturation,
even at the individual organizational level. These organizations included the Air Force UAS
Task Force and the Air Force lead for the JPDO. In both cases, this lack of data saturation was
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determined to be acceptable because while both of these organizations are clearly stakeholders in
the UAS AI enterprise, the saliency analysis (see the next chapter) indicated they were not
stakeholders on par with the other organizations interviewed. In addition, the interview data
collected from these two organizations proved to be almost totally overlapped with data
previously collected from the other decision makers in the enterprise.
Once the collection was considered saturated from a primary data set standpoint, the unstructured
topics that were provided as unsolicited inputs from the interviewees were re-assessed, and the
additional analysis revealed a clear pattern to the type of information that was being
communicated voluntarily. The information was binned according to the topic categories
depicted in Table 8-1. The information that was provided in the "unsolicited" data can be
generally categorized as "context" information and "behavioral" information. The implications
of this observation will be addressed further in the next section.
Knowing What to Look For: Data Analysis
The reduced (but unfiltered) data collected during the interview process is provided in Appendix
F for detailed reference or additional analysis. What follows in the remainder of this section is
an analysis of the collected data that attempts to capture the relevant information for constructing
the enterprise value structure. The high points will be summarized by questionnaire category to
provide the contextual depth needed for the application of the methodology described in
Chapters 9-11.
Certificate of Authorization Process - Strengths and Weaknesses
The intent of starting the questions with the Certification of Authorization (COA) process was to
provide a concrete point of departure for the more conceptual questions that would follow.
Using the COA (the current method by which the FAA approves flights of military UAS in the
NAS) provided a known reference point for the interviewee to answer value questions about the
existing process. This proved to be useful in helping the interviewee think in terms of value
space rather than in alternatives. The data from this question suggested that DoD sees the extent
to which the COA process delivers value in significantly different terms than the FAA. In effect,
the COA process provides a proxy "As-Is" assessment to the current UAS airspace integration
effort.
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Discussions with ACC/A3 concerning the value delivery associated with the COA process
revealed a number of important insights for architecting the future enterprise. Figure 8-2




















Low Stakeholder Relative Importance to Enterprise High
Figure 8-2. ACC/A3 Value Delivery Assessment of COA Process.
One very valuable outcome of this exchange with ACC/A3 was understanding the shift in the
value delivery state should the conflict in Iraq end and all of the UAS assets ACC is currently
operating in theater have to be sent back to U.S. basing locations. In essence, the ACC/A3 value
shift indicates that if this were to occur, the ability of the COA mechanism to meet mission
requirements would fall well short of the needed value delivery. The implication for current
operations is that the war effort itself is being used as a way to keep pilots and crews proficient
in their jobs. Without the war activity to provide this additional level of access to airspace for
UAS assets, the current situation would not be sustainable.
Building off of the previous work conducted by Weibel [92]and Blackburn et al.[93], the AJR-36
value delivery assessment can be constructed. Notice that in Figure 8-3, there are a few more
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aspects to the value delivery mechanism, but the safety aspect dominates the scene in terms of
the value delivered as well as the importance placed on the delivery of that value. From an AJR-
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Low Stakeholder Relative Importance to Enterprise High
Figure 8-3. AJR-36 Value Delivery Assessment of the COA Process.
The challenge facing the enterprise architect is the creation of an architecture that preserves the
FAA's value delivery level (especially with respect to safety) while significantly increasing the
DoD value delivery level for operations and training.
Enterprise Scope and Purpose
The primary responses to questions regarding the nature of what the enterprise objective or
purpose should be varied by organization. In effect, there were two primary sets of definitions,
one from the Air Force and the other from the FAA, on what the UAS Al enterprise needed to
accomplish. These are summarized as follows:
Air Force
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- Purpose is driven by Air Combat Command (ACC)
- Enable Training: 100% (4 of 4) of ACC/A3 interviewees said training
missions for wartime ops was the primary purpose the UAS airspace
integration effort should pursue
- Conduct Operations: 100% (4 of 4) of ACC/A3 interviewees said conducting
primary missions in or through the NAS when tasked was a second need for
the UAS airspace integration effort
- Additional Perspectives taken from across the decision maker data
- Need to access/transit airspace to accomplish above two activities
- Shifting force structure puts more and more capability on UAS platforms
increasing likelihood of usage




- Ensure operations meet safety objectives
- Underlying premise on which all other action is undertaken-AJR observation
- Enabler to DoD: Provide mechanism for mission accomplishment
- Maximize Resources
- Leverage common objectives to get viable outcomes
- Political and teamwork value
- Dual-Use products
Resolving these two very different value definitions for the UAS AI effort will be at the heart of
aligning and flowing the value each decision maker expects out of the activity pursued in the
UAS airspace integration context. The following is a consolidated list of the different types of
activities decision makers believe the enterprise needs to undertake in order to deliver the
expected value:
- Fill the gaps in current UAS capabilities
- Provide the appropriate equipage to comply with the CFRs to fly in the NAS
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- Enable airworthy UAS certifications
- Enable Situational Awareness data to ground station/pilot
- Address Policy issues impeding the progress of integrating UAS into the NAS
- Develop the appropriate procedures needed to integrate UAS into the NAS
- Develop the appropriate standards to integrate UAS into the NAS
- Still developing and evolving-don't know enough to say what the scope should be
- Define critical set of scalable activities and work on getting those laid out in more detail
- Comparative analysis with manned aircraft to demonstrate safety of UAS operations
Between the different perspectives on the value definition and the wide variety of views on the
scope of the effort, the clearest message that emerged from the interview data on these two topics
was the critical need for a well structured enterprise purpose statement with clearly defined goals
and metrics associated with its delivery. This is addressed in detail in the next chapter.
Enterprise Stakeholders
As part of the interview process, the interviewee was asked to provide a list of organizations they
felt were critical to the delivery of the value definition they provided. In other words, who
needed to be involved and engaged in order for the enterprise purpose (as they defined it) to be
successfully completed or realized?
Table 8-2 provides a consolidated tally of all of the stakeholders elicited during the course of the
interviews. Of the 20 individuals interviewed, 17 provided an input to this question. Of these 17
individuals, the total number that mentioned the organization listed is annotated in the next
column. Because this was a totally open-ended question based on the individual's definition of
the enterprise purpose, those organizations that had a significant number of multiple interviewees
identifying them as key organizations suggested a strong probability that these organizations
would likely emerge from the saliency analysis as "definitive stakeholders", or using the model
from Ross, decision makers.
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thought each organization should be considered a"key" stakeholder to enabling the enterprise value delivery.
Table 8-2. Consolidated Responses for "Key" Enterprise Stakeholders.
Without having conducted the saliency analysis for the stakeholders provided in Table 8-2, and
simply going off of the relative frequency an organization was mentioned, the following general
observations can be made. Total number of ACC references (specific offices being lumped into
a total for the overall organization) amount to 23; total Acquisition references amount to 22; total
FAA references amount to 20; total DoD and Congressional policy-level organizations amount to
15; and all other references combined amount to 16.
Two observations are worth noting. First, this is a much shorter list than the "full" stakeholder
set provided at Appendix B. This suggests the enterprise architect should apply some domain
insight as the Grossi method of enumerating enterprise stakeholders is executed. After eight or
nine interviews, it became clear that the critical organizations consistently popped up regardless
of the interviewee's particular view of the enterprise purpose statement. A number of other
uniquely identified stakeholders would invariably surface, but just as predictably, these "one-off'
stakeholders were only rarely mentioned by any of the other interviewees, and the specific
stakeholders in these categories tended to be correlated very closely to the technical depth of the
individual in his or her field.
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Second, despite the fact that the enterprise purpose and scope appears to need additional work,
there is a consistent picture for who needs to be engaged in the discussion. This provides an
important area of consensus between both the Air Force and the FAA perspectives to help build
the appropriate enterprise architecture.
Resources, Constraints, and Timeframes
As might be suspected with such variation in the responses for the scope of the UAS airspace
integration activity, the inputs on the required resources needed for the enterprise to accomplish
the purpose the individual interviewee articulated were all over the map. As Table 8-3
demonstrates, the range in funding was "already have enough" to $100s of millions per year.
Table 8-3. Consolidated Responses for Required Enterprise Resources.
The high variation in the timeframes over which various interviewees saw the UAS Al enterprise
operating had a corresponding effect on an estimate of the time required to achieve the enterprise
purpose as well. Estimates provided varied from completion dates of 2013, 2015, 2023, and
many were simply indefinite. Nailing down the enterprise purpose and scope should provide for
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a much improved understanding of the resources and timeframes that will be required to
accomplish the value delivery articulated by each of the decision makers in the enterprise.
A discussion of constraints often led to significant entries in the "Remarks" categories (in other
words, inputs that did not fall into any one of the structured interview categories). In general, the
following list provides a good representative sample of the type of constraints interviewees
identified as having the potential for the most impact on the effort. The organization providing
the input is captured in parentheses at the end of the bullet.
- Need to convince senior AF/DoD leadership to take this issue on as a major
interdepartmental effort (ACC)
- Funding has to be protected to make any progress on equipage/standards (ACC & OSD)
- Rulemaking process is the single most limiting aspect to making progress. Changes here
could cut the time to reach standards by 50-70% (FAA)
- Arriving at a common purpose for the effort. A philosophical level of agreement is
required on the vision (FAA)
- Data required to establish the needed regulatory requirements in the operational
environment (i.e. wake turbulence categories, separation distances, etc) (FAA)
- Generating a higher level of leadership advocacy (OSD)
- Get the FAA to take more of a partnering role in the effort at senior leadership levels
(OSD)
In the case of many of the constraints elicited in the above list, the architect will need to iterate
closely with the relevant decision maker to determine if the constraint articulated can
legitimately be moved as part of the analysis, or whether the issue is a true constraint and
provides a hard boundary on the execution of the enterprise.
Barriers
Table 8-4 provides a summary of the results of the "barriers" question. Note that the question
was entirely open ended, so the responses should be as nearly independent as possible barring
any unintentional anchoring that occurred during the course of the interview. In a similar
manner as the stakeholder analysis, the barrier assessment elicited responses from all 20 of the
interviewees and the "Top Ten" list is provided in Table 8-4 based purely on the number of
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instances in which the subject was mentioned as a major barrier to the UAS AI enterprise
conducting a successful value delivery effort. The total number of responses with the identified
issue is captured in the parentheses after the barrier name.
* Culture (9)
* Lack of leadership (8)
* Equipage shortfalls (5)
* Lack of funding (3)
* Lack of resources (3)
* No one person in charge (3)
* Politics (3)
* Lack of aviation heritage (2)
Table 8-4. Barriers to UAS Airspace Integration.
At the level of aggregation provided in Table 8-4, the preciseness of what is meant by each of
these terms is conveniently left off. In fact, if the data is examined closely (See Appendix F for
the complete data collection results) it will become apparent very quickly that a number of these
terms meant significantly different things to the decision maker providing them. Once again, the
architect must verify that the list is indeed an accurate one for what barriers must be overcome to
successfully launch the enterprise.
There was a strong and pervasive theme that came to the forefront regularly, and that was the
lack of strong leadership engagement on this topic. The sense was that leadership across all
definitive stakeholder organizations lacked the ownership and will to see the airspace integration
effort succeed. This will prove to be a major factor in both the current assessment and in future
architecture considerations.
Without detailing all of the highlighted areas in Table 8-4, suffice it to say they each have similar
detail and specific examples associated with them to provide a clear picture of the issues to be
resolved by the future enterprise architecture. These barriers can be thought of as the hurdles to
value delivery. What was even more enlightening was the emergence of fundamental cultural
and organizational perspectives as the data was compiled and categorized. These will be
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explicitly detailed in following sections because they represent very strong beliefs that will have
to be taken into account with any future activity.
Solution Characteristics or Attributes
A sense for the diversity of decision maker perspectives on solution characteristics or attributes
is conveyed in the following list. Note that these responses were provided in response to the
question of what a good solution to the UAS airspace integration effort would "look like" from
the interviewee's perspective.
- Conforms to existing structure
- Does no harm
- Man-like/equivalent access
- Integrated pilot SA
- Flexible to meet schedule
requirements
- Safe
- Accepted as integral member of
NAS
- Flexibility of operations
- New ops not significant emotional
event
- Enables mission
- Consensus of approach
- Cost
- Impact on NAS structure
- Integrated equipage
- Sense-and-Avoid capable
- Pilot provided advisories
- ATC treats UAS the same
- Launching a recovering with United
Airlines Flt




- My phone isn't ringing with a
problem
- Responsive C2 system
- Airworthiness certified
- Reduced training/ops overhead
- Reduced operating cost




The most apparent observation from the above data is the wide variety in the responses, and the
implied challenge to the enterprise architect when it comes to creating a value proposition that is
robust enough to deliver the wide range of characteristics described by the enterprise decision
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makers. While not conducted as part of this research, a major issue that confronts the architect in
this situation is a way to conduct this many utility interviews if a high confidence tradespace
were desired as the outcome of the effort. This is especially true since attribute utilities cannot
be aggregated across difference decision makers.
Remarks
The "Remarks" section of the data collection effort, along with the "Barriers" responses, was the
single largest category of information collected during the interview process. The "Remarks"
section represents all of the information provided during the interviews that did not fit into an
already defined category on the interview questionnaire. Much of the data contained in this
section of the results was unsolicited in the sense that it resulted from tangents or follow-ups
from other questions. Because the volume of information in this section is so extensive, only a
series of quotes will be reproduced here with the intent of conveying some of the more salient
aspects of cultural differences, politics, and mindsets embedded within the various decision
maker organizations involved in the UAS Al enterprise.
- The FAA perspective: "Interested in the anticipated case being good enough versus the
best case being the norm." (FAA AIR-160)
- ACC's resource perspective: "Not going to launch a Manhattan Project or an ACAT 1
program." (ACC/A8)
- One AF UAS TF member's perspective: "Predator could fly today with its current
complement of sensors and equipment and fully comply with the regulations associated
with flying in the NAS-except for those conditions in which it goes lost link." (AF UAS
TF)
- FAA description of legacy hurdles: "UAS are at the will of every other system that is
already in operation in the NAS. We are trying to take a futuristically capable system
and dumb it down so it will play nicely with a system that is 40-50 years old." (FAA
AIR-160)
- SAF/AQ view on problem: "We've had the technology for decades to hit things. We can
clearly use the same technology to avoid them. Technology is not the problem-it's the
social element." (SAF/AQIJ)
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- One blessed with much insight on AF culture: "I'm worried that if I solve the UAS
problem, I'll be blamed."
If anything, these quotes bring to the forefront the fact that UAS airspace integration challenges
are not fundamentally technical in nature. It is much more deeply rooted in the fundamental
sociological differences between organizations and cultures. The implication for the architect is
the need to craft an enterprise purpose statement that will be sufficiently strong to unite these
diverse perspectives into a viable activity with all of the decision makers pulling in the same
direction.
Summary of Data Collection Effort
The very act of going to each decision maker and eliciting the information contained in
Appendix F was the single most important activity for gaining the needed insights into the values
and perspectives of the various decision makers required to create the alternative architectures
and transformation plan detailed in Chapters 9 and 10. The data set represented in Appendix F is
rich in both the complexity of the decision maker value propositions and the breadth of the issues
that it highlights as important to address in the analysis. The above discussion has only
scratched the surface on the usefulness of this information for forging a path forward.
Knowing What to Do Next: Implications for the Value Structure
The last section of this chapter discusses the ramifications of the above observations and
synthesizes a number of possible perspectives various decision makers are likely to have based
on the responses to the interview. These observations in the data fall into two major categories,
labeled "tensions" and "consensus" respectively. The areas that fall under the "tensions"
moniker represent differing perspectives of the same topic. These are important because while
the same word might be used, the differing perspectives on the subject result in often
fundamental, philosophical disconnects on how activities should be pursued. For those falling in
the "consensus" category, there is strong general agreement on the topics, and these represent
areas where there appears to be good alignment already within the enterprise.
The issues held in tension are addressed first. The largest, and most significant of these, is the
subject of safety. Figure 8-4 details the significant differences in how safety is viewed relative to
the UAS platform itself between the DoD and the FAA. Any successful enterprise endeavor will
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require, at a minimum that this tension be resolved to the satisfaction of all of the decision
makers involved in the enterprise. Note that this tension does not imply that the Air Force, or
DoD in general, is not safety conscious or does not take adequate measures to ensure the safety
of their operations. To the contrary, safety is a critical enabler to mission effectiveness. It is this
distinction, however, that drives the difference in perspectives. For the Air Force, safety is an
important mission enabler, not an end in and of itself. On the other hand, the FAA's mission
itself is safety, so the degree of emphasis between the two organizations and the relative amount
of risk in the area of safety each are willing to take are significantly different, as the interview
data points out.
This difference in perspective is captured well in the following excerpt from a recent
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the subject of integrating UAS into the NAS
[94]:
"FAA and DOD officials acknowledge that military experience and operational data on
UASs are not always directly transferable to operations in the national airspace system. The
military's use of UASs is focused on mitigating the danger to troops. Safety and reliability
risks that may be appropriate in a war zone to protect troops may not be acceptable in the
national airspace system."
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* Little to no olbjective safety data
* Little heritage in components
* \lanufacturers lhae little aviation
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* Context: NAS operations
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SAFETY THRESH(OLD
Figure 8-4. Differing Enterprise Perspectives on Safety.
The second issue in tension is the difference in perspectives on what is needed to move forward.
This is labeled as differing perceptions on the hurdles that need to be overcome to generate
positive movement forward on the airspace integration effort. This issue is one that falls largely
down "professional" lines, as opposed to organizational lines. Figure 8-5 illustrates the
difference between the ways the operational community sees the need to move forward versus
the way the engineering or acquisition community sees the shortfalls that need to be addressed.
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Figure 8-5. Differing Enterprise Perspectives on Hurdles.
The third and final tension addressed is the difference in the perceptions various stakeholders in
the enterprise have of other organizations involved in the airspace integration effort. Figure 8-6
details these deeply rooted cultural perspectives ingrained in the day-to-day mental models of
each of these decision makers. To further complicate the resolution of all three of these tensions,
they do not all lie on the same "cleavage plane." That is, the resolution of one tension does not
make either of the other two "go away." The enterprise architecting effort will have to arrive at a
mechanism that provides for the resolution, or at least the containment, of all three of these
factors simultaneously.
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Figure 8-6. Differing Enterprise Perspectives on Other Stakeholders.
Fortunately, all is not doom and gloom with respect to the inter-relationships or the degree of
alignment between stakeholders in the enterprise. There are a number of very important
elements with general enterprise-wide consensus. The first of these is the issue of advocacy. All
of the stakeholders unanimously agreed that senior leadership-level advocacy for the effort was
both paramount though lacking, as was a single, coordinating office "in charge" of making the
effort a success. Figure 8-7 details the additional perspectives voiced on this need for a
collective "stepping up to the plate."
The biggest difficulty with this issue is how to generate an architecture that will facilitate the
growth of this kind of support. Without a "burning platform" for change, accomplishing the
major paradigm shifts needed for the appropriate policy and procedural changes, let alone the
backing to resource the materiel development aspects of the problem, will be incredibly difficult
if there is not significant senior leadership support for the effort across all of the stakeholder
organizations in the enterprise.
To illustrate the magnitude of this hurdle, consider the example of the Traffic Alert and Collision
and Avoidance System (TCAS), used widely in manned aviation to help prevent collisions,
which according to the GAO was developed "...over a 13-year period, at a cost of more than
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$500 million...FAA officials believe that an acceptable detect, sense, and avoid system for
UASs could cost up to $2 billion to complete and is still many years away." [94] In addition to
the shear enormity of the financial investment required, there is the even larger issue of cultural
and organizational lock-in that must also be addressed. The TCAS effort was not only a huge
cost, but it required an act of Congress before the issue was taken up by the relevant parties. By
all accounts, the UAS airspace integration effort is at least an order of magnitude more difficult
problem to solve. All of the organizations involved in the current efforts agree that without
strong advocacy across all of the key organizations, the degree of engagement will not be




* Need seior leaderslip to actively engage on the issue
* Need a single, consolidated focal point to lead effort
* (Oly need leaderslup to temporarily overcome obstacles and
get solutions put in place
* Need a "stepping up to the plate," a collective will to find a
solution, a desire to see UAS integration succeed as soon as
possible
Figure 8-7. Enterprise Perspective on the Need for Advocacy.
The next issue with strong consensus is how the challenge should be approached. In this case,
there is a positive consensus on the kinds of things that need to be worked and how they need to
be approached. Figure 8-8 details these points of alignment within the enterprise.
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APPROACH
( 1onseiin. u. oi:
* Bound the problem using a local case, collect data over time,
anl use data ::experience to build a solid safety case
* Mnust accommnodate limited resources to work the issue
* Policy. procedure, and materiel elements must be addres sed
concurrently and coherently
* Significant teclhnology issues (e.g. SA., spectruml C2) need
to be worked for appropriate equipage performance
* Must be done in a full D)o[) FAA collaborative partnerslup
Figure 8-8. Enterprise Perspective on Approach.
The enterprise architecting effort should be able to use these points of agreement on what needs
to be tackled at almost a product-level to build an initial core set of activities that will deliver
these products while resolving the previously outlined tensions and filling the advocacy vacuum.
The final area of consensus for consideration is that of the enterprise "end-state." Besides the
agreement on the approach to the problem, this area of agreement is perhaps the most critical to
the prospect of arriving at a successful architecture since it suggests that despite the differences
in many areas, there is at least a shared perspective on what a final future state might look like.
Figure 8-9 provides characteristics that were typical across every decision maker interviewed.
This convergence in perspective on the end-state provides the most concrete basis for building a
broader level of consensus on the precise approach, goals, and objectives the enterprise will need
to articulate before it will be possible to make good on the enterprise mission statement.
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END-STATE
Looks like:
* UAS mission has fill advantage of principle of mianeuver
* Integrated operations with nmaned aircraft
* Transparent to Air Tra ffic Control
* Mirrors n manlied aircraft for flight planuing and approvals
* Safety track record is equal to or better than nmanied
' UAS ops are routine, eveiryday and conmmon occurrences
Figure 8-9. Enterprise Perspective on the End-State.
These points of tension and consensus provide the basis on which the enterprise architect will
conduct the analysis described in Chapters 9-11 of this thesis. Note that the elicitation of the
data, and the enterprise purpose and stakeholder analysis conducted as the first two steps in the
value identification phase, are woven together tightly with this chapter. Both provided bounding
elements on who needed to interviewed, what the scope of the questionnaire should be, and how
the overall effort should be framed and presented.
The advantage of providing all of the data collection and analysis results upfront and together in
a single chapter is the common basis the reader should now have for understanding the enterprise
architecting decisions that are described in Chapter 9. It should also be apparent that the analysis
in this chapter has only begun to unravel the myriad of issues surrounding the complex
stakeholder and inter-organizational issues associated with this problem. Harkening back to
Chapter 4 and the necessarily iterative nature of the methodology employed in the approach, this
data collection and analysis effort should only be considered a "first pass" through the problem,
not a final solution to the challenge.
Chapter 8 Summary
The data collection and analysis effort provides the basis on which to establish the enterprise
value structure. An iterative process between identifying the enterprise purpose and decision
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makers results in a list of organizations and individuals from which to solicit the appropriate
value structure definitions. Understanding and assessing the degree of interview data saturation
by the current interviewees provides the basis on which to judge the completeness of the data
collected. Once the data collection effort is deemed complete, thorough analysis of the
information should provide the depth of understanding needed to build an enterprise-wide value
structure sufficiently robust to provide the tradespace for the building and evaluation of
alternative value propositions using enterprise architecting tools.
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CHAPTER 9 - UAS VALUE-CREATION ANALYSIS
"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to
adapt the world to himself Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."
- George Bernard Shaw
In the process of conducting the analysis that follows, the architect will find a certain degree of
tension must be maintained between providing what each decision maker will likely see as their
optimum "local" solution and what will actually create the overall best "global" result from a
value flow standpoint in the enterprise. It is in this sense the architect may need to be
"unreasonable" in persisting in their efforts to adapt the enterprise decision makers to a different
way of looking at the problem.
Clearly in cases like the UAS AI effort a "business as usual" mentality for dealing with the
complex issues identified in the previous chapter will not adequately resolve the value
misalignments between the decision makers needed to flow value through the enterprise.
Chapter 9 begins the process of translating the theory of Section II into practical application for
addressing the UAS airspace integration challenge.
For the sake of clarity in presentation, the source of information for the remainder of the chapter
is the interview data described in Chapter 8, unless specifically annotated otherwise. Citing the
specific interview in which the data under discussion was collected will be done to the extent that
it clarifies the issues, but specific citations will not be included. Refer to Appendix F should
additional detail be desired beyond what is presented in the main body of this analysis.
UAS AI Enterprise Intent and Purpose Statement
In one sense, the argument could be made that the very act of calling out the enterprise activity
as "airspace integration" presupposes a solution to a more fundamental problem identified in the
interview data, namely the need to train and operate UAS to the satisfaction of the military
services and combatant commander deploying the capability in the battlespace. The need to train
and operate UAS is the underlying value the enterprise should be focused on delivering. Putting
the context into the airspace integration arena brings in the additional need to satisfy the FAA's
safety and capacity requirements in the pursuit of those training and operational needs.
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Applying the enterprise purpose statement methodology, an analysis of the existing JIPT mission
statement was conducted. The result is depicted in Figure 9-1. Notice that in this instance, the
JIPT mission statement needs further clarification before it will pass tests of both completeness
and attainability.
The goal of the Airspace Integration Project
is to achieve routine access to civil airspace INTENT
for all DoD operational and training
missions rng t e nned FORM
aircraft systems by developing an
integrated set ofinteroperable standards FUNCTION
and procedures that gain access to the NAS
for DoD and Interagency UAS and identify
gaps between the standards and current
technologies d r a the technical
Figure 9-1. JIPT Mission Statement Analysis.
In particular, the JIPT mission statement needs to explicitly include the critical constraints on
how the above intent is to be implemented. There is also a convolving of formal and functional
elements together resulting in some ambiguity about what functions need to be performed as
opposed to the form they will take in order to deliver that functionality.
The ambiguity in the current problem is apparent in a number of places in the interview data.
The most telling was the observation from the FAA that they do not have any clear
understanding of what DoD really wants to do in this area or how they want to move forward.
There is also some uncertainty within the JIPT activity base on what is required within the
functions of developing standards, identifying gaps and coordinating technical approaches. With
no clear specifications of the constraints on the problem, these are open ended questions with no
clear answers.
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Perhaps more fundamental than even these disconnects is the sense from the interview data that
not all of the enterprise stakeholders would even agree that the JIPT statement of intent is
correct. In this case, the idea of routine access stems directly from the belief that this is required
in order to achieve the desired training and operational missions. This is understandable.
Unfortunately, as subtle as this distinction is, it has tremendous implications for the way the
enterprise orients the structure and content of the activities it undertakes. In this case,
transposing "routine operations" for "conduct training and operational missions" interjects a
different value definition than the one elicited during the interview process conducted for this
research. In fact, nowhere in the interview data from ACC does the idea of routine access come
up in the underlying value delivery definition. Routine access does come up in the description of
attributes some decision makers might use to assess value delivery, but this switch between the
primary value definition (training and operational mission accomplishment) and an attribute
describing the level of delivery (routine operations) is a distinction that must be preserved as the
UAS AI enterprise purpose is further defined.
To address these shortfalls and ensure an UAS AI enterprise purpose statement that is
appropriately defined and rigorous in its interpretation of decision maker value definitions, a
clean sheet assessment was conducted using the interview data and the methodology developed
in Chapter 4. Figure 9-2 illustrates the initial UAS Al enterprise purpose context analysis and
how it fits in the broader military operational space, as well as the lower level of detail within the
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Figure 9-2. Initial UAS Enterprise Purpose Context Analysis.
Several observations are worth mentioning at this point. First, as expected, the value definition
of train and operate occurs at the center (or origin) of the UAS AI enterprise. This need is the
fundamental driver without which the activity would not occur. An analysis of the broader
context reveals that the need to train and operate stems from the broader mission requirement the
UAS supports which is to enable the Global Strike Concept of Operations, and in particular the
Find, Fix, Track, Target, Execute, Assess (F2T2EA) mission thread. The initial "1 up"
assessment in the context suggests good alignment between these two layers. This higher level
context in which the UAS Al enterprise operates within will be referred to as the Global Strike
Task Force (GSTF) extended enterprise.
The "1 down" assessment, however, reveals an important issue the architect must address before
moving forward. The three primary internal functions for enabling the "train and operate as
needed" origin goal are "using the CONOPs Needed for Mission", "Access Required Airspace",
and "Safely, Effectively, and Efficiently" conduct the needed training and operational missions.
An assessment of the completeness of this arrangement reveals a critical shortfall in the
decomposition, principally the fact that "train and operate as needed" captures the first functional
requirement quite well, but it doesn't speak to the second two functions in any direct sense.
This is an important element to get a hold of because these internal enterprise functions represent
either constraints or additional value definition requirements on the enterprise "origin" purpose
statement. The implication is that if the "origin" enterprise purpose statement does not
adequately address these other value definitions or constraints there will a significant risk of the
enterprise activity falling short of the expected value delivery to at least some, if not all, of the
enterprise decision makers. Continuing to implement the methodology from Chapter 4, the next
step is to consider whether or not the enterprise boundary should be expanded or contracted in
order to assure a representative enterprise purpose statement. Given the above assessment, the
current enterprise purpose statement would appear to be too narrowly stated, and the boundary
should be expanded.
If the boundary is pushed "1 up" in the context, the next logical enterprise purpose statement
would be to make the enterprise purpose "enable global strike" based on what is provided in
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Figure 9-2. While this approach would be consistent with the practice of moving the boundary
out, it misses the purpose which is to increase the available enterprise tradespace to include all of
the necessary enterprise decision makers and their values or constraints. Unfortunately, a simple
move "1 up" to "enable global strike" as the enterprise purpose statement does not resolve the
representation issue. "Enable global strike" still suffers from the same lack of addressing both
the "Access to Airspace" and the "Safely, Effectively, and Efficiently" functions.
To sort through how the dimensions of the enterprise purpose statement should be changed to
accommodate all three of the lower level enterprise functions, the interview data was re-
examined in a different light. One particular characterization of the problem from one decision
maker suggested that there was in fact a more fundamental need beyond the desire to train and
operate UAS. This more fundamental need is "restoring the principle of maneuver" to UAS
platforms-independent of the context in which they are operating.
This observation seemed to be moving in the right direction with respect to what is needed for
the enterprise purpose statement. Note that the word "seemed" is used. This is where the
architect's job takes on a decidedly "art" flavor and creativity must be exercised to find ways of
generating a resolution to the identified issue. In this case, the intuition behind "restoring the
principle of maneuver" appeared to be a good place to start. This brings to the forefront the fact
that there are aspects to the architecting business that are fundamentally creative, and while a
framework can be implemented to assist in this endeavor, there are elements that are
fundamentally tied to the architect's intuition, perception, and creativity. While there are a
number of tools that may assist in some of these endeavors, it boils down in the end to the
architect's underlying talents and abilities.
In the case of trying to understand how the idea of "maneuverability" might tie into both the
DoD and FAA context, basic research was done to understand the meaning this term had in each
culture. To be clear about what is meant by the principle of maneuver in the DoD context, Joint
Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, provides a military context definition that will be used as the
basis for understanding the principle as initially used by the interviewee. [95] Joint Pub 3-0
defines the principle of maneuver as follows:
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a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power.
b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain
positional advantage, usually in order to deliver - or threaten delivery of - the direct and
indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance
and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes,
preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new
problems for the enemy.
As one interviewee points out:
"Doctrine writers are operationally-focused and often take ISR for granted. Considering
current roles for UAS, the grounds for a broader view are inherent. So the ability to
publish orders for fires is based on intelligence for informed maneuver; therefore, freedom
of maneuver for ISR platforms to inform the commander and make decisions for the
maneuvering force presupposes the same need for maneuver by ISR forces as well. In
short, it is not really just about 'fires."'
This represents the fundamental linkage between maneuver for fires and freedom of navigation
for ISR platforms such as UAS.
Further clarification is provided by Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, in which the
principle of maneuver is further refined to specifically address the aspect of maneuver with
respect to air power operations, of which UAS are a contributing capability. [96] AFDD-1
expands on the principle of maneuver as follows:
"Maneuver places the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible
application of combat power in a multidimensional combat space. Air and space power's
ability to conduct maneuver is not only a product of its speed and range, but also flows
from its flexibility and versatility during the planning and execution of operations.
Maneuver, like the principle of offensive, forces the enemy to react, allowing the
exploitation of successful friendly operations and reducing friendly vulnerabilities. The
ability to quickly integrate a force and to strike directly at an adversary's strategic or
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operational centers of gravity is a key theme of air and space power's maneuver advantage.
Air maneuver allows engagement anywhere, from any direction, at any time, forcing the
adversary to be on guard everywhere."
In the broader sense, the American Heritage Dictionary defines maneuver as "A controlled
change in movement or direction of a moving vehicle or vessel, as in the flight path of an
aircraft." [97] In this sense, the use of maneuver in a civil airspace context is an exact analog to
that of the military context. The sense of the word, the implication of the functional definition,
and the intent in enabling maneuver for an UAS is consistent across both the military and civil
sectors. The biggest difference is with respect to the object against which the UAS is being
maneuvered. In the military context, the frame of reference is the "enemy." In the FAA context,
the frame of reference is other aircraft in the airspace, or in the context of ground operations,
physical obstructions in the path of the UAS.
The results from this investigation seemed positive in that using the idea of "maneuver" appears
to provide a common perspective from which to view the enterprise. The question resulting from
this approach is how this translates into a common metric for both sets of decision makers. To
generate additional insight into this, Figure 9-3 provides a way to better visualize how maneuver
looks in both the military and civil airspace contexts. Note that the common axis between the
two contexts is "Safety" while the second axis for military context airspace is "Capability" and
the secondary axis for civil airspace is "Capacity."
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Figure 9-3. Understanding Impact of Maneuver on Enterprise Context.
The validity of the model should be judged by the extent to which it captures and explains the
interview data. By using the "Safety - Capability" space to describe the military airspace
context, nearly all of the cultural and organizational perspectives from the DoD decision makers
can be addressed. The FAA interview data appears to fit equally well with the "Safety -
Capacity" dimensions for the civil airspace. The question that remains is how to characterize the
interaction of these two contexts if they are "swung" together to meet in the middle. This is,
after all, the objective of the exercise. The enterprise purpose statement needs to result in some
lower level attribute that both groups of decision makers can hold in common. The idea that
both the military context and the civil context dimensions could be used to assess the operational
flexibility of the UAS came to the forefront. This is represented in Figure 9-3 as the diagonal
line running through the bottom plane labeled "Operational Flexibility."
The operational attribute of flexibility that is enabled by maneuver will be the common "ility"
used to assess the degree of maneuver delivered to the enterprise (as Figure 9-3 illustrates). The
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use of "flexibility" as a measure for maneuver has the advantage of having a robust theoretical
and literature base against which to establish the appropriate metrics and architectural principles
within the broader engineering and social sciences fields. It is also a basic tenet of air power
theory. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 defines flexibility as follows:
Flexibility allows air and space forces to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously.
Flexibility allows air and space operations to shift from one campaign objective to another,
quickly and decisively; to "go downtown" on one sortie, then hit fielded enemy forces the
next; to rerole assets quickly from a preplanned mission to support an unanticipated need
for close air support of friendly troops in contact with enemy forces. [96]
The American Heritage Dictionary defines the word as follows:
flex-i-ble
1.a. Capable of being bent or flexed; pliable.
1.b Capable of being bent repeatedly without injury or damage.
2. Susceptible to influence or persuasion; tractable.
3. Responsive to change; adaptable: a flexible schedule.
Note that in both cases, the same fundamental characteristics are inherent, primarily the concept
of being able to adapt and being responsive to change. Thus, flexibility provides a basis across
the enterprise for a common way to measure the extent to which the enterprise is delivering value
that all stakeholders can hold in common.
The enterprise intent can now be described in more concrete terms as UAS operations that occur
at the desired level of maneuverability as measured by the delivered flexibility (from both the
DoD and the FAA perspective) to provide the needed mission capability (whether training or
operational), with the appropriate level of safety and with acceptable capacity impacts to the
NAS. Returning to the contextual analysis that started this line of investigation, the ability to
"Restore the Principle of Maneuver" is now show in Figure 9-4 as the overarching basis upon
which both the initial enterprise origin purpose of "train and operate UAS as needed" and
"Enable Global Strike" are designed to enable.
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I ligher level principle of war
required to enable Global
Strike for UAS platforms
/ Enterprise Boundary
I I
What about the "I down" situation since this is where the original "train and operate UAS as
needed" fell apart in the initial analysis? In this case, "Restore Principle of Maneuver" works in
all three of the needed sub-functions. It enables the CONOPs, provides the means of gaining
Figurand thus maintain safety in flight. The final enterprise Purpose Context analysis is depicted in Figure 9-5.mework.
Notice that in this instance the decision is made to hang onto the primary value terms used by the
interviewees by using them as a constraint on the extent to which the principle of maneuver
would need to be delivered in order for the enterprise to find value in the approach.
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I' - Enterprise Boundary
Becomes a constraint on the M
I extent to which maneuver
1 must be provided
Using the CONOPs Access Required Safely, Effecti yand[ ---------- -----Needed foi Mission Airspace Efficien I
Figure 9-5. Final UAS Enterprise Purpose Context Framework.
The revised UAS AI enterprise purpose statement can now be provided, and it is shown with the
checks for completeness, consistency, and attainability in Figure 9-6. Note that the new
enterprise purpose statement has the entire set of intent, function, form, and constraints detailed.
Technically, the function and form should be the result of a first pass at the enterprise
architecture, but for simplicity in presenting the information in a logical progression, the entire
enterprise purpose statement is provided. The development of specific components of the
Enterprise Purpose Statement result as the enterprise architecting effort continues into the next
phase.
Notice, however, what the impact is to the sense of the size of the tradespace that may be
available for moving the effort forward under the new enterprise purpose statement vice the
previous one that was targeted at "routine access". By pushing at the original enterprise purpose
statement from different directions, the insights gleaned from looking at the data differently and
discussing the research with other's in the field provided the additional depth in the scope of the
analysis needed to attack the problem from a more fundamental level.
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Figure 9-6. Final UAS Airspace Integration Enterprise Purpose Statement.
Also note the major enterprise constraints on how the value definition is to be delivered are
included in this definition within the "constraints" aspect of the problem. This helps in resolving
ambiguity and better defining the expectations of all concerned. Just this level of analysis and
the ensuing results in the enterprise purpose statement will lead to a significant change in the
focus and orientation of the UAS AI enterprise.
Again, it is worth pointing out that the entire enterprise purpose statement provided in Figure 9-6
is the result of several iterations between the enterprise purpose statement, the stakeholder
analysis, the interview data, and ultimately the enterprise architecture selected as the best
approach to delivering enterprise value. The iterations between the enterprise purpose statement,
the stakeholder analysis, and the interview data provide the intent, function, and constraints in
the final purpose statement. The form cannot legitimately be determined until after the
enterprise architecting exercise is complete and the final architecture selected. As a preview, the
final architecture selected for the value proposition set the policy requirements to be addressed
explicitly, the process element centers the enterprise with the product view providing the basis
for forward progress.
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UAS AI Enterprise Stakeholder Analysis
With the UAS AI enterprise purpose taking form, an initial set of enterprise stakeholders can be
established. The advantage of having extensive domain knowledge proved to be extremely
beneficial at this stage of the investigation. Armed with previous experience and knowledge
concerning which organizations were involved and the role they played in the airspace
integration activity, it was possible to go through the stakeholder identification effort in a single
pass rather than having to iterate as additional stakeholders were identified. This initial pass was
then validated by a blind interview question posed to each stakeholder to ensure there were no
additional stakeholders beyond the list. In fact, there were no additional stakeholders identified
through the interview process, and the stakeholder identification activity was deemed complete.
The effect was to significantly truncate the stakeholder identification process depicted in Figure
4-6 by only having to loop through the indicated process once.
The results of the stakeholder identification and saliency analysis are provided in Table 9-1.
Notice that even the initial list of 34 organizations identified through the interview process is
significantly smaller than the total number listed by the RTCA in Appendix B. The question that
now presents itself is knowing where to draw the line for who will be considered as the key
stakeholders, or as Ross puts it, the decision makers of the enterprise. [9] Recall from Chapter 4,
the Grossi model provides an initial sorting and preliminary ranking for a large number of
stakeholders. Once the initial list of stakeholders is assembled using the Grossi methodology,
the model developed by Ross to characterize enterprise decision makers is used to further pair
the list down to just those organizations that are central to the enterprise decision making cycle.
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ASTM 2 0 4 3
Table 9-1. UAS Enterprise Stakeholder's and Saliency Ratings.
Further assessment of the saliency index provides for a relatively straightforward way to
categorize the relative importance of each stakeholder. The results demonstrate a distinctive
grouping of the stakeholders with a clear demarcation of the definitive stakeholders for the
enterprise being comprised of the following organizations: ACC/A8, FAA AIR-160, ACC/A3,
FAA AJR-36, 303 AESW, SAF/AQIJ, USD(AT&L), and the PBFA. These in turn can be
mapped to the Ross stakeholder taxonomy with the following assignments:
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AI I10 8 10 87
FAA AJR-36 10 8 10 87
SAF/AQI 8 6 10 63
PBFA 5 5 10 42
AFRL 6 3 10 36
HAF/A3 4 6 8 35
ESC NextGen Office 4 5 7 28
AF UAS Task Force 5 3 8 26
FAA ATO/S 3 5 8 26
FAA ATO/S 3 5 8 26
NASA 5 3 8 26
Congress 1 10 5 22
HAF/A8 2 5 6 17
ICAO 8 2 2 12
ACC/A5 4 2 2 7
OSD(NII) 2 2 3 5
NTSB 3 0 5 5
H/A 2 24>444 7 4I~u;' 2 >. 4I
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Level 0 Organization: USD(AT&L)
Level 1 Firm Organizations: SAF/AQIJ and PBFA
Level 1 Customer Organizations: ACC/A8 and AIR-160
Level 2 Design Organization: 303 AESW
Level 2 User Organization: ACC/A3 and AJR-36
Figure 9-7 illustrates the entire end-to-end stakeholder analysis methodology as applied to the
UAS AI enterprise. For the purposes of this analysis, the above list of decision makers within
the Ross framework will be used moving forward in the assessment. The fundamental
assumption given the scope laid out in Chapter 2 (i.e. MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4) is that if these
eight organizations believe value is being provided to them by enterprise activity, a sustainable
solution can be implemented for the UAS AI challenge.
Stakelder Saliency IndexF A0 C 
_Aa_ _ _07is_ a o sM A.1R-36 10 8 10 87A 5 5 10iuSC NedGe Office 4 5 7 28AF 1)S Ta %k For . 3 a 6
Stakeholder Saliency Index 3 8
5 Salience Index
2 2 3
Figure 9-7. Stakeholder to Decision Maker Process.
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The UAS AI enterprise decision maker set is now defined. In conjunction with the enterprise
purpose statement and the wealth of information collected from the interviews, the basis for
establishing the enterprise value structure is secured.
UAS Al JIPT Value Structure and Alignment
Initial Value Structure Assessment
Based on the information in the previous chapter and the analysis conducted to date on the UAS
AI enterprise purpose statement and decision makers, an X-matrix was constructed depicting the
value structure of the enterprise. Figure 9-8 represents a first pass through the value structure.
Emphasis is on the fact that this is just a first pass. Until the results of the analysis are validated
by the enterprise decision makers, the representativeness of the value structure depicted in Figure
9-8 cannot be stated with total confidence.
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Figure 9-8. UAS Enterprise Value Structure Depicted in an X-matrix.
Before proceeding with the actual assessment, two points are worth making. First, the
stakeholder value axis is comprised of two major groupings. The first three values represent
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those that DoD organizations articulated over the course of the interviews. The second set are
values derived from the FAA responses. Second, the key attributes also divide into two
subcategories. The first set of attributes (4) represent those specific to the desired outcomes of
enterprise activities, labeled as "Enterprise Performance" attributes. The other attributes (5)
represent those attributes that specifically address the strong path dependent nature of arriving at
the enterprise performance attributes. These attributes provide the insight on 'how' the
enterprise performance attributes are delivered.
More on Enterprise Metrics
Given the importance metrics play in driving enterprise behavior, it is important to delve deeper
into the rationale for why the above metrics were chosen the way they were. The first four key
attributes are enterprise output specific as previously described: safety, capacity, capability, and
flexibility. The key safety metrics include the number of accidents per flight hour (lagging
indicator) and the number of deviations from ATC direction (leading indicator). Capacity is
measured primarily in terms of the number of exceptions to standard aircraft performance
requirements that have to be made in order for the UAS to fly through civil airspace, and
capability is measured primarily by the percentage of needed missions that are actually flown.
Flexibility gets aggregated into a measurement of the time required to coordinate or approve a
mission, since this metric is of equal interest and valid to both the military context and the FAA
context.
The enterprise behavior metrics, of which there are five, are intended to drive the enterprise
behavior in very specific ways to address major shortfalls, barriers, or characteristics that came
out of the data collection effort as consistent themes across the entire enterprise decision maker
community. The intent is to ensure the enterprise executes on the delivery of the primary value
mechanism of maneuver in a way that is implementable within the external constraints on budget
and schedule, is cooperative amongst the enterprise stakeholders, actively engages leadership,
clearly defines activities and roles, and establishes solid processes and criteria for arriving at
consensus on enterprise decisions.
The corresponding metrics to these key enterprise behavior characteristics are, respectively, an
assessment of the scope of the enterprise activity to the available budget, time, and CONOPs; the
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degree to which stakeholders feel their perspective is being addressed by the enterprise; the
number and level of stakeholder leaders committed to success across the enterprise activity; the
degree of horizontal and vertical alignment in enterprise activities; and the existence of
standardized, implemented processes and criteria to resolve open issues.
COA Value Structure Assessment
With the understanding that this analysis only attempts to make an initial first pass through the
value-creation chain, and that the results require further iteration with the UAS AI decision
makers, an assessment of the current JIPT effort is provided as a means of understanding how
the emphasis and effort should be assessed. Figure 9-9 provides the results of this analysis.
Figure 9-9. X-matrix Assessment of COAs using Redefined Purpose and Stakeholders.
Note that the existing COA activity only provides a strong degree of correlation across the
enterprise value structure in the "Train and Operate Safely" strategic objective. The next best
alignment is a weak correlation in the value structure with "Train and Operate as Needed." This
assessment is based on the data from interviews with both ACC and the FAA, specifically, the
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inputs received on the extent to which the existing COA process was delivering value. The
supporting rationale follows.
COA Value Delivery Assessment from ACC/A3 and AJR-36
Recall from the previous chapter that discussions with ACC/A3 concerning the value delivery
associated with the COA process revealed a number of important insights for architecting the
future enterprise. [98] Figure 9-10 reproduces the value delivery assessment from ACC first
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Figure 9-10. ACC/A3 Value Delivery Assessment of COA Process.
This provides the basis for the assessment of an overall weak correlation being recorded in the
X-matrix for the "Train and Operate as Needed" strategic objective. Although the case is based
on the current COA process as opposed to a specific JIPT process, the use of the COA for the
current JIPT activity is appropriate since the JIPT Track 1 effort is still in work and no
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Also recall from the previous discussion on COA value delivery that from an AJR-36
perspective, the COA process is working well. Again, the FAA value delivery assessment is
provided in Figure 9-11 for convenient reference. In this case, the rationale for a strong
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Figure 9-11. AJR-36 Value Delivery Assessment of the COA Process.
Using COAs going into the future, however, is something both ACC/A3 and AJR-36 said was of
limited utility in the long-term. The expected growth of the number of COAs processed every
year by AJR-36 (depicted in Figure 9-12) is a clear indication that significant restructuring or
additional hiring will have to be accomplished to sustain even the current level of value delivery
from an ACC perspective.
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Figure 9-12. Actual and Forecasted Number of COAs.
Other ACC Factors
There is also an issue with shifting ACC expectations. The degree to which previously
satisfactory levels of access continue to remain "adequate" as operations expand will very likely
diminish with time. [99] What was acceptable several years ago for training and operations is
meeting with increasing pressure to expand further. This shift in expectations results in an
apparent decline in the level of value delivered by the existing COA process.
Further complicating this picture is the basing of a number of UAS units at various Air National
Guard locations in portions of the country with no access to restricted airspace. This element
was not explicitly addressed by ACC/A3 in the overall value delivery of the existing COA
process, but it was an issue ACC/A8 brought up on several occasions as a growing area of
concern to the Command. [100]
UAS AI Enterprise Value Structure Assessment
The UAS AI enterprise is necessarily broader in its scope and participation than the operational
COA approval process. To provide the appropriate level of understanding for the value flow
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value are provided below. Through the interview process, an attempt was made to construct the
value exchange mechanisms from both an "in" (what inputs they expect to receive) and "out"
(what outputs they expect to contribute) perspective for each organization. This proved to be
complicated by the military culture of "doing what you're told" and varying definitions of the
interfaces between the organizations engaged in the problem. For the purposes here, the value
definitions centric to each organization provide a starting point from which to build the value
propositions that create an actual flow of value through the enterprise. As an academic aside, it
would appear from the anecdotal evidence that decision makers engaged in the airspace
integration activity have a difficult time projecting value inputs they need from other
stakeholders. That said, they all seemed to have a very well developed sense of the value they
deliver from an internal perspective to the enterprise.
ACC/A8 and ACC/A3 Value Definition
Both of these organizations provided very consistent value definitions: train and operate with
UAS to the extent required to fulfill service obligations to the joint warfighter. Discussion
beyond this straightforward declaration of value focused on constraints associated with how this
underlying outcome could, should, or would be accomplished. It was also clear from the
interview data that both of these organizations define the ability to train and operate in very
concrete, tangible terms. Their perception of the value delivery mechanism supporting this
outcome was made in terms of specific platforms being able to operate at specific locations
under specific conditions. There was very little abstraction involved in any of these
conversations with either organization. The bottom line was routinely, "Can I do my mission?"
followed closely by "Is it cost effective?"
AIR- 160 and AJR-36
These two FAA organizations are paired based on the strong degree of correlation in their value
definitions. Both of these organizations' value definition is driven in large measure by the ability
to ensure safe operations in the NAS. Delivery of this value dominates all other considerations
in the value delivery spectrum. This was, in fact, the single value definition provided by AJR-36
during interviews.
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AIR-160, however, did articulate addition value constructs that contribute to their perception of
delivered value. In addition to the need to ensure safe operations, AIR-160 also articulated
several additional value delivery mechanisms that grow out of their engagement with the
airspace integration activity. These include the value derived from enabling the operations
required for another government agency to accomplish its mission, and the value derived from
being able to leverage taxpayer dollars to work toward a common objective with the DoD.
Additional insights gleaned from an analysis of the UAS experimental aircraft certification
process suggests that AIR-160 also perceives value delivery in acquiring UAS data, experience,
and leadership in the regulatory environment. [93] This broader value delivery definition, while
in many ways tied to the safety proposition, is nonetheless significant in providing a richer
understanding of how AIR-160 looks at potential situations and arrives at a value determination
of outcomes.
SAF/AQIJ and the 303 AESW
The value commonality between these two organizations lies in the functional position they
maintain with respect to ACC. These two organizations derive value in their ability to fill
identified shortfalls in materiel capabilities the operational community has identified, or
conversely, to develop a new materiel capability that provides a value to the operational
community. To illustrate, consider the analogy provided during the course of an interview with
SAF/AQIJ:
"SAF/AQ is tasked to weaponize the warfighter. In a historical context, we'd contract
with the blacksmith to make the sword. We'd leave the actual sword fighting to the
knight. If he needed a different kind of sword, we'd go out and get it for him. Now there
a few more rules to fighting, and SAF/AQ is being asked to procure capability in
conformance with the rules for an integrated solution. We would like to be engaged in
working the total solution to the airspace integration challenge--not just fix the 'truck' or
make the 'black box', but be integral to the development of the materiel capability in
conjunction with the policy and regulatory environment in which it will perform." [101]
The 303 AESW further characterized the assessment of value delivery by noting that there are
the dimensions of cost and schedule in addition to performance that are also factored into a value
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judgment determination concerning the activity. In other words, it is not just the delivery of a
materiel asset that is graded. The cost and schedule associated with the development, design,
fabrication, procurement and fielding of the materiel asset are also considered, in conjunction
with how well it meets performance expectations. This is an important point to remember when
organizational dynamics start to factor into the picture. In most military procurement activities,
the 303 AESW would ostensibly own both the authority and resources required to definitize all
three aspects of the effort - schedule, cost, and performance. In the case of the airspace
integration activity, the performance specification lies outside of their direct control or influence.
USD(AT&L)
The value delivery definition for USD(AT&L) looks very similar to that of the 303 AESW and
SAF/AQU. This is to be expected since the organization is also engaged in the acquisition of
materiel capability. There is, however, an important difference between the value delivery
definition of USD(AT&L) and that of the 303 AESW or SAF/AQIJ. USD(AT&L) defines value
as the ability to exercise the required oversight needed to "Push the services for solutions that
will in the end expand the solution space and provide better warfighting capability." [102] The
distinction here may be a bit subtle, but it is an important one to drive home. The primary
objective for the 303 AESW and SAF/AQIJ is the actual production of the materiel solution (e.g.
aircraft, UAS, spacecraft, electronics, etc). The primary purpose of USD(AT&L) is to provide
oversight, and where needed, redirect service efforts to meet materiel shortfalls. USD(AT&L)
does not itself engage directly in the actual procurement or fielding of the materiel capabilities.
PBFA
The DoD Policy Board for Federal Aviation represents the official position of the DoD to the
FAA on matters that are of common interest and applicability to all of the services. It provides a
"one-stop" shop to deal with these cross-service issues. [99] The value definition articulated by
the PBFA is the ability to work an issue across all of the services resulting in a common,
interoperable solution with the FAA. Coordination and standardization, reducing time for
staffing packages, and providing unity of voice from the DoD to the FAA are all key elements to
accomplishing this value delivery.
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Note that a prerequisite to accomplishing this task is consensus from the services on the
existence of a common problem or issue that needs to be worked with the FAA, an agreed to or
at least consensed position on the desired end-state for the PBFA interaction with the FAA, and a
clear understanding of the costs and benefits for pursuing the specified course of action. Without
meeting these basic pre-conditions, it is very difficult for the PBFA value proposition to be met.
X-matrix Summary of UAS AI Enterprise Alignment
To create the necessary alignment between all of the stakeholders described above, the X-matrix
was re-coded to provide strong correlation throughout the entire enterprise value structure. The
result of this analysis is shown in Figure 9-13.
Figure 9-13. X-matrix Evaluation of UAS AI Enterprise.
Again, as an initial pass through the enterprise value structure, Figure 9-13 provides a good point
of departure for going back to the enterprise decision makers for a vector check and to generate
buy-in for the analysis that follows. In this case, there was enough confidence in the proposed
value structure to warrant continuing with the analysis. If however, the architect did not feel
confident the value structure would find widespread agreement amongst the decision makers in
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the enterprise, an additional iteration with these decision makers at this juncture would be
entirely appropriate before expending the needed effort to generate alternative architectures
based on the value structure capture by the X-matrix.
The other question that comes up frequently in the case of assessing the value alignment of
future enterprises is "How do you actually effect the changes put into the matrix?" This is in fact
precisely the point of conducting the next series of activities within the enterprise architecting
domain. The enterprise architecture is the means by which the value alignment proposed in
Figure 9-13 is implemented.
Chapter 9 Summary
The results of the enterprise purpose statement analysis revealed several shortfalls in the JIPT
mission statement and the analysis then concisely bounded the UAS Al enterprise activity. The
stakeholder analysis and subsequent methodology identified three primary groups of enterprise
stakeholders: ACC, the Air Force acquisition community, and the FAA. Use of the X-matrix
provided a way to establish the appropriate enterprise value alignment as the primary input into
the alternative architecture exercise described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 10 - UAS VALUE PROPOSITION CREATION AND SELECTION
"Know your enemy and know yourself and in a hundred battles you will never lose."
- Sun Tzu
The key to creating solid value propositions is insight into each decision maker's value definition
in addition to your own. To be as effective as possible in creating architectures that deliver
enterprise-wide value, the architect must be capable of seeing the context through the eyes of
each individual decision maker and understanding what the value scene looks like from that
decision maker's perspective. This insight coupled with a clear sense for personal biases or
tendencies is the basis for creating solid value delivering architectures. Applying the principle of
war referenced in the above quote by Sun Tzu several millenniums ago to the current application,
if the architect has a deep knowledge of the decision makers' value definitions and a clear
understanding of his or her own predispositions, the result will be a value proposition that will
"never lose."
The previous two chapters provide for understanding the decision maker value definitions. This
chapter now takes that knowledge and applies it using the enterprise architecting methodology
developed in Section II. Before beginning, however, the context is examined in light of each
enterprise architecting view to provide a more robust basis for the QFD analysis. Then the QFD
assessment is conducted to understand which enterprise architecting views play a dominant
design role in the value proposition. Third, the OPM model for the enterprise is constructed
using the results of the QFD model, the enterprise purpose statement, and the X-matrix. Fourth,
the resulting architectures are assessed and the most desirable solution selected for
implementation.
Contextual Assessment of Enterprise Architecting Views
Before conducting the QFD assessment of the enterprise architecting views and the value
attributes from the X-matrix described in the previous chapter, an analysis of the existing
situation from the perspective of each view should be conducted to provide the additional insight
needed to know how important each view is to the various attributes that will be assessed. Once
some understanding of the existing context issues are established with respect to each enterprise
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architecting view, the QFD analysis can be conducted to narrow down the alternative
architecture views that will be assessed as design variables in creating the alternative value
propositions.
Policy/External Factors
The external factors surrounding the enterprise activity have been addressed leading into this
section. The policy aspects, however, warrant some additional attention. The external policies
are a major constraint to developing viable alternatives. Specifically, the USD(AT&L) guidance
on the airspace integration problem stipulates three guiding principles in the generation of a
solution: Do no harm, Conform rather than create, and Establish the precedent. [3] The guidance
from the OSD Unmanned Roadmap is articulated as follows:
"Do no harm. Avoid new initiatives, e.g. enacting regulations for the military user that
would adversely impact the Military Departments' right to self-certify aircraft and
aircrews, ATC practices or procedures, or manned aviation CONOPS or TTPs or that
would unnecessarily restrict civil or commercial flights..."
"Conform rather than create. Apply the existing Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) (formerly known as the Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs) to also cover
unmanned aviation and avoid the creation of dedicated UAS regulations as much as
possible. The goal is to achieve transparent flight operations in the NAS..."
"Establish the precedent. Although focused on domestic use, any regulations enacted
will likely lead, or certainly have to conform to, similar regulations governing UAS flight
in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and foreign domestic (specific
countries') airspace..."
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Figure 10-1. Joint FAA/OSD Approach to Regulating UASs.
The approach to building an integrated UAS capability is shown in Figure 10-1. These policies
formed the historical constraints within which the JIPT activities were conducted and with which
the current enterprise must conform. In addition to this explicit OSD guidance on airspace
integration, there are also the standing policies regarding DoD acquisition requirements, federal
statutory and regulatory requirements, interoperability requirements, and host of others that are
applicable almost exclusively to the product view. They will not be addressed in any greater
degree of detail as they do not have substantial influence on the architecting design activity.
Strategy
The contextual drivers in this enterprise have been detailed previously (See Section I for
additional background). Certain aspects of the resource constraints should also be considered in
this view given the broad ranging implications associated with how funding and manpower are
allocated within the DoD and the impact this has on efforts that are attempting to get off the
ground. Existing resource limitations have placed the "As-Is" enterprise in a position where it
must operate on a "shoe string" budget of $5-$10M per year over the next several years. This
has significant implications for the other views as well as the strategy implemented for a way
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fundamental question of the enterprise purpose itself. In other words, the level at which
"restoring maneuver" will be funded will depend directly on the extent to which senior Air Force
and DoD leadership see the effort contributing to the "1 up" purpose of "enable global strike."
Without completely rehashing the enterprise purpose statement analysis conducted in Chapter 9,
recall the enterprise purpose statement that resulted was the need to restore the principle of
maneuver to UAS platforms. Previous efforts at UAS airspace integration have failed not
because they lacked talent or the ability to execute at the program level. Nothing could be
further from the truth. These activities have had the benefit of some of the best minds in DoD,
FAA, and industry working extremely challenging technical and procedural requirements to turn
integrated operations for UAS into reality. Recall the enterprise purpose statement analysis
indicated the primary shortfall for the JIPT was in the thrust of the purpose statement itself--
standards were the means rather than the end, and instead restoring maneuver should be the
focus.
This is all well and good at the level at which the current multi-program analysis is being
conducted; however, a "1 up" analysis of this redefined purpose of "restoring maneuver" will
reveal a major hurdle in realizing this value proposition. The primary issue, at a strategic level,
to initiating an effort to "restore maneuver" to UAS platforms is the need to balance the extent of
investment in restoring maneuver with the benefit that results in the delivery of the "1 up"
purpose described in Chapter 9 as "Enable Global Strike." In other words, the value proposition
at the next level up from the currently defined UAS airspace integration enterprise is not
"maneuverable UAS" but rather "enabled global strike." The extent to which Air Force senior
leadership will find value in an investment in the UAS AI enterprise is dictated by the increase
such an investment makes in the Air Force's ability to conduct global strike missions.
From a strategic view, then, the enterprise architect's responsibility is to align the value structure
between the "1 up" GSTF extended enterprise and the UAS AI enterprise purpose as defined in
Chapter 9. This amounts to the enterprise architect ensuring that the analysis conducted in
Chapter 9 on the enterprise purpose statement and value structure integrate directly into the
efforts of the UAS AI enterprise architecture. This is accomplished by explicitly calling out the
need to develop a strategic approach to the problem that actively seeks feedback from the "1 up"
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level of the GSTF extended enterprise on how well the path pursued by the UAS AI enterprise
satisfies the need for "enabling global strike."
To illustrate how this looks in practice for the UAS challenge, consider the perspective provided
by Mr. Parker at SAF/AQIJ concerning the extent to which the UAS AI enterprise should be
resourced to pursue putting additional maneuver on UAS:
". .. as the proportion of the force that goes unmanned increases, the ability of the overall
force structure to maneuver incrementally declines. It is not, ultimately then, about
scratching the itch of UAS advocates and their architectures.
"When we think about the larger picture, some level of capability-challenged UAS is okay.
When USAF flew then-called drones off of DC-130s in Vietnam times, nobody was, or
would have been, concerned about the maneuver of the rest of the force structure being
impaired. Failure to solve this is no big deal IF UAS are few and fill in small niche
capabilities.
"...maneuver for the strike package is what is key, for training, deployments and
operations... We're certainly past a tipping point when we now start thinking about strike
packages. From Gen Jumper [former Air Force Chief of Staff], 'Prior to any conflict,
preparation is key. The team of GSTF [Global Strike Task Force] assets, aligned within an
AEF [Air Expeditionary Force], will be on call and ready for immediate tasking to hot
spots around the globe. As in any emerging crisis, the first requirements call for ISR
platforms. [103]'
"Platforms enable CONOPs... as we see in this quote, the CONOPs implicitly calls for the
ISR platforms to be yet EVEN MORE responsive to get to an AOR [Area of
Responsibility] to prepare for the strike force - for not just "targets" and "fires" as we may
traditionally think, but for advance logistics, force protection, the whole deal. If you move
your ISR force to unmanned platforms in a big way before they have freedom-of-
navigation capabilities [equate with maneuver], the foundation of the house of cards is
undermined ..."
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The strategic task before the enterprise architect is to fundamentally understand and coordinate
across the UAS AI enterprise boundary with senior Air Force, DoD, and FAA leadership on the
extent to which these other organizations are willing to resource "restoring maneuver" given the
"1 up" considerations just detailed. By articulating the purpose as "restore maneuver", the UAS
AI enterprise has brought to the forefront the strategic importance of the effort to "enable global
strike" and provided an effective handle for the UAS AI enterprise architect (and for that matter,
the enterprise decision makers) to communicate the connection between the enterprise efforts
and those of the extended enterprise at the Air Force, DoD , and FAA levels.
Practically, the impact on the enterprise architecting effort is a clear articulation of the
constraints the "1 up" value structure imposes on the enterprise architecture effort. In other
words, the results of the strategic level alignment in value structures across the enterprise
boundary will be a clear articulation by the GSTF extended enterprise on the constraints under
which the principle of maneuver will have to be restored to UAS platforms in order to deliver the
"1 up" value definition of "enable global strike."
Process
The above discussion on the broader strategic issues that need to be resolved notwithstanding,
the analysis returns to the specifics of what will be required for a successful enterprise effort at
the multi-program level. The activity model implemented by the JIPT to accomplish the airspace
integration activity was fundamentally sound; however, the JIPT effort is still attempting to
deliver the single most important process required for value delivery-a joint safety analysis
framework for proposed UAS operations that would be conducted collaboratively between the
DoD and the FAA. As JIPT Track 2 Activity Center efforts ramped up, and major planning
efforts were started for better defining the scope of activities for the longer-term solution, the
immediate need for a common safety assessment process fell by the wayside, despite several
attempts to propel it along. It lacked the sustained level of resources and attention needed to turn
it into an implementable approach to make a tangible difference to the approval of near-term
operations.
At a more fundamental level, the JIPT effort also needed a clear process and criteria for making
important scope, budget, manpower, and technical decisions. In "Managing the Human-Side of
Page 224
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
Technological Innovation," Katz makes a convincing case from the literature and empirically
collected evidence that in the absence of a well-defined, agreed upon goal or objective, a team
must create criteria for how decisions will be made or chaos will surely follow. [19] This
shortfall in the JIPT process model resulted in a struggle to generate an overall coherence to the
activity that people could see, understand, and follow. Instead, individuals were often unclear
about what needed to be done, what objectives they were attempting to meet, or what success
looked like for their part of the initiative. It also led to suboptimal allocation of resources since
budget allocation was not accomplished in a manner consistent with a well-articulated, published
set of criteria.
There was also a distinct need for processes that enabled cross-functional sharing of information
between efforts engaged on different parts of the problem. This was especially true as the effort
started to mature on the equipage issues that needed to be resolved. The ad hoc nature of
meetings, the distributed nature of the organizations involved in the effort, and the lack of focus
on creating meaningful interaction at the technical level created significant hurdles to effective
and efficient transfer of information. Much of this communication gap was the result of the
distributed nature of the enterprise, and a web-based application was put in place to better
facilitate the exchange of information. Unfortunately, this venue never really proved to be
effective for the transmittal of technical information. Allen describes the phenomenon
associated with how different types of information are communicated in organizations with
associated studies that show technically rich information content almost always requires a face-
to-face meeting to be effective. [104] This fact has significant implications for the
organizational view considered next.
Organization
The organizational issues associated with the previous UAS AI efforts were substantial, and they
represent a significant design challenge for the enterprise architect to establish a meaningful
organizational paradigm in a highly-distributed entity with a dispersed authority structure. An
organizational analysis conducted using Allen's framework found the fundamental JIPT
organizational structure sound given the nature of the problem. In this analysis, a major
consideration in the organizational structure is the determination of whether to go with a project-
centric structure, a functional-centric structure or a matrixed structure. As Figure 10-2
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illustrates, a number of different parameters feed into the decision on which type of
organizational structure to implement. In the case of the JIPT effort, the organization was
suitably positioned in the organizational design space to accommodate the rate at which
knowledge is advancing (dK/dt), the degree of subsystem interdependencies (Iss), and the overall
length of the project (Ti). [105]
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Figure 10-2. Variables Impacting Choice between Project vs. Functional Structure.
The three primary roadblocks in the JIPT context are the number of organizational boundaries
present within the JIPT membership, the geographically distributed nature of the team, and the
lack of any consistent, fundamental innovation occurring within the SIPTs or ACs. The major
issues to be addressed included the following:
To help bridge the organizational boundaries, the recommendation is to create a
common model of the end-to-end problem that will allow all of the SIPTs and ACs to
understand where they fit in the broader picture, and to get everyone discussing the same
problem in the same language.
Page 226
Iss
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
The JIPT should institute better management of the meetings it is conducting in order
to realize the full benefit of the opportunities these forums represent for communicating
complex technical information in a face-to-face venue.
Increase the number of face-to-face communication opportunities. This is especially
true with respect to the amount of unstructured, informal time in which people could
discuss the issues they felt were important to them or their particular SIPT.
The quality of innovation within the JIPT is the third challenge in need of some
additional insights. In this case, decreasing the total number of personnel working on
the problem and increasing the percentage of time for each remaining individual
would likely pay significant dividends.
Gains in the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the UAS integration effort could be
realized if the team were at least co-located and if the total number of organizations
represented could be whittled down to around seven total, but certainly no more
than 10.
The organizational design aspects of the enterprise architecting effort must address the above
issues if the inefficiencies associated with the previous efforts are to be minimized or eliminated.
Knowledge
The need to manage information and data in the JIPT airspace integration enterprise was just
beginning to take shape at the current level of activity. In this case, the knowledge management
activity needs to be able to deal with a future quantity of data that will be extremely large and
will need to be accessed from differing motivations and needs. As a consequence, the enterprise
architecture will need a robust metadata standard, a process for accepting, verifying, and
validating data submitted for inclusion in the data repository, and methods for extracting the
desired information quickly to meet varied demands. The IT view will need to tie into this
aspect of the Knowledge view very closely.
The JIPT effort had just started defining the elements that needed to be considered in this view.
As such, it represents a relatively nascent view, and it is likely that the requirements for what the
Knowledge architectural requirements look like will need to be developed as the enterprise
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becomes better informed about what kind of information and data is important to collect and
analyze. It will also be important that the information associated with the effort be seamlessly
available to all of the enterprise stakeholders.
Information Technology
A number of important aspects of the enterprise will need to be enabled through the IT view.
Knowledge capture will depend heavily on an IT system that is capable of extending to meet the
growing data storage, security, and data type requirements. It must also provide a mechanism to
the Organizational view that will help breach some of the organizational inefficiencies associated
with the distances at which the various enterprise stakeholders interact and share information and
data. Providing a platform on which to launch a common enterprise model is paramount to solid
progress being made on this issue.
From a Product perspective, the IT architecture becomes one of several dominant features. The
issue of command and control (C2), data links, bandwidth, security, automation schemes, etc.
drives much of the physical design space around the implementation of the needed equipage.
The IT view is highly coupled with the Product view, and there are likely aspects to this that are
not even apparent with the current level of understanding on the problem. Additional constraints
in this arena include how spectrum management and radio frequency allocations will occur; what
communication protocols will be used; the general issue of how and which standards will be
applied and enforced; what the impacts are to flight critical software and on-board processing
requirements with the addition of a man-on-the-loop, autonomous collision avoidance system;
and host of others.
While some of these issues are yet distant in the future, others have already overtaken the effort.
Protected frequency for UAS use in communicating with ATC and maintaining C2 links is
already a growing concern with a number of enterprise stakeholders. The extent to which the
enterprise architecture needs to proactively deal with some of these issues remains an open
question at this point, but clearly there is a need for an explicit treatment of these issues within
the broader effort.
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Product
The product issues are substantial. The one that drives many of the other aspects of the
technological challenge is the modular versus integral architecture debate. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the Sense-and-Avoid equipage requirements. In this case, there is a
fundamental disconnect between where the technology performance puts the preferred type of
architecture (integral) versus what various stakeholders (specifically the FAA) would prefer to
see implemented for the purposes of testing, evaluation, and the ability to provide a broader base
of manufacturing capability to the problem. [106] The current airspace integration product
development state is clearly in the early ferment stage of Figure 10-3. Every penny is going into
figuring out how to get the needed performance out of sensors, processors, algorithms,
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Figure 10-3. Characteristic Product/Industry Life Cycle Phenomena.
In this early ferment stage, the natural technological infrastructure needed to support these high
performance demands is an integrative design. The natural progression is for a large, diverse
number of entrants into the market at this stage. Recall, for the JIPT activity, the product is
focused on the equipage requirements needed for sense-and-avoid, reliable C2, situational
awareness for pilots in ground stations, etc. None of these "products" are at any significant level
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of maturity at this point (at least from a technology trajectory standpoint depicted in Figure
10-3).
Unfortunately, the highly regulated nature of the NAS environment precludes a "natural"
evolution of technology in this sphere, at least from the perspective of several key components,
one of them being the sense-and-avoid solution. The nature of the FAA's safety assessment
process, the testing regime, and the unknown performance requirements all drive design
decisions that look much more like spirally developed, modular architectures. This is clearly an
additional element of tension at the product level that the enterprise architecture will need to
account for and accommodate. The lack of broader engagement from DoD prime contractors on
this issue might be in part due to this conflict.
As an aside, it should also be pointed out that the above discussion is not intended to imply that
the FAA is responsible for conducting all of the safety testing required to enable broader UAS
integration into the NAS. In fact, the safety assessment process itself is pretty generic and very
similar between both the DoD and the Department of Transportation (DoT). More to the point,
the Air Force and DoD will establish and run their own safety assessment programs and provide
the data to the FAA for further assessment. The FAA is not funded or manned to take on the
level of effort required to accomplish the amount of work required. A major task of the
enterprise architect is to arrive at a structure that recognizes this distinction in roles while also
minimizing the possibility that the DoD and the FAA might arrive at different conclusions while
assessing the same data set.
Another way to look at the product architecture requirement for the existing state is to consider
where the typical UAS flight in the NAS winds up in the space defined in Figure 10-4. [107]
From a military in-theater usage standpoint, the UAS is in the "smash hit" quadrant because
there isn't much change required to the way the Air Tasking Order gets done, and the perceived
payoff is significant (although, as the discussion in "Strategy" points out, the lack of maneuver
on UAS platforms is setting up significant issues for how UAS capability will move forward into
the future). When the context is shifted to the NAS, however, UAS airspace integration flips
down into the lower right corner, the "Long Haul" quadrant, because the behavior change that is
required on the part of the existing infrastructure is high with the current UAS performance
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capabilities. There is actually a degradation in the overall performance of the system when it
does accommodate the UAS. The enterprise architecture needs to address this aspect of the
problem by developing a full spectrum of options in the product design that provide a way for
the UAS to migrate out of the lower right quadrant and into the upper right segment. Just as
importantly, the enterprise stakeholder community needs to see and understand this dynamic to
facilitate better alignment at the philosophical level for what needs to be done moving forward in
the design space. This is a view that fundamentally supports the need to address the other axis of
the "civil airspace" context presented in Chapter 9--the "capacity" axis in Figure 9-3.
Figure 10-4. Capturing Value from Innovations.
Services
For the UAS AI enterprise, and likewise for the existing JIPT effort, the Services view is not
considered as one of the active views. The UAS Al effort is oriented around the delivery of
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Product-focused effort as opposed to one characterized as a "Service" oriented industry or case
study. As a result, the Service element will be dropped from further consideration.
Summary of Enterprise View Context Analysis
A number of recent and on-going efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace provide the
context for the current enterprise activity. These efforts yield a significant degree of insight into
the difficulties associated with creating a sustained effort for solving this issue (due in large part
to the overarching problem of unifying senior leadership on the need to "restore maneuver" as
discussed in the "Strategy" view). The NASA Access 5 effort, the RTCA SC-203, the JIPT, and
the USD(AT&L) UAS Task Force activities provide key insights for the current effort.
Augmenting this information with the specifics of the data collection effort undertaken for the
current analysis results in a fully characterized environment in which the UAS airspace
integration enterprise will need to operate. With the above information for insight, the QFD
analysis is undertaken to assess the relative contributions of each enterprise architecting view to
each of the enterprise attributes.
QFD Analysis
Applying the approach developed in Section II, the QFD analysis for the enterprise architecture
"views-to-enterprise" attribute mapping is provided in Table 10-1. For this assessment, the
dominant enterprise architecting views turn out to be Strategy, Policy, Process, and Product.
Going in the other direction, the attributes that appear to be influenced by the most views are
'safety', 'civil capacity', 'military capability', 'useful increment of ops flexibility', and 'well-
defined process'.
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Table 10-1. QFD Assessment of Views-to-Attributes Mapping.
The implications from the QFD analysis suggests that 'Organization', 'Knowledge', and
'Information Technology' related issues should be resolved through the use of a common
approach that satisfactorily addresses the issues presented in the previous section, but will not be
varied as actively traded design variables in the alternative architecture tradespace. The
remainder of the views are assessed further to understand what the interactions are and how they
should be treated in the alternative architecture design space.
All of the interview data, with one exception, treated policy as a constraint on the problem as
opposed to something the decision makers felt they had any ability to influence directly. Even in
the one case where a policy constraint was brought up as a major issue that needed to be worked,
the interviewee had little hope that it could be changed in any substantial way, at least within
realistic timeframes on which this analysis is being conducted. As a result of the interview data,
the 'Policy' view, while clearly an important influence on the enterprise, will be treated as a
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constraint. The net result of this decision will be to treat it as a constant much as the
'Organization', 'Knowledge', and 'Information Technology' views are static in the analysis.
Also recall that the previous discussion on 'Strategy' highlighted the higher-level "l-up" issues
associated with coalescing senior Air Force, DoD, and FAA leadership around the need to
"restore maneuver" to UAS platforms based on "enabling global strike." Regardless of the final
enterprise architecture selected for moving the UAS AI effort forward, the need to create this
unified perspective on the level of investment in the principle of maneuver as the underlying
raison d'8tre of the UAS AI enterprise is an a priori requirement for moving any activity
forward.
Further analysis within the 'Strategy' view at the multi-program level reveals another set of
dependencies, primarily the coupling that should take place between the 'Strategy' view and
those of 'Process' and 'Product'. Recall from the previous discussion on the product view that
the overall approach should be tailored to account for where the product is within the technical
evolutionary trajectory in addition to the interactions in "customer" behavior. The evolutionary
trajectory path is an assessment that falls directly out of the 'Product' view, and in the case of the
impacts to "customer" behavior, the 'Process' view speaks to this dynamic. The implication of
these observations (coupled with the previous paragraph on the principle of maneuver) is that
'Strategy' is in fact a derived quantity for the UAS AI enterprise depending on the choices that
are made for 'Process' and 'Product'. Thus it is no longer considered a true design variable since
it can be determined based on the design decisions made in the other two views. In addition, the
strategic imperative to bring a unified perspective to the level of resourcing that should be
applied to the effort to restore maneuver based on the contribution to enabling global strike is a
common requirement across all possible alternative architectures regardless of the specifics that
come out of the combination of the 'Process' and 'Product' views.
Figure 10-5 provides a summary of the QFD results and analysis for the purposes of moving
forward with the alternative architecture development.
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Figure 10-5. "Active" UAS Airspace Integration Enterprise Views.
In summary, the QFD assessment revealed that there were four primary views that influenced
attribute delivery for the enterprise. These were 'Strategy', 'Policy', 'Process', and 'Product.'
Of these views, additional analysis found that 'Policy' could not be changed with any degree of
confidence in the outcome and is treated as a constraint. The 'Strategy' view was determined to
be both an a priori requirement for all architectures (i.e. a unified perspective on the need for
restoring maneuver) and a derived value from 'Process' and 'Product'. It was likewise removed
from the active design space. This leaves 'Process' and 'Product' as the two dominant decision
variables explored with alternative architectures in the next several sections.
UAS Enterprise Alternative Architectures
UAS Airspace Integration Enterprise Object Process Model
Using the methodology described in Section II and the information collected and assessed from
the X-matrix and QFD, an OPM for the UAS AI enterprise was constructed. The result of this
effort is depicted in Figure 10-6.
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Figure 10-6. UAS Enterprise Architecture OPM,
The first layer, the far left "stack" labeled "Enterprise Scope and Purpose" encapsulates the
overall enterprise purpose and scope by explicitly enumerating the value focus ("Restore
Maneuver") to the object of that focus ("Level 3-5 AF UAS"). The process of "Restoring
Maneuver" is further characterized by the attribute of "Operational Flexibility." Stack 1 one can
be described as simply the enterprise intent and scope communicated in OPM language.
The second layer, the "Enterprise Views" stack, is just that-the seven "views" represented by
the enterprise architecting framework. The color-coding is relatively straight forward, but
technically should not be done until after the entire model is constructed. The grey boxes
represent those views that do not significantly contribute as major drivers within the internal
enterprise context (as determined by the QFD analysis). The red box, 'Policy', is a significant
architectural constraint in the design that must be satisfied, as previously explained. The green
boxes represent the views that have active, independent designs and trades connected with their
content-for this analysis, 'Process' and 'Product'. The yellow box, 'Strategy', is an actively
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designed view, but it must address the underlying value consensus for restoring maneuver and it
is dependent on the 'Process' and 'Product' views per the previous analysis.
Stack 3, "Enterprise Attributes," is taken directly from the X-Matrix key attributes column, and
"put into action." In other words, the X-matrix describes "states" that characterize the enterprise.
In the architecture generation model described here, these states are transformed into processes
with verbs per the methodology described in Section II. The result of accomplishing these
processes will be the desired value delivery annotated in the X-Matrix. Each of these attribute
processes is color-coded based on the number of active enterprise views that an attribute process
interacts with.
Stack 4, the stack furthest to the left, the "points of leverage", are the mechanisms needed by the
attribute processes in order to actualize the result of their processes. They are classified as either
agent mechanisms involving human interaction (connected with a filled black circle), or as
instrument mechanisms (connected with an open circle). As an example, consider the path trace
from "Restore Maneuver" to "Process" to "Foster Cooperation." The job of the architect is to
come up with as many different possible types of mechanisms as possible attached to the end of
this sequence that facilitates the delivery of better enterprise cooperation within the 'Process'
domain. For the OPM in Figure 10-6, the possible mechanisms that might contribute to the
successful "fostering of cooperation" include "collective data gathering", "shared PM
responsibilities", "joint-led teams", and "established criteria."
Candidate Architectures: Views Held in Common
Implementing the full QFD and OPM models just described for the UAS AI enterprise results in
the determination that of the seven different views, only four played a significant role in driving
the enterprise performance and behavior. Recall, however, that in the QFD analysis the 'Policy'
view is treated as a design constraint or constant. In addition, recall that there is also one
element of the 'Strategy' view that is also consistent across architectures-the need to create a
unified senior leadership perspective on restoring maneuver to UAS platforms based on the
contribution to enabling global strike.
Page 237
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
These "four and half' views (policy, organization, knowledge, information technology, and the
first element of strategy) were not actively traded between candidate architectures. As a
consequence, they are all described up front before the specific candidate architectures are
enumerated since they draw upon largely the same structure in each of these views. Note that
just because these views are not actively included as design variables in the alternative
architecture development process does not mean the architect ignores them. It simply means
each of these views only needs to be designed once to deal with the specific value attributes to
which the view contributes. The specifics for the "design" of each of these four and half views
follows.
Policy View
As described previously earlier in this chapter, the current policy from USD(AT&L) dictates
three axioms that will be observed as a solution to the airspace integration effort: Do no harm,
conform rather than create, and set the precedent. These policies drive the consideration of
airspace integration as the principle means by which to restore the principle of maneuver. The
astute observer will have no doubt looked at the architecture development segment in Figure
10-6 and wondered what necessitated the integration of UAS into the airspace in order to restore
the needed degree of maneuverability. After all, there are likely a number of different ways in
which the Air Force could restore maneuver to these platforms that do not require their
integration into the National Airspace System (although this perspective would do violence to
the belief that freedom of navigation and the principle of maneuver are tightly interwoven in the
UAS context).
Air Combat Command continues to look into other venues for doing just this in fact. One of
these mechanisms involves the implementation of Part 93, Special Air Traffic Rule, for custom
designed airspace. By ACC's own admission, however, the likelihood of this approach gaining
any traction is extremely remote, and the clear consensus was that the only viable, long-term
option is to pursue a capability that provides for routinely integrated UAS operations in the NAS.
Other suggestions such as different basing locations (both within and without the U.S.), changes
to the airspace structure itself to provide for dedicated UAS airspace, and others as far out as
"Buying Albania" have been floated at various points in the past. All of them suffer from the
same fundamental shortcoming in that they do not materially improve the intrinsic ability of the
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UAS platform to maneuver. As a result, integrating them into the civil airspace structure
continues to remain foremost on the "desired" list as the way to restore maneuver to these
platforms.
Since the 'Policy' view remains relatively unchanged from that described previously in the
context assessment earlier in the chapter, the discussion will not be reproduced here. The only
additional aspect that is worth mentioning is the potential evolution of the NAS structure as the
Next Generation Air Transportation System becomes better defined and funding begins to flow
into modernization. This would fundamentally change the external context of the enterprise and
would trigger a re-evaluation of the decision to treat policy as a constraint.
Organizational View
Recall from the context assessment that several recommendations came out of the analysis of the
JIPT organizational structure. Most of the issues identified within the organizational view find
their way into the mechanisms of "Joint Led Teams" and "Establish Criteria." As pointed out
previously, many of the organizational issues faced by the JIPT can be mitigated by a simple
down scoping of the number of different organizations involved in the activity. Recall, the
analysis indicated the JIPT effort had the appropriate organizational structure in place, but it
needed additional help on several important implementation considerations.
To overcome many of the organizational interface barriers, the current organizations should
implement several changes that would dramatically increase the degree of communication and
information flow. First, a regular 18-24 month personnel rotation should be established between
the active organizations in the enterprise. This would pay significant dividends in the quantity
and quality of the communication occurring between geographically dispersed offices.
Second, a common model for discussion reference and investigation is an absolute must if
substantive dialogue is going to occur as things move into the future. Interview data shows very
clearly that different organizations are still talking past one another, even after working the issue
together in the same rooms for over two years. A common reference model would provide a
much needed grounding point for discussions and evaluations. It provides a mechanism for
bridging the geographical and cultural divides between enterprise decision makers.
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Resolution on the third organizational issue, lack of consistent innovation, will be addressed
through the interaction of some of the other views, principally the 'Process' and 'Knowledge'
views. The tie back to the organizational element is important to bring out, however, because the
best source of high quality innovations occurs within an individual's own organization. [108]
This means the 'Knowledge' management and 'Process' views need to provide a mechanism that
reinforces this type of collaboration. This impacts the "Foster Cooperation" attribute process,
and suggests an additional supporting object may need to be included that enables this process to
establish the appropriate interactions between the 'Organizational', 'Process', and 'Knowledge'
views.
Knowledge View
In the 'Knowledge' view, the architecture needs to enable several key enterprise performance
and behavioral attributes, primarily "Ensure Safety" and "Foster Cooperation." To enable the
"Ensure Safety" attribute process, the 'Knowledge' view needs the mechanisms of "Educated
Participants", and "Collective Data Gathering". Education will need to be a systematic effort
that starts with the participants closest to the current UAS activities, and then grows outward
from there to inform and educate other airspace users and controllers until the level of
understanding concerning UAS platforms is as ubiquitous as knowledge and expectations
concerning manned aircraft.
The "Collective Data Gathering" mechanism provides a strong linkage between the 'Knowledge'
view and the 'Information Technology' view. Essential for the appropriate collection of data is
an understanding of what information is needed to collect the appropriate data to inform the
decisions or change the appropriate criteria. While the 'Information Technology' view plays a
key role in the infrastructure needed to capture and retrieve the needed information, it is the
'Knowledge' view that ultimately describes why the data in the 'IT' view is important and how it
will be used to inform other decisions.
Under "Foster Cooperation" the primary mechanisms are "Collective Data Gathering", "Shared
PM Responsibility", "Joint Led Teams", and "Establish Criteria." Note that "Collective Data
Gathering" is already emerging as a potential tradeoff point in the architecture as it has now
shown up in several different attribute processes as a mechanism. By "Establishing Criteria" for
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what data needs to be collected under the auspices of fostering cooperation, a key path
dependency in the enterprise is addressed, namely the quality and integrity of the data provided
for safety assessments. It also provides a method for the enterprise stakeholders to discuss and
get smart on the differing assumptions and criteria they are bringing to the table with respect to
their safety considerations. The principle forum that enables this is the "Joint Led Teams"
mechanism. By systematically going through and connecting these various mechanisms back
through the attribute processes and views, a clear picture of the interactions between views,
processes, and mechanisms begins to come into focus.
Information Technology View
The 'IT' view provides many of the critical interfaces needed between the other views. As
previously mentioned, the 'Organizational' view needs to stay connected to the 'Product' and
'Knowledge' views, and 'Knowledge' needs 'IT' internally in order to carry out its own
requirements for data collection, storage, and retrieval.
Fortunately, bandwidth for shipping data between organizations is not typically an issue, at least
within the FAA and the DoD. There are a few issues to be resolved with respect to domain
permissions, and a dedicated shared resource may need to be established and maintained in order
to address some of these file sharing and collaboration issues between IT systems, but these are
all within the grasp of the enterprise to make happen with existing tools and technologies.
Further definition of the 'IT' view may not be possible in any level of explicit detail until things
progress further in the evolution of some of the other views. This is especially true with respect
to trying to define the command and control IT requirements for portions of the 'Product' view.
Of some interest, the ATAM approach actually recognizes this uncertainty in the construction of
architectures. [14] It specifically calls out this fact by saying the following:
"...it is not uncommon for an architect to answer an elicitation question by saying: 'we
haven't made that decision yet'. In this case you cannot point to a component or property in
the architecture and call it out as a sensitivity point because the component or property
might not exist yet."
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Given the level of maturity in the effort, the 'IT' view is an area that does not lend itself to the
identification of more concrete, specific design decisions. The "wait-and-see" decision to not
decide must be documented and then revisited as other things fall into place later in the effort.
Strategy View
Aside from the 'Policy' view, unifying senior leadership on a clear articulation of the constraints
for restoring the principle of maneuver to UAS platforms is the single most important element
the architect must design into the UAS AI architecture. This is the first element addressed under
the 'Strategy' view described previously. The rationale for this reasoning is relatively straight-
forward. Recall that under the enterprise purpose statement analysis, the conclusion was the
enterprise should focus on "restoring the principle of maneuver" to UAS platforms. This
addresses the identified shortfalls and constraints elucidated under the enterprise purpose
statement framework nicely, but it gives rise to a practical consideration from the strategic
perspective, namely the premise that "restoring the principle of maneuver" is an underpinning
construct that those "1 up" from the current enterprise will see as a valid value definition from
the standpoint of "enabling global strike."
This underlying premise is captured beautifully at the OSD-level by one interviewee who said,
"Leadership is the firewall to identifying value. If leadership doesn't believe there is value to
UAS airspace integration, nothing else matters-money, manpower, etc." The implication in
both the quote and the consideration driving the current strategy view is the need to carefully
consider the extended enterprise impact when declaring the enterprise purpose statement or
intent. In this case, the data from the interviews suggests that a simple declaration of "restore the
principle of maneuver" as the underlying value definition needs to be reconciled with a higher-
level group of decision makers that fall outside the current scope of the decision makers
considered for this analysis, and who's value definition centers around "enable global strike" not
"restore the principle of maneuver."
The consequence of this "1 up" assessment of the GSTF extended enterprise decision makers
means the system architect must implement a strategy that accounts for the constraints from the
"1 up" level to build a unified perspective on the UAS AI enterprise value definition-restore the
principle of maneuver. As the quote points out, unless senior leadership sees the value in
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restoring maneuver to UAS platforms (the contribution it makes to "enabling global strike") in
the manner articulated by the UAS AI enterprise, none of the rest of the analysis and
recommendations will result in any lasting value delivery. If the UAS AI enterprise value
structure around "restore maneuver" is not well-articulated with respect to the GSTF extended
enterprise value structure centered around "enable global strike", the perceived value exchange
with respect to "restore maneuver" will only be secondary at best.
It should be apparent that this continually expanding boundary of the enterprise scope could go
on ad infinitum as each successive layer of decision maker is considered in the process. Recall,
the purpose of this research is to address the problem at the multi-program level, effectively
placing the senior leadership of the Air Force, the DoD, and the FAA outside the immediate
enterprise boundary and into the "GSTF extended enterprise" or "1 up" level in the enterprise
purpose framework from the perspective of the current analysis. The practical result of this
scoping decision is that the issue of creating a unified senior leadership position on the value of
"restoring the principle of maneuver" lies outside the scope of the current analysis, but the need
to bring the extended enterprise together for a consensus on the constraints becomes a strategic
factor in the success of the enterprise. If this cannot be achieved, the enterprise will have
virtually no ability to deliver long-term value.
The immediate task of the enterprise architect is to arrive at an enterprise strategy that enables
the required convergence of senior leadership on the current UAS AI enterprise constraints.
Practically speaking, the most effective path is to tie the principle of maneuver (and the
associated military doctrine with techniques, tactics, and procedures), freedom of navigation, and
the shifting of capability from manned aircraft to unmanned platforms with an objective analysis
of projected capability the Air Force will be equipped to provide the combatant commander in
the future. This should be done specifically as it relates to "enable global strike" CONOPS as
detailed earlier in this chapter. This approach is complicated by the realization that current force
structure decisions have resulted in an actual perceived increase in the level of combat capability
the Air Force is providing to the combatant commander with UAS assets. The analysis must
clearly draw out the underlying basis for current operations and demonstrate the extremely
limited set of conditions under which current operations are extensible to the broader
environment in which these platforms must ultimately operate to be compatible with Air Force
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and DoD doctrine and principles of war (commensurate with the perspective articulated by Gen
Jumper on the role ISR platforms will play moving into the future [103]). There should also be a
clear picture of the compromises made to the basic tenets of airpower in order to put UAS into
wartime operation along side of manned aircraft.
Clearly this aspect of the analysis is both highly nuanced and on the fringe of the enterprise
scope defined in this analysis; however, the architect is beholden to the enterprise decision
makers to create an enterprise architecture that will successfully deliver the needed value under
the constraints imposed by the "1 up" GSTF extended enterprise. In this instance, the architect
needs to address the very definition of value and the lack of clear constraints within the senior
Air Force, DoD, and FAA leadership on this topic. Significant iteration with the UAS AI
enterprise decision makers will be required to refine and implement an effective strategy for
achieving the desired ends, but the effort is paramount to a successful enterprise architecture.
Service View
The 'Service' component of the enterprise architecture framework does not really play to any
significant degree in the current enterprise (as alluded to previously). An argument could be
advanced that the FAA's role in the enterprise is primarily one of a service provider, but this
perspective misses the fundamental distinction that arises as a result of the FAA's regulator role.
A significant degree of insight was shed on this aspect of the FAA's approach to UAS airspace
integration by Blackburn et al. looking at the issue of UAS experimental aircraft certification
(EAC) procedures conducted by the FAA's airworthy certification office (including AIR-160 as
a major element in the EAC approval process). [93] The upshot of the UAS EAC process
evaluation was that while it was possible to develop a value proposition in both directions (i.e. on
the part of both the industry applicant and the FAA), the relationship could not be characterized
as anything close to what would normally be considered a "service" type of activity.
Candidate Architectures: Differing Views
The 'Process', 'Product' and second half of the 'Strategy' view will now be described for the
two primary architectures resulting from the architecture generation effort. These are labeled as
"Architecture 1 - Process Focused", and "Architecture 2 - Product Focused." In each instance,
the pro's and con's associated with each view will be assessed.
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Architecture 1: Process Focused
The first architecture for consideration is the Process Focused architecture depicted in Figure
10-7.
Figure 10-7. Process Focused Enterprise Architecture.
In this architecture, the enterprise is dominated by the collaborative process depicted in the
center of the picture. All of the enterprise decision makers work in a collaborative environment
with a common sight picture established through well-defined criteria and processes. The
process is supported by the 'Organization', 'Knowledge', and 'Information Technology' views
described previously. All of it is grounded on the backplane of product development-fielding
capable equipage and thus enabling additional maneuver on the UAS platforms under
consideration for specific CONOPs. The strategy of implementing critical processes and simple
rules [18] stems from the factors introduced as a result of the process and product decisions. The
entire activity takes place against a policy backdrop that mandates the three-plank platform of
doing no harm, conforming, and setting the precedent.
Process View
The 'Process' view cuts a wide swath across the various attribute processes from Figure 10-6,
engaging "Ensure Safety", "Foster Cooperation", and "Define Process." The "Ensure Safety"
attribute process was discussed previously under the 'Knowledge' view, but the nature of the
actions required in each of the mechanisms takes on a significantly different flavor when looked
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at under the process lens. Key elements related to "Educate Participants" include processes for
educating industry partners who may seek a UAS experimental aircraft certification to conduct
testing and data collection, processes for educating other government agencies about the issues
and protocols associated with flying UAS in the NAS, and processes in place to better educate
other DoD and FAA offices about the current state of affairs and the points of contact for
addressing UAS issues. These all fall into the general category of "educate the masses" on the
existence of UAS and how they are being flown. In a more concrete way, processes need to be
established to explicitly train and familiarize air traffic controllers with UAS unique issues (i.e.
lost link procedures and emergency procedures) so there is a clear understanding within the ATC
community about what to expect from a UAS in either of those situations.
In the case of "Ensure Safety" and "Capable Equipage", the process related architectural
elements have to address the methodology by which the equipage will be researched, developed,
fabricated, tested, and fielded. Without a clearly articulated performance specification against
which to design hardware and software, a well-defined process for activities that will result in the
needed specifications is what is ultimately required. It is this trace through the alternative
architecture OPM that provides this view with its strongest position relative to the other views.
This will also have direct implications for the 'Strategy' view. Notice that while this particular
architecture explicitly calls out the need for this equipage process, it does not specify the object
to which the process should be applied. This in turn becomes the largest shortfall of this
architecture, but these points will be demonstrated once the evaluation criteria are applied.
For the "Ensure Safety" and "Procedure and Standards" fragment, the existing work by the JIPT
stands as a model for continuing down this path. Enough has been detailed on this aspect of the
JIPT's work to forego further details on this fragment. There is an open question in assessing
Architecture 1, however, concerning the degree to which this element is emphasized. Relegating
the procedural and standards development mechanism to the same overall level of emphasis as
the other mechanisms described in this section may deemphasize this aspect of the work that is
much needed.
For the "Ensure Safety" and "Collective Data Gathering" fragment, the 'Process' view must
supply the necessary approach to defining and implementing a data management approach and
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knowledge sharing mechanism across organizational boundaries. This is especially true with
respect to the data for safety critical decisions. Once again, in the absence of a priori standards
on what constitutes an acceptable level of performance, the process in which this consensus is
reached becomes the driving mechanism in the architecture.
In the "Foster Cooperation" and "Share PM Responsibility" fragment, there is a need to work out
the process under which programmatic decisions are reached and how they are implemented.
Clear definition to this process provides an effective and efficient method for executing the day-
to-day program management decisions needed on a whole host of topics that would otherwise
bring the enterprise to its knees if there were not clearly established guidance and processes in
place.
The last fragment in the 'Process' view that will be considered is the "Define Process" and
"Establish Criteria" mechanism. As previously mentioned, the lack of established performance
specifications creates any number of difficulties, especially for the engineering community who
rely on these specifications to understand the functional requirements of the part and to design a
system capable of delivering the needed performance. Because these specifications do not exist
for the UAS category of aircraft, the conversation should focus on the problem space before it is
turned on the solution space. [19] One effective way to accomplish this objective is to
implement a set of decision criteria that all of the stakeholders agree is binding on how decisions
should be documented, discussed, and decided. Short of this, it is unlikely the enterprise will
ever have any significant success in aligning the multitude of different organizations and efforts
into a single vector of intent. This has been a chronic problem with past and current efforts in
this domain.
Product View
The 'Product' view is one that is similarly cross-cutting in the number and range of attribute
processes that are impacted by what goes on in this view. The full architectural description for
this view will not be provided here, just the high points to provide enough definition to bring out
the salient characteristics for the purpose of evaluating the architecture. The two most
significant attribute processes attached to the 'Product' view are the "Ensure Safety" and
"Provide Implementation" views. With respect to the "Ensure Safety" attribute process, the
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critical supporting object is the "Capable Equipage," and in the case of "Provide
Implementation", the key supporting object is the available budget and manpower. Each of these
will be considered in turn.
For the "Capable Equipage" object within the product context, the most significant issue is the
question of what has to be built and to what performance specifications. As was pointed out
under the process view, these are unanswered questions and are not likely to have well-defined
responses anytime within the next five to ten years. This is what makes the 'Process' view so
central to this particular enterprise architecture. As a result, the architect will have to pay
particular attention to the threat of unfocused, diluted materiel development efforts within this
enterprise if the risk is not mitigated in some other way. In addition, the explicit lack of a
concrete platform within this architecture also opens up the potential for adverse consequences
when it comes to fighting for budget and manpower, discussed next.
Within the DoD context, the programs that end up with the money more often than not are those
efforts that are tied clearly and unequivocally to a specific, high-profile mission or objective.
This makes communicating the impact of a budget cut to Congress very straightforward and
provides a clear description of the potential impact loss of resources may have to the warfighter's
ability to accomplish the desired mission or create the intended effect. The more abstract the
rationale becomes from this very tangible and concrete point, the more difficult it becomes to
convey the impact of funding and manpower decisions. There is nothing explicit within the
Architecture 1 framework that requires this kind of direct tie between the platforms and the
budget/resources drill.
The 'Product' view, while absolutely essential to the enterprise moving forward, is hindered by
not having a dedicated program to marshal support, address the constraints and attempt to fight
for more resources. It takes a direct hit in the "Implementable Program" attribute process as a
result of the combination of these factors.
Strategy View
The 'Strategy' view grows out of the need to accomplish the things previously articulated in the
'Product' and 'Process' views. Like the 'Product' view, not all of the attribute process and
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supporting object combinations will be presented here. The most important attribute processes
are "Engage Leadership" and "Set Activity Scope/Purpose."
To provide a framework for thinking about different types of strategies and where they are
important, the model developed by Eisenhardt is presented. [18] This model describes three
basic strategy approaches that companies can typically take when faced with complex business
contexts: position, resource, and simple rules. The situations and factors that bear on the
decision about which approach to use are provided in Table 10-2.
Table 10-2. Three Approaches to Strategy.
An examination of the criteria in Table 10-2, further augmented by additional information in the
cited source, will quickly lead the reader to the conclusion that the most appropriate choice for
an overarching strategy is the "Simple Rules" approach outlined above in the far right hand
column. The "Simple Rules" strategy also ties in very cleanly with the first half of the strategy
view discussion related to unifying senior Air Force, DoD, and FAA leadership on the value of
"restoring the principle of maneuver." The Air Force in particular is looking at UAS platforms
as a significant growth area (as is DoD writ large), and tying the implementation plan back to
basic doctrine and warfighting principles with several key processes significantly reduces the
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complexity. This in turn provides senior leadership with the ability to get and keep their heads
wrapped around the issues and to advocate for the needed changes effectively.
The impact on engaging leadership and setting the scope/purpose is significant. Rather than
pursing a classic DoD event-driven sequence of events, the effort should be put on a flexible 18-
24 month, time-certain development path. Kicking things out the door in this kind of an
incremental fashion helps the enterprise from several standpoints. [109] First, it smoothes out
the inevitable transitions that will come up in this work as things progress by putting in a
structured mechanism for forcing those transitions, and thereby a process in which to ensure their
effective and timely transitions.
Second, this approach to fielding capability into operational use sooner will provide a significant
opportunity for more data collection, operational testing and evaluation, and "what-if' drills
needed to convince the FAA the safety case has been met. Use of this kind of incremental, spiral
delivery or evolutionary framework is also the most consistent with what DoD acquisition policy
guidance recommends for programs just getting off the ground.
Third, it provides a basis for planning that has heretofore been lacking. By creating a time
driven calendar, there should be significantly fewer unknowns within the rolling two-year
window ahead of the program. It also matches up to the overall DoD budget clock speed quite
nicely while still providing enough time for significant advancements to be made in the delivery
of restored maneuver (and thus meeting one of the enterprise purpose statement constraints of
providing incrementally valuable deliveries).
Perhaps most significantly, this strategy fits hand-in-glove with the emphasis on process-driven
criteria and decision making. In one sense, you could say this strategy is itself a recursive
process. In an environment with as few concrete specifications as the current UAS airspace
integration effort, the need for a strategy that can effectively deal with large degrees of
uncertainty in both inputs and outputs is clearly the strategy to call upon. Notice that even the
objective of the simple rules strategy, growth, is well-aligned with the enterprise intent of
restoring ("growing") the principle of maneuver back onto UAS platforms.
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Architecture 1 Evaluation
The above information is used as a basis for scoring Architecture 1 against the previously
described architecture evaluation metrics. It is worth pointing out that each Architecture is
scored against the established criteria, not against one another. While this scoring methodology
has strengths and weaknesses, one of the biggest reasons for proceeding down these lines is the
consistency it shares with already conducted source selection evaluations accomplished by the
DoD. It also forces a higher level of rigor into the justification of why a certain Architecture
received a given score for a specific set of conditions. As described further in Section II of this
research, other value ranking methods may also be employed (i.e. the Pugh, QFD, Single
Attribute, etc).
Table 10-3 captures the results of the Architecture 1 scoring exercise. Note that the overall
Architecture placed in the bottom of the green zone with an overall risk rating squarely in the
upper middle of the yellow zone. The biggest shortcomings were in the areas pointed out in the
above discussion. For this analysis, the QFD results for each enterprise attribute were used as
relative weights between each of the Enterprise Performance and Behavior metrics. To account
for the addition of architectural evaluation metrics, both the enterprise performance and behavior
categories each gave up a total of 0.05 points off their totals to contribute a weighting of 0.1 to
the architectural evaluation metrics. The confidence (risk) rating stands independent from the
other enterprise weighting criteria and is not weighted relative to the other factors.
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Enterprise Behavior Metrics I
S Implementability 0.28 Scope matched to budget, resource 20 80 100 10
Cooperation 0.17 Extent people feel their perspective is 50 80 100 25addressed (% addressed)
Engaged Leadership 0.17 % enterprise leaders committed to 20 80 100 25Engaged Leadership 0.1 UAS success
Clearly Defined Activities, Scope 0.1 Extentof enterprise alignment (%) 0 80 100 120
Well-defined processes & criteria 0.24 % workdone by standard processes, 20 80 100 1
1 Architectural Checks 1
OPM completeness for architecture
1 Logically Correct 0.2 cptn20 80 100 20
Provides Desired Capability 0.3 Degree to which architecture satisfies 50 80 100 1decision makers
Decomposition maps to team, stations, 0.3 Degree to which supporting process 20 80 100 45
and flows and objects "fit" at interface
Adheres to "Architectural Principles" 0.2 Extent to which complexity, ambiguity 20 80 100 10and uncertainty are managed
Risk: Confidence in achieving the desired
enterprise attributes
1 Safety 1 0.1Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Safety 2 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Capacity 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 801 100 100
Capability 0. 1Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Ops Flexibility 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
lmplmentability 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Cooperation .1Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Engaged Leadership 0.1JEffort required to achieve attribute 60 801 100 100
Cleary Defined Activities, Scope 0.1JEffort required to achieve attribute 60 801 1001 100
Well-defined processes & criteria 0.11Effort required to achieve attribute 60 801 1001 100
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Architecture 2: Product Focused
As you may expect, the other primary architecture developed for consideration is the product-
focused enterprise. Much like the previous architecture built the core activity set around a
collaborative process, the product-focused architecture builds the core set of activities around
specific UAS platforms, in this case the MQ-1, MQ-9, and RQ-4, as depicted in Figure 10-8.
Figure 10-8. Product Focused Enterprise Architecture.
In this architecture, the individual UAS platforms become the primary avenues down which the
enterprise's efforts move forward on restoring maneuver to these aircraft. They are unified in
their otherwise independent efforts through a single set of policies and strategies that provide the
overall direction to the effort. Each product development line is supported by the needed
processes to resolve any outstanding issues or actions and foster the required cooperation among
the players. The organization, information technology and knowledge components of the
enterprise run through all three of the product platforms in a "cross-cutting" direction to provide
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the needed support, infrastructure, and data management required for all three efforts. Different
products may also find themselves at different points in the product development process, and
consequently, there may be different manpower, budget, and expertise required and/or available
to continue pushing the restoration of maneuver back onto these aircraft. Each can be tailored to
respond to the specifics of the situation and environment confronting that specific platform.
Rather than explicitly rehashing the same information presented out of the first architecture, the
approach taken for Architecture 2 will be to describe the differences between how the first
architecture addressed the issues in each of these views vice the second architecture. Strengths
and weaknesses of the approach will be pointed out in the same way as Architecture 1 was
described.
Process View
The biggest difference in the 'Process' view for Architecture 2 is the lack of any one single
collaborative process providing the overarching perspective and control to the enterprise
activities. Instead, each product platform uses the processes and methods that work in that
particular situation or environment, and the efforts proceed at somewhat of an arm's length from
one another with respect to the day-to-day details. Everyone working the issues is intensely
focused on the product line itself and getting capability pushed out as quickly as possible.
The strength in this approach is that it provides for a concurrent approach to finding and
resolving issues on multiple platforms simultaneously. In addition, a snag in one platform does
not necessitate the entire enterprise activity grinding to a halt until a solution or work around can
be implemented on that product line. Depending on the nature of the issue, the other platforms
may be able to continue unabated in their activities. This layering of multiple concurrent
processes provides a degree of robustness to changing environmental factors that Architecture 1
lacked. For instance, resources can be shifted between product development efforts to help
resolve issues and fix problems to keep the overall enterprise on track.
The downside to this structure is the loss of integration across the enterprise. The Architecture 2
arrangement is structurally prone to stove piping effects, and significant effort and attention
would have to be devoted to making sure the cross-cutting elements in the organization,
knowledge, and information technology domains provided sufficient presence to mitigate against
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this tendency. It could also have the potential to work at cross-purposes with the enterprise
attribute associated with fostering cooperation, especially if so many different activities are being
done concurrently that one or more of the enterprise decision makers no longer has the ability to
cover all of the bases simultaneously. This is a very real consideration for the FAA decision
maker groups as they struggle to get additional manpower applied to an already rapidly
accelerating workload.
Product View
The 'Product' view is obviously where Architecture 2 comes into its own. By focusing so
narrowly on restoring useful increments of maneuver to an individual UAS, the enterprise has
the opportunity to make harder hitting inroads and to consolidate gains as they are implemented.
Because DoD and Congress typically program and budget down largely platform lines, this
approach aligns better with a significant set of budget, manpower, and schedule interfaces the
enterprise needs to maintain close connections with to remain effective.
The Architecture 2 arrangement also provides a more scalable arrangement should additional
resources be available to apply to the challenge. The product-centric approach provides for
better mapping to existing organizational forms within the enterprise, and it will likely provide
for better leveraging of existing manpower allocations at several of the decision maker
organizations, particularly the 303 AESW and SAF/AQIJ. Whether this level of scalability is
something that is even needed is still in question. The current level of resourcing against the
airspace integration issue in general is significantly less than what is likely required to conduct
even a single product development effort with any degree of alacrity.
Strategy View
This is actually a point in common between both Architecture 1 and 2. By implementing the
same simple rules strategy, Architecture 2 may be able to mitigate some of the fragmenting
potential pursuing relatively independent product development efforts may introduce into the
enterprise. This is especially true if the enterprise governance structure is instituted in a way that
would help ensure consistent criteria and metrics are being applied across each of the
development efforts. A fuller discussion of governance alternatives is likely something that
should be included in this discussion, but time and space preclude a more developed assessment
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and recommendation. At a minimum, governance should be added to the alternative enterprise
architecture generation model as an additional supporting element. This way the architect can
ensure the subject is at least considered and a decision documented so a deliberate direction with
respect to the overall enterprise operational strategy can be determined.
Architecture 2 Evaluation
The results of the Architecture 2 evaluation are provided in Table 10-4. Notice that while the
overall score for Architecture 2 is essentially identical to that of Architecture 1, the risk
assessment is not nearly as good. This is primarily a result of the fragmenting potential
described in the above discussion. The actual Enterprise Performance and Behavior metrics are
assessed to have relatively strong returns with this Architecture. The risk rating captures the
impact of the path dependencies. In other words, the lower risk rating says that generally there is
less confidence Architecture 2 will actually be able to make good on this level of attribute
delivery as a result of the more fragmented approach. This shows up predominantly in the
Enterprise Behavior category of "Well-defined processes & criteria."
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1 1Enterprise Behavior Metrics
Risk: Confidence in achieving the desired
enterprise attributes
1 Safety 1 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Safety 2 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Capacity 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Capability 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Ops Flexdbility 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Implementability 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Cooperation 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Engaged Leadership 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Clearly Defined Activities, Scope 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 10
Well-defined processes & criteria 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 8 100 10
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Insights from Architecture 1 and 2 Evaluations
As a result of the initial effort with the first two architectures, several design considerations come
to light. First, the process-focused architecture could benefit significantly in the
implementability attribute if some additional structure were to be imposed that would provide for
a better product structure in the interface between the enterprise and the external environment.
This is true for all of the reasons cited as strengths under the product-focused architecture
description.
On the other hand, the product-focused architecture clearly suffers from the lack of a unifying
process construct that would facilitate the enterprise behavior characteristics desired by a large
majority of the decision makers. The benefits derived from this scenario are those extolled by
the process-focused architecture. An obvious solution would be to merge the two architectures
together.
The question is how to proceed down this line of reasoning. Is it best to try to modify the
process-focused architecture with Architecture 2 inputs or the other way around? To answer
this, the basic functions of the architect are revisited: manage complexity, reduce uncertainty,
and drive out ambiguity. With these goals set clearly before the alternatives, the decision to stick
with a process-focused architecture is the obvious choice.
By integrating the enterprise efforts under a single process, the potential for confusion between
enterprise organizations and activities is significantly reduced and minimized. A single process
also provides for a clear path toward continuous process improvement activities that would be
significantly more difficult to achieve if the processes were fragmented down product lines. In a
sense, you would give up the advantage of what would hopefully turn into standardized work,
eventually reaching the point where the FAA could codify it into regulation because it produced
such excellent results.
Uncertainty becomes an interesting parameter because in this case, the local uncertainty for each
product platform will actually be increased by going to the process-focused architecture;
however, the overall enterprise uncertainty should go down. How does this work? If each UAS
platform had the flexibility of pursuing its own means and methods in pushing maneuver back
onto its aircraft, the case can certainly be made that the local uncertainty will get less. Consider,
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however, the impact on the broader enterprise. As each UAS platform pursues this policy, the
lack of a strong top-down driven process means that each platform could elect to take different
approaches and equipage paths for reaching the next desired increment in operational flexibility.
At the enterprise level, this proliferation in the approaches actually causes the overall uncertainty
to go up since it is no longer clear that consistent implementations of algorithms, sensor
technologies, redundancies, or procedures are rigorously transferred between UAS systems. This
is a significant driver of uncertainty, especially for the FAA decision makers engaged in the
enterprise. Architecture 1 is much more conducive to accommodating an approach to resolving
these types of issues than the product-focused architecture will be.
The issue of driving out ambiguity is actually a wash between the two architectures. On the one
hand, a single collaborative process drives out ambiguity by denying the opportunity for multiple
forums to exist that could work at cross-purposes to one another. Alternatively, the clear focus
on a specific UAS platform and the issues dominating the delivery of additional operational
flexibility also has the potential to drive down ambiguity since the objective and outcome are so
tangible and immediate.
In light of these considerations, the process-focused architecture was considered the better
candidate for providing the overall enterprise structure. The platform-focus from the second
architecture must then be interjected to strengthen the external interfaces and meet the
implementation constraints. The approach ultimately arrived at for this convolving of the two
architectures was to specify the individual UAS platforms under consideration, and explicitly
call one of them out to serve as the pathfinder for the others. To mitigate against potential
bottlenecks in this approach, off-ramps onto one or more of the other UAS platforms will be
planned into the enterprise strategy to keep the activity flexible and moving forward.
With the issue of combining the strengths of the first two architectures resolved, the only other
question remaining is whether or not they both collectively missed anything important that needs
to be filled in. This is where the benefits of having to roll up the sleeves and actually plumb the
depths of each supporting object within the various views and attribute processes pay dividends.
The insights into the interactions between supporting objects, attribute processes, and views
Page 259
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
provides a much richer understanding of the dynamics in the system than would otherwise be
possible.
As a result of the previous two architecture builds, and alluded to in the discussion of
Architecture 1 shortfalls, it is apparent that a key object is under-emphasized from the "points of
leverage" stack-standards. Upon further reflection at the mechanisms level, however, and the
continual questioning of whether there were other possible concept fragments that could be
interjected to either enhance, replace, or provide a substitute for an existing mechanism,
standards emerged as a dominant mechanism. In fact, on further reflection, the standards object
was actually removed from the mechanisms tradespace and turned into a constraint.
The rationale for doing this is straightforward. Recall, the purpose or intent of the enterprise is
to restore the principle of maneuver to the specific UAS platforms under discussion. Previous
efforts, such as those undertaken by the JIPT, actually pursued the development of standards as
the primary objective of the effort. Ultimately, this confuses the means with the ends. To drive
out ambiguity and provide a clear delineation in roles and responsibilities, the development of
standards is placed cleanly within the FAA's historical regulatory role, and is removed from
active pursuit by the airspace integration activity. Doing this helps keep the enterprise effort
well-focused, and it re-establishes some of the organizational discipline needed for the activity to
be successful. While the enterprise efforts will most certainly contribute in an extensive way to
the development of standards, the pursuit of them should not be an objective of the enterprise.
This is likely another point within the current JIPT structure that is frustrating efforts at building
better cooperation and collaboration between the various organizations engaged in the activity.
Figure 10-9 illustrates the end-to-end result of this integrated architecture.
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Figure 10-9. Product-Informed Process Enterprise Architecture.
Architecture 3: Product-Informed Process
The results of the Architecture 3 evaluation scoring are shown in Table 10-5. As would be
expected, the integration of the previous two architectures' strengths and the inclusion of the
standards as additional constraints resulted in appreciably higher Enterprise Performance and
Behavior scores and a better overall confidence rating for achieving them. For comparative
purposes, the primary sub-category scores for all three architectures are presented in Figure
10-10. The baseline data is an assessment of the previous JIPT effort. Note that this comparison
is not a true apples-to-apples comparison. In the case of the JIPT baseline, the effort was
actually attempted with historical results. Furthermore, it was never architected in the sense the
other three alternatives have been. This results in "double jeopardy" for the JIPT baseline
performance evaluation scores.
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Figure 10-10. Comparisons of Alternative Architectures Scoring Results.
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Risic Confidence in achieving the desired 1
enterprise attributes
1 Safety 1 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Safety 2 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Capacity 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Capability 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Ops Fledxibility 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Implementability 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 1
Cooperation 0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute 60 80 100 100
Engaged Leadership
I ICleary Defined Activities, Scope 0.
Well-defined processes & criteria
ffort required to achieve attribute I
0.1 Effort required to achieve attribute
80 100
80 100
Table 10-5. Architecture 3 Scoring Results.
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1 Safety 1 0.16 # of Accidents per Flight Hour 1E-05 1E-07 1E-09 0.00001
Safety 2 0.16 1# of ATC deviations per Flight Hour 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.1
Capacity 0.2 # of exceptions per approval 20 10 0 20
Capability 0.2 % missions achieved vs requested 1 80 95 99 80
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Final Architecture Description
Implementing the third architecture will result in all of the previously described characteristics,
both for those elements combined out of Architectures 1 and 2, and the additional payoff
associated with including standards as a major constraint in the activity base. For the purpose of
bringing the final architectural description to some semblance of a conclusion, however, a brief
summary of the critical elements are presented below.
Policy
Policy is a major constraint that must be satisfied by the architecture in this design effort. Policy
mandates that solutions conform rather than create, do no harm, and set the precedent for other
nations. In addition, standards are considered the purview of the FAA, and will enter the
enterprise sphere only from the standpoint of how they enable or limit the ability to provide
another increment of useful operational flexibility to the enterprise. Data and knowledge
generated in the pursuit of restoring maneuver to the UAS platforms under consideration should
provide a basis for the FAA to move forward in the standards arena, but this will not be an
objective of the enterprise.
Strategy
A simple rules strategy should be employed to guide the overall direction and pace of enterprise
activities (in conjunction with the previously described strategy for unifying senior leadership
value perception of restoring the principle of maneuver). Implementing a simple rules strategy
that is anchored in a couple of critical processes will provide the needed flexibility to adapt to a
highly dynamic external context; a context with changing budget, manpower, and operational
priorities. It is also a context in which there are very few discrete known's against which to plan.
The rapid pace of changing priorities, the evolution in technology and CONOPs, and unknown
performance standards make this a highly uncertain environment in which the enterprise must
consistently make headway.
Process
Path dependencies dominate the internal enterprise landscape. The surest path through these
potential landmines is with the implementation of a single, integrated process that results in a
highly collaborative environment that is open and transparent across the entire enterprise. The
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'Process' view is the primary driver in many of the Enterprise Behavior attributes, and the extent
to which the enterprise makes establishing collective, agreed upon criteria for resolving issues
and plotting a way forward a priority will determine the long-term effectiveness and efficiency of
the enterprise activities.
Product
Putting the technological poweress behind building a UAS platform with the kind of materiel
equipage needed for useful gains in operational flexibility is the foundation on which the
enterprise as a whole will move forward. In the end, no matter how good the strategy or
collaborative the process, if the materiel capability is not up to the task, the objective of
increasing the operational flexibility of these assets within the NAS environment will ultimately
fail. The important point to remember is that this product development activity must be
accomplished in a fundamentally different way, employing a time-pacing schedule that
consistently pumps out incremental improvements for further testing and data collection. The
extent and frequency of these releases can be directly regulated by the constraints imposed by
current budget and manpower limitations. Focus on a single platform initially and build out from
there.
Organization
The basic organizational structure of the current JIPT effort is fundamentally sound, but should
be reoriented off of a standards focus and onto an operational flexibility approach. Active steps
should be taken to reduce the total number of organizations involved in the effort (resolved by
down scoping the enterprise to that recommended in this analysis). Additional effort should be
expended to create a common model that can be shared across organizational boundaries to
clarify language and information that is communicated over both geographical and cultural
divides.
Knowledge
Information and data must be deliberately structured and then routed through the enterprise in a
way that fosters transparency and collaboration. It should become the ultimate "currency of the
realm," but for this to happen, the previously described 'Process' and 'Strategy' views must be
instituted so these critical decisions can be made and implemented.
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Information Technology
Information technology is the highway over which the information and data in the 'Knowledge'
view will travel. It is also through this mechanism that many of the important external interfaces
with budget, manpower, and political sources are made. In many cases, the effectiveness of IT is
not measured by what is happening as much as by what is not happening (i.e. losing budget,
manpower, political capital because information can't flow where and when it needs to.)
This summarizes the overall "look and feel" of the enterprise when Architecture 3 is
implemented in the way envisioned by the architect. The only remaining consideration is how
best to move from our current position to the one described by the future vision state embodied
in this architecture, the subject of the final chapter in this section.
Chapter 10 Summary
The QFD analysis of the enterprise architecting views mapped to the enterprise attributes
revealed the importance of four views in particular to the UAS airspace integration challenge:
'Strategy', 'Policy', 'Process', and 'Product'. Further analysis suggested that 'Policy' be treated
as a constraint and held constant while 'Strategy' emerges as a result of choices in the 'Process'
and 'Product' views. The result is an active trading of 'Process' and 'Product' design
alternatives that give rise to a specific strategy needed to implement them. Two alternative
architectures resulting from this exercise provided the additional insights needed to generate a
third optimal design with good performance and behavior delivery and a reasonable confidence
level in achieving the results.
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CHAPTER 11 - UAS ENTERPRISE TRANSFORMATION PLAN
"Principles become modified in practice by fact."
-James Fenimore Cooper
Up to this point, the discussion has centered around the theoretical and conceptual development
of a process for rigorously driving value into alternative enterprise architectures. This final
chapter in the application section describes the specific issues that need to be considered and the
actions required to take the enterprise from its current state to the realization of the enterprise
architecture selected in the previous chapter. This is ultimately where theory must contend with
what happens in the real world. The chapter will start with a detailed discussion of the actual
recommendations, and then conclude with the broader enterprise transformation roadmap
considerations. The approach taken is consistent with the methodology described in Chapter 7.
Connecting the UAS OPM with the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
The OPM model is provided again in Figure 11-1. Note, however, that the "Points of Leverage"
stack is now color-coded. The previous discussion on sensitivity and tradeoff points can be used
to help formulate the transformation plan by identifying which mechanisms provide the greatest
degree of leverage on enterprise value delivery. The red-filled supporting objects represent those
that are critical tradeoff points within the architecture and the lack of which will almost certainly
lead to enterprise failure. The yellow-filled supporting objects are those objects that are
important to the successful realization of the architecture. They may represent less critical
tradeoff points or they may be sensitivity points with fewer connection points to other attribute
processes. Without the successful implementation of these important objects, it will be very
difficult for the enterprise to achieve the desired end-state. The green-filled supporting objects
are those things that should be relatively straightforward to implement, and at the same time, will
not make or break the transformation plan. The blue supporting objects are largely secondary in
nature, but without them, the delivery of the desired enterprise attributes will be difficult. In
other words, in and of themselves, these objects do not necessarily contribute to the advancement
of primary enterprise attributes, but without them, key attributes cannot be secured.
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Figure 11-1. Using the OPM View to Identify Sensitivity and Tradeoff Points.
Harkening back to the discussion in Section II of this research in reference to the analytical
methodology used to conduct architecture evaluations, the transformation plan is a scenario
under which certain actions and priorities will be assigned in order to achieve a specified
outcome. [ 14] Just as these scenarios were combined with the various architectural alternatives to
identify sensitivity and tradeoff points, these same tradeoff and sensitivity points can now be
reused to generate the "transformation plan" scenario, essentially running the methodology in
reverse. The interactions between the various components of the analysis from Section II are
depicted below in Figure 11-2 for quick reference. [14] Notice that when the assessment is
conducted for creating and evaluating alternative architectures, the result of the analysis
produces insights into the sensitivity and tradeoff points as well as the risks. For the purpose of
the transformation plan, reverse the arrows and conduct the analysis in the other direction, using
the sensitivity points, tradeoff points, and risks in conjunction with the selected architecture to
create the transformation plan scenario (or scenarios if the degree of uncertainty warrants
multiple decision paths). This is the underlying motivation and basis for how the supporting
objects are categorized in the above architecture description.
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High-Priority Attribute-Specific Questions Architectural
Scenarios Approaches
Analysis
Sensitivity Tradeoff Points Risks
Points
Figure 11-2. ATAM Concept Interactions.
The final element needed to implement a transformation plan is to connect the results from using
the sensitivity points, tradeoff points, risk assessment, and enterprise architecture to the
Enterprise Transformation Plan first introduced in Chapter 3 and reproduced below in Figure
11-3. The broader Enterprise Transformation Plan provides the bigger picture considerations
that need to be integrated into the transformation plan while the specifics that arise out of the
above architectural analysis provide the details that need to be addressed explicitly by the
transformation plan. Recall, the enterprise architecting activities primarily fall within the
"Planning Cycle" steps of "Understand Current State" and especially "Envision & Design Future
Enterprise." The remainder of the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap provides the broader
elements needed to implement a full-bodied plan.
This completes the linking of the Enterprise OPM and architecture selection results with
Enterprise Transformation Roadmap plan methodology. To recap, the ATAM approach using
the specific information out of the architecture generation OPM is used to assess and pinpoint the
high-leverage sensitivity and tradeoff points in the architecture. These in turn are combined with
the identified risks and architecture to layout the scenario-specific elements that need to be
explicitly addressed in the transformation plan. These enterprise specific call outs are then
integrated into the broader Enterprise Transformation Roadmap framework to ensure any
remaining considerations are addressed and included in the transformation plan.
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Figure 11-3. Enterprise Transformation Roadmap.
Enterprise Transformation Plan
The above discussion on linking the OPM and enterprise transformation roadmap might suggest
a cleaner process than is actually the case. Both the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap as well
as the Enterprise Architecting endeavors are inherently iterative in nature, and will overlap in
terms of the material and content covered under each. Recall from Chapter 7 and the broader
framework for enterprise transformation, the discussion of the transformation plan will start with
the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap, and then dive into the details of the Enterprise
Architecture and OPM to feed in the needed information in the "Planning Cycle" phase of the
Roadmap. In reality, there is significant interaction between these two frameworks, and in the
end, it isn't nearly as important to maintain the distinction between which framework supplied
what information as it is to ensure a fully integrated transformation plan results from their use.
Details for each of the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap steps will now be detailed to provide
the level of details needed for an effective plan to be created.
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Planning Cycle
The transformation plan for the airspace integration enterprise actually starts with the "Planning
Cycle" instead of the "Strategy Cycle." The reasons for this are twofold. First, the effort has a
major shortfall in the "Strategy Cycle" portion of the Roadmap as identified by the interview
data citing the lack of leadership commitment and engagement as a major barrier to enterprise
success. Second, since the previous 100 pages in this report have been devoted to primarily the
front-end of the "Planning Cycle" for the UAS AI enterprise, it makes sense to pick up from the
Enterprise Architecting discussion at this point, especially since the Roadmap itself is intended to
represent a repeating cycle and the point of entry is less of an issue anyway.
The Enterprise Architecting effort has effectively addressed all of the issues presented under the
"Understand Current State" and "Envision & Design Future Enterprise" subtasks. The next step
requires the enterprise infrastructure to be aligned. Each of these tasks is discussed in turn.
Align Enterprise Infrastructure
To align the organizations involved in the enterprise, several of the key architectural
considerations highlighted under the value structure and contextual assessments in Chapters 9
and 10 come to bear. First, the overall scope and number of active participants in the activity
should be cut down to less than ten total, and preferably something closer to six or seven. The
recommendation out of this analysis is obvious. Down scope the activity to looking at a single
platform and then engage just those organizations needed to directly address that particular
platform. Given the nature of the current funding situation and the available size, weight, and
power (SWaP) margins, the RQ-4 Global Hawk provides the easiest platform on which to begin
building capability. It is also the one with the greatest training and operational needs associated
with existing mission requirements. Once these decisions are made, and the enterprise is re-
scoped according to the purpose statement provided in this report, there should be good
alignment in the organizations involved in the enterprise.
Aligning incentives is somewhat more problematic since the usual tangible kinds of incentives
are not necessarily transferable to the government sphere. The best that can be done without
broader leadership engagement in this area is to once again re-scope the enterprise purpose
statement in a way that provides for positive value delivery to each organization in the enterprise.
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Organizations should then be incentivized by the fundamental value proposition. Outside of the
value delivery mechanism, it is difficult to see how the various stakeholders in the enterprise
might be provided with additional incentives.
Empowering change agents will need to occur in several different forums and with various spans
of influence. Initially, change agents will likely have to be content with focusing on those things
that do not require significant capital investments or expenditures. In this regard, the
collaborative, process-focused architecture chosen for the enterprise architecture provides a
natural venue in which to establish many of these kinds of changes. The structure of the
enterprise itself is an accommodating environment for process and operational innovations in the
way the effort is pursued, and the collegial nature of the enterprise should provide a receptive
forum for presenting, discussing, and implementing changes when and where they make sense.
As the scope of the activity increases, and additional resources become available, the magnitude
of the changes that are realistic should also grow. This may start to influence infrastructure and
even organizational placement into more geographically central locations to further facilitate the
work. Initially, the enterprise should identify at least one individual from each organization that
will serve as a change agent champion to the enterprise leadership. Once the governance issues
have been resolved, a consistent process for floating up proposed changes and having them acted
on will provide the needed implementation for these change activities.
Rationalizing systems and policies as well as aligning metrics are resolved inherently within both
the architecture and the X-Matrix. The architecture provides for the establishment of decision
criteria and processes by which to resolve enterprise decisions. The X-Matrix provides the
alignment between the values, key attributes, and metrics needed to drive enterprise behavior
consistently toward the strategic objectives. These will not be reproduced here given their fuller
development in Chapter 9.
The take away from the discussion on alignment is that the architecture itself should provide the
fundamental structure under which the organizations, incentives, and metrics fall into place. If
the architecture is not providing that level of concrete guidance, the architect should revisit the
architecture and consider if there are not important supporting objects or attribute processes that
may be missing from the architecture. This should have been caught when the architect
Page 272
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
evaluated the architecture against the appropriate key attributes, but this higher-level perspective
may bring out operational aspects of attempting to implement the architecture that may not have
come to the forefront when the architecture was evaluated simply with respect to the key
attributes specified by the enterprise.
Create Transformation Plan
The backbone of the transformation plan grows out of the methodology described in the first part
of this chapter. Using the OPM and the ATAM methodology to identify the sensitivity and
tradeoff points in the architecture, and then categorize them appropriately, the important
supporting objects can be captured and addressed in the transformation plan. Figure 11-4 and
Figure 11-5 capture the details of supporting element dependencies and time phasing.
Phase I: 0 to 12 Months
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Figure 11-4. Phase I of the Transformation Plan.
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Figure 11-5. Phase II of the Transformation Plan.
Several general points are in order prior to delving into the details of the transformation plan.
First, in keeping with the process-centric enterprise architecture, the 24-month plan depicted in
Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5 is a repeated cycle. The 24-month clock speed is designed to
interface with the primary DoD budget cycle that occurs on every even year, the issuing of the
Program Objective Memorandum, or the POM. This provides the primary mechanism for new
budget requests to be vetted through the DoD budgeting process and included in the budget
request sent to Congress.
In addition, putting the enterprise on a 24-month time-paced calendar will provide a greater
sense of urgency in pushing gains in equipage and procedures implemented and tested. This
incremental release philosophy is essential to the long-term success of the enterprise based on the
interview data and information collected on the nature of how the FAA builds the experience and
information base needed to expand the operational flexibility of aircraft flying in the NAS.
The other obvious reason for implementing a transformation plan that is a recursive process is
because in the current context, it is not at all clear what the ultimate product requirements or use
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context will ultimately be. Under these kinds of uncertainties, it is impossible to specify what
the final details will look like, but the method employed to arrive at them may be.
A description for how each of the supporting elements in the transformation plan will be
implemented can now be undertaken. Capable equipage is secured through the targeted
application of technology on the RQ-4 Global Hawk to begin the first 24-month cycle. The
specific objectives of this initial two-year cycle will be to conduct the appropriate technology
survey, and select the most promising candidates for further development. The approach that
should be taken for this effort should be one of "incremental commitment." The Incremental
Commitment Model (ICM) is an approach detailed in a recent National Academies
commissioned study conducted by the Committee on Human-System Design Support for
Changing Technology. [110] The overall approach is further developed and a decision method
presented using the ICM by Dr. Boehm at the University of Southern California Center for
Systems and Software Engineering. [111] The ICM is based on five fundamental principles
deemed critical to success for human-system integration efforts such as the UAS airspace
integration effort. These are enumerated by the Committee on Human-System Design Support
for Changing Technology and detailed below:
1. Satisficing of system stakeholders (e.g., users, acquirers, developers);
2. Incremental growth of system definition and stakeholder commitment;
3. Concurrent system definition and development;
4. Iterative system definition and development; and
5. Risk management.
A full implementation of the ICM with the associate decision method described above is beyond
the scope of the existing transformation plan, but the details are well-aligned with the needs of
this effort and should be examined in detail for further actions to take beyond those called out in
the Phase I and II diagrams provided in Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5.
"Establish Criteria" is the next critical supporting object. The collaborative process at the center
of the enterprise architecture should provide the venue in which to secure early and continuous
enterprise stakeholder buy-in and implementation of these criteria. This should be the first
priority within the transformation plan. Without clearly established criteria, the enterprise will
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be crippled in its decision-making abilities. The collaborative process instituted by the enterprise
should make the review and validation of decision criteria a part of the regular review cycle.
Furthermore, these criteria need to be clearly documented and communicated to the entire
enterprise activity to allow for the effective use of the prescribed "simple rules strategy"
articulated in Chapter 10. The mechanics of creating these criteria require the enterprise
leadership to meet and spend intensive time collectively discussing and agreeing to these criteria.
This should be accomplished through one or more off-site meetings without the distractions of
other work or issues diluting the effort.
"Collective Data Gathering" was detailed earlier as an element within several attribute processes.
From an implementation standpoint, the process for how safety will be assessed, the questions
that will need to be answered, and the allowable data collection and validation procedures all
have to be defined before the specifics of which data needs to be collected can be determined.
Reference to the Phase I and II plan will demonstrate the dependencies associated with this
activity.
"Defined Path Forward" is the second priority the enterprise must undertake. This is essential
for two reasons. First, generating broader leadership engagement and advocacy for the effort
will be impossible without a clearly articulated plan for how the desired operational flexibility
will be achieved. Interviews with several of the enterprise decision makers brought this point out
with considerable force and clarity. Second, securing the needed budget and manpower cannot
proceed without a clearly defined set of objectives and deliverables against which money and
manpower can be committed. This dovetails back into the "Capable Equipage" block and the
need to implement the ICM to create a tractable problem that can be appropriately scoped and
implemented for the available resources. Once this proverbial "chicken-and-egg" problem can
be dealt with, positive reinforcing loops can grow and expand the effort.
"Joint Led Teams" and "Shared PM Responsibility" are both supporting objects that already
have some legacy with the previous and current efforts in this domain. The recommendation in
this transformation plan is to push the degree of shared responsibility and cooperation to an
entirely new level of transparency and trust within the enterprise. Both of these actions can be
implemented concurrently with the other supporting objects previously discussed and detailed.
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In some instances, such as for "Established Criteria" and "Defined Path Forward," the existence
of these relationships will provide a better foundation in which to accomplish other tasks. Once
again, the nature of how the enterprise establishes these joint teams and shared program
management duties should be the subject of early decision criteria and processes.
"Budget and Manpower" largely follow the dictates of the external POM process mentioned
previously. The important aspect to this supporting object is to align it as quickly as possible
with these external interfaces to ensure the highest probability of securing the needed resources.
If this alignment is not achieved quickly, the entire effort may very well be sidelined for another
POM cycle (2 years). It is particularly important that the Air Force, OSD, and the FAA all
submit mutually reinforcing budget requests through the funding process. On the Air Force side,
this should be the budget function attached to the RQ-4 program and ACC/A8. On the FAA
side, this should be primarily the AIR-160 office.
"Educated Participants" was discussed at some length in Chapter 10. The basic transformation
plan for this element is to begin to engage the assistance of training and educational centers of
excellence to pull together the necessary programs and materials to get the word out to as broad a
constituency as possible. Some of this is already underway with efforts by both AIR-160 and
AJR-36. The UAS experimental aircraft certification report reference earlier also provides a
number of excellent recommendations on specific steps the FAA could take in regards to this
particular item. [93]
Collectively, the timing and dependencies annotated in Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5, along with
the above recommendations, provides the core to the transformation plan activities that need to
occur to initiate a successful enterprise activity. The additional details from Chapters 9 and 10
that further enumerate the specifics within each supporting element provide a comprehensive
description of the types of activities that need to be undertaken for significant progress to be
made in this arena.
Execution Cycle
The execution cycle provides the first opportunity for feedback on the effectiveness and
efficiency of the activities outlined in the transformation plan. As the old military adage says,
"No plan of battle ever survives contact with the enemy." [ 112]
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Implement & Coordinate Transformation Plan
The development of detailed project implementation plans, budgeting, and resource commitment
will need to be accomplished as the details for the first two-year cycle comes into focus.
Specific call outs are made in the Phase I and II diagrams for enterprise-wide reviews and
updates in order to secure the needed synchronization and phasing between organizations and
activities. Detailed program plans such as the one shown in Figure 11-6 will have to be
developed and coordinated to provide a master schedule against which planning and execution
can be tracked and measured. Education and training will need to be provided internally to the
enterprise to help reduce the inefficiencies that result from the different cultures and perspectives
each organization brings to the table.
It is important to point out that the detailed program planning that must be carried out should still
be done in conformance with the broader enterprise strategy of implementing simple rules and a
few critical processes. The more complex an undertaking becomes the more simple the rules
should be for how it is managed. [18] For the enterprise to remain agile and flexible in the
dynamic environment of changing budget, priorities and performance objectives, a deliberate
effort to guard against "solution lock-in" must be ingrained into the architecture itself. By
forcing an incremental delivery every two years, a recalibration of the program can occur on
regularly scheduled intervals, providing the opportunity to not only refresh the potential
technology applied to the problem, but to re-evaluate the processes and approaches as well.
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Figure 11-6. Example of Detailed Program Plan from JIPT Effort.
Nurture, Process & Imbed Lean Enterprise Thinking
Once again, because the chosen architecture is an inherently process-based structure, the
implementation of lean practices for continuous process improvement and the elimination of
waste in the execution of the enterprise activities can be embedded into the enterprise from the
ground up. The challenge is to create the culture. The hooks are there and the tools are
available, but it is not at all clear that the organizations involved have either the knowledge or the
motivation to institute solid lean enterprise practices.
The best hope for successfully integrating lean practices into the enterprise is to conduct value
stream mapping for the critical processes that are instituted at the initiation of the effort. If
tangible savings and value can be exhibited early and often as the enterprise matures, there is a
reasonable expectation that lean practices will take hold. With the appropriate leadership, these
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practices can be formalized and the appropriate culture and perspectives cultivated throughout
the entire enterprise. Results from these exercises should also be used to close the feedback
loops into the strategic and planning cycles to leverage the operational experiences gained on the
execution side of the transformation cycle. This will help create the "macro" level process
improvement needed through the entire enterprise transformation process, not just within the
planning or execution cycles.
Strategic Cycle
The third and final stage in the transformation roadmap is the Strategic Cycle. This aspect of the
roadmap details the activity required to determine the strategic imperatives of the enterprise and
undertakes to actively engage the enterprise leadership in the transformation process itself. This
portion of the transformation plan is a critical element in the UAS AI enterprise and represents a
significant source of risk to the successful execution of the enterprise activities. Nearly every
decision maker interviewed cited the lack of engaged, committed leadership as a major barrier to
the success of the effort.
In this regard, the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap provides a clean way to integrate the
issues highlighted under the "Strategic" view of the enterprise architecting effort, specifically,
the need to unify the senior Air Force, DoD, and FAA leadership perception of the value of
restoring the principle of maneuver to UAS assets based on the contribution made to "enabling
global strike." The creation of this strategic level support and active endorsement goes to the
heart of the issues previously discussed in Chapter 10.
There are two approaches to building enterprise success in the face of endogenous factors . The
first would be to pursue a "bottoms-up" approach by operating entirely within the existing
resource constraints and building an initial portfolio of successes. Success breeds success, and if
the enterprise can begin to build the reputation of being able to deal with the highly dynamic
nature of the problem in a way that provides for meaningful improvements in operational
flexibility, all the while adhering to the resource and political constraints surrounding the
problem, then the needed leadership advocacy will begin to materialize.
While this "bottoms-up" approach is likely necessary, it probably will not be sufficient in and of
itself. The additional "top-down" approach will almost certainly be required to build a durable
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effort that will deliver the required value. This "top-down" approach was discussed extensively
under the "Strategy" view in Chapter 10, and will not be revisited here. The point is that
ultimately, the senior leadership at the "1 up" level from the current enterprise needs to be of one
mind on the value proposition proposed by the intent behind "restoring the principle of
maneuver" and the contribution it makes to "enabling global strike." They need to subsequently
get behind the effort and provide the required advocacy and resource support needed to make
incrementally useful value deliveries.
The other key element to this facet of the transformation plan is the need for a communication
strategy that is both simple and inclusive. This need was a key observation from the interview
data, and it provides some insight into the lack of more energetic leadership engagement on the
subject to date. One interviewee surmised that one of the reasons there was not more leadership
involvement on the topic of airspace integration was due to the complexity of the problem and a
lack of a clear, actionable plan that leadership could understand, articulate, and push further up
the command structure. The enterprise architecting effort conducted here should provide the
needed clarity on the issues and what needs to be done to address them. By providing the
information in this analysis in a format that enables senior DoD and FAA leadership to
fundamentally understand and articulate the issues, the degree of leadership advocacy and buy-in
should expand considerably, even in the short-term.
Once this has been accomplished, hit "repeat" and start over again at the planning cycle stage to
reassess the current state and see what adjustments need to be made in order to keep the
enterprise moving forward toward the objective of restoring maneuver to UAS operations. In
addition, also recall that the transformation plan should be structured in such a way as to provide
stable intermediate forms along the change path. These stable intermediate forms should be the
starting point from which each two-year cycle begins the planning phase of the process. Because
the context is in such a dynamic state, calling out the specifics of each of these states would not
only be impossible, but it would also defeat the purpose of having an iterative process in which
to work out the details of what these should look like as the system and enterprise evolves.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that in reality, the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
can be started in either the Strategic Cycle or the Planning Cycle, at least in terms of the analysis
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conducted for the UAS AI problem. There are advantages and disadvantages to each. In reality,
both stages would likely need to be implemented concurrently so that the senior leadership value
perspective on the UAS AI problem could be aligned even as small, incremental successes are
claimed as proof the enterprise architecture is both valid and executable.
Barriers
Before concluding, a brief note on barriers to the transformation plan is in order. Recall that an
extensive discussion of enterprise barriers was presented in the discussion of the data analysis
collected from the interviews conducted with enterprise decision makers. All of these barriers
are relevant to the discussion here, and the previous recommendations largely addressed the most
significant of these barriers. More to the point is the existence of transformation specific barriers
not addressed by the previous discussion.
The largest transformation related barrier that will need to be overcome is the perception among
many that the time and effort focused on "process" is wasted energy that would be better spent
actually getting things pushed out the door. This was touched on previously under the
"Execution Cycle" discussion. It will be imperative that this mindset and attitude be countered
with effective and tangible examples of lean enterprise practices at work.
Consolidated List of Research Findings and Near-Term Recommendations
A list of the "Top 5" research findings and near-term recommended actions resulting from this
effort summarizes the hardest hitting results of this research. The research findings provide the
context for implementing the near-term "tactical" recommendations that follow.
Research Findings
This summary of the research findings provides a succinct statement of the insights the
methodology developed in this thesis provided in the analysis of the UAS AI effort. No
ubiquitous claims to validation or extensibility result from this research; however, the
methodology did prove useful in the following ways:
1. The deployed methodology provides a clean interface to the existing DoD
Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) process. The results and implementation
recommendations appear to align well with Air Force and DoD organizational structures
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and responsibilities. In addition, the recognition of CBA as a value-based approach
resulted in significant insights and extensions to the current CBA processes based on the
broader value-focused literature and theory.
2. The enterprise purpose framework and the X-matrix analysis yield well-aligned
value structures both vertically and horizontally across the Global Strike Task
Force (GSTF) extended enterprise and the UAS AI enterprise, respectively.
Disconnects between the UAS Al enterprise and the broader GSTF extended enterprise
were highlighted. Using the X-matrix to assess the internal UAS AI enterprise provided
key insights into needed development of specific attributes and metrics to align disparate
decision maker perspectives within the enterprise. The coherency established by the
value alignment in both dimensions provided a basis for accomplishing the more detailed
analysis for the enterprise architecting effort.
3. Unarticulated assumptions come to the forefront of the analysis, and several
doctrine-to-activity disconnects were highlighted. The combined insights resulting
from the value alignment activities described above, coupled with the more detailed and
rigorous analysis using the Object Process Methodology (OPM), served to highlight the
interactions that were present (or lacking) between various elements of the enterprise. By
requiring a clear articulation of what these interactions actually look like, as opposed to
what people often mistakenly took for granted, disconnects between the doctrinal
elements related to flying UAS (what was said) could be contrasted with the activities
that were actually implemented (what was done). These insights provided a rich source
of information for where barriers might exist to moving the UAS Al effort forward.
4. The need for a consolidated position at the GSTF extended enterprise level on the
constraints under which the UAS AI activity should operate surfaced as a major
hurdle to creating value. This insight resulted from the enterprise purpose statement
analysis and an assessment of the vertical alignment in the value structure. This
information, coupled with the explicit interactions described by the architecture OPM,
highlighted the following: the current move to push additional capability onto UAS
platforms is occurring without a clear trade having been conducted on the impact those
platforms' capabilities bring (or don't) to the global strike capability of the larger Air
Force force structure. The research methodology provided clear insights into the need for
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this discussion at the GSTF extended enterprise level to specify the resource expenditures
for restoring maneuver to UAS.
5. Rigorous implementation of the methodology provides strong and clear linkage
between the delivery of the GSTF extended enterprise value definition (i.e. global
strike) and the specific, concrete actions the UAS AI enterprise must accomplish to
realize the desired level of maneuverability. The Enterprise Transformation Roadmap
provided a robust approach for translating the GSTF Extended enterprise values driving
the UAS Al enterprise into a concrete, time-phased roadmap grounded in details and
practical implementation considerations. It is through the Enterprise Transformation
Roadmap the transition is made from subjective (but needed) expressions of value
definitions (i.e. restore maneuver) to concrete, specific, and actionable plans that can be
implemented, assessed, and modified to take into account the relative success of a set of
activities (i.e. implement joint-led teams).
In summary, the methodology as implemented in this research provides a natural interface to the
existing DoD CBA process, yields vertically and horizontally aligned activities, pushes
assumptions and interactions to the forefront of the discussion, establishes the strategic issue(s)
that must be addressed to flow value, and connects subjective values directly to specific,
actionable effort needed to deliver the desired value.
Near-Term Recommendations
With the previous research findings as context, the following "Top 5" describes the near-term,
"tactical" activities needed to move the UAS Al activity in the right direction for realizing the
desired value of both the UAS AI enterprise (restore maneuver) and the GSTF extended
enterprise (enable global strike). The list is in roughly the order of highest-to-lowest priority.
1. The UAS airspace integration purpose statement must clearly link military
capabilities (i.e. global strike), where the principal shortfall is maneuver, and the
need to integrate UAS into the airspace. Solutions will be more difficult to resource if
there is a perception that UAS airspace integration is the end goal as opposed to enabling
the relevant mission area. Unmanned aircraft are national security programs tied directly
to projected military capability, and framing the airspace integration issue in the same
light is important to elevating the discussion to the appropriate level. A proposed UAS
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Al purpose statement connecting the desired military capability with airspace integration
is provided as follows:
The purpose of the airspace integration enterprise is to restore the principle of
maneuver to operations by integrating UAS into civil airspace using a full spectrum
approach of policy, procedures and materiel system equipage while enabling needed
UAS training and operational missions and meeting the contextual constraints
(political, cultural, organizational, resource, etc) necessary to successfully deliver
incrementally meaningful levels of value.
2. Implement a senior leadership engagement plan to specify the constraints the Air
Force and DoD have on the effort to restore the principle of maneuver to UAS platforms
(i.e. Non-Recurring Engineering costs, production numbers, limited or niche mission
areas assigned to UAS, the maneuver of the overall force, etc). Elucidating these
constraints within the broader context of "enabling global strike" puts a handle on the
strategic issues for senior leadership to engage on. Communicating the value of restoring
the principle of maneuver will be most effective through an analysis of Air Force
capability delivery and the ramifications of current UAS policy and practices on the Air
Force's ability to deliver "global strike" to the Combatant Commander. Once the
constraints are clearly established, they should be implemented in concert with a "Simple
Rules" strategy of a few key processes and a couple of critical criteria (i.e. decision rules
or processes-see Recommendation #4) to govern the overall enterprise effort across Air
Force, DoD, and FAA decision makers.
3. The enterprise must produce a resource-constrained approach providing an
incremental product delivery the decision makers within the UAS Al enterprise, and the
GSTF extended enterprise will consider worthy of investment, while also meeting the
intent of the limitations brought out in Recommendation #2. This means active
engagement with all of the enterprise decision makers to ensure the development of a
properly scoped, "revolving" two-year plan, providing an increase in value from the end
user's perspective (i.e. how has global strike capability increased because of these
expenditures of resource?).
4. The absence of clear end-state, performance objectives requires the establishment of
decision criteria and processes to effectively direct UAS AI enterprise activities.
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Recommendation #4 expands on the need for enterprise governance decision criteria in
the face of unspecified, final objectives or outcomes (the current condition in which UAS
AI efforts are operating). Day-to-day activities needed for UAS Al enterprise unity of
effort depend on clearly established governance criteria for teams or activities facing
unspecified performance objectives or requirements [17]. More complex systems or
activities require simpler (and fewer) rules for effective decision-making (see reference
[18] for further expansion of this topic). As decisions arise, the only meaningful way to
make consistent progress is to have a consensed set of priorities or criteria against which
the enterprise has agreed to make resource and materiel related decisions. While
seemingly straight forward, this approach is largely absent from past and present efforts.
5. Limit the number of active decision makers on any one given enterprise effort to less
than 10, and preferably no more than six or seven, by segmenting the scope of activities
into specific subsets of the problem the enterprise can work in parallel. Additional
analysis shows the rapid decrease in activity effectiveness with an increase in the number
of decision makers beyond the prescribed six or seven recommended for this effort [19].
One approach to implementing this recommendation would be to have the Air Force
work all of the early operational aspects for the Level 3-5 UAS, have the Army work all
of the early operational aspects for the Level 0-2 UAS, and have the Navy work all of the
broader systems engineering aspects to the problem. These would be accomplished as
largely independent efforts (and consequently involve fewer decision makers), but
lessons learned and process related information would be communicated back out at the
full UAS AI enterprise level. This would also allow each service to conduct activities
within the constraints established by their respective services while still contributing to
the UAS Al enterprise effort.
In summary, implementation of near-term actions include redefining the UAS AI enterprise
purpose, engaging senior leadership to clearly specify constraints, initiating a cyclical, 2-year
plan to operate under these constraints, establishing the appropriate governance decision criteria,
and limiting the total number of decision makers on any one given effort.
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Chapter 11 Summary
The Enterprise OPM provides the insight into the key points of leverage in an enterprise to focus
the transformation planning stage of the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap. Using the
Enterprise Transformation Roadmap provides a broader set of implementation issues to consider
in the advancement of the current enterprise state towards the desired objective articulated by the
selected enterprise architecture, in this case the product-informed, process focused architecture.
Using the approach outlined in the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap, specific details
concerning the planning and execution stages of the UAS airspace integration activities are
called out by referencing the specific mechanisms that have been determined to provide the
highest degree of leverage over the enterprise performance and behavior characteristics. The top
five research findings and near-term recommendations the UAS airspace integration enterprise
effort should address provide concrete, tangible action items to move forward.
Page 287
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
Page 288
Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft in the NAS
This final section and chapter conclude by examining potential extensions to the methodology
developed in Section II. Specifically, the use of the framework developed in this research for use
in DoD Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) processes is examined along with an investigation
into the additional effort required to create an executable model of the enterprise architecting
portion of this analysis. The chapter concludes with thoughts on the need for further iteration
with the UAS AI enterprise to reach a truly implementable plan and the need to think at least a
level above the point where the current challenge resides in order to secure a lasting solution.
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CHAPTER 12 - FURTHER RESEARCH AND FINAL THOUGHTS
"He can compress the most words into the smallest ideas of any man I ever met."
-Abraham Lincoln
Hopefully, you have not arrived at this point in the research discussion only to find yourself in
violent agreement with Abraham Lincoln, at least with respect to this thesis. Certainly the
methodology and application described in this research leaves much to be desired from an
implementation standpoint, and this is in fact a good piece of the discussion that follows.
Turning the three enterprise architecture point designs explored under the application section of
this research into a true tradespace exploration methodology will require the implementation of
executable models to deal with the sheer number of potential alternatives.
Before tackling that issue, however, a brief excursion is made into an extension of the
methodology presented in this research back to the CBA framework that provided an initial
constraint to the path selected. Inadvertently through the selection of the methodology and
framework employed in this analysis, an approach to resolving several CBA execution problems
presents itself. This methodology extension will be addressed briefly, followed by the
executable model discussion. The research concludes with a couple of final thoughts on the
current research and the need for continued work in this area of value-focused thinking and
enterprise architecting.
Methodology Extensions
Recall that for the research and methodology developed in this thesis, the decision was made to
implement an enterprise architecting framework developed by Nightingale and Rhodes. [11]
This enterprise architecting framework can be switched in the OPM construct for a different set
of enterprise views that more closely aligns with the existing CBA process, namely the
DOTMLPF framework already in place through the JCIDS process. Figure 12-1 provides the
general architecture development OPM for the CBA context.
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Figure 12-1. Methodology Extension to CBA using DOTMLPF for "Views".
In addition to the architecture OPM elements described previously in Section 11 of this research,
the CBA context in Figure 12-1 also has a number of additional items included to provide a
reference back to the current CBA and JCI1DS processes (Reference Chapter 2 for more detail on
the CBA process itself). With the simple substitution of the JCIDS DOTMLPF framework for
the enterprise architecting framework used in this research, all of the methodology developed inSection can be applied directly to the CBA assessment.
The Power of using the approach outlined in Section 11 for the CBA process is the ability to
resolve at least one observed shortfall in the implementation of the current CBA process within
the DoD, and it paves the way for a resolution of a second issu . The immediate i pl mentatiproblem the current methodology resolves is the lack of a consistent instantiation of a singleI
value-focused approach across the entire DOTMLPF assessment that is rigorous enough to spanLink
the full scope of organizations and needs typically associated with a CBA activity.SSpeclalizesto , ..... it
Figure 12-1. Methodology Extension to CBA using DOTMLPF for "'Views".
In addition to the architecture OPM elements described previously in Section II of this research,
the CBA context in Figure 12-1 also has a number of additional items included to provide a
refeThis addresses a significant shortfall into t e current CBA and JCIDS proprocess as it relater 2 for morhe detail onthe CBA process itself). With the simple substitution of the JCIDS DOTMLPF framework for
the enterprise architecting framework used in this research, all of the methodology developed in
Section II can be applied directly to the CBA assessment.
analysisThe power of usingh the approach outlined approach is nSection II for the CBAis is most apparent when toe
anaresolve at least one obsa Materved shortfall in th e icmplementationd as p rt of the currentradespace. The observation ofthe DoD, and it paves the way for a resolution of a second issue. The immediate implementation
problem the current methodology resolves is the lack of a consistent instantiation of a single,
value-focus d approac  across the entir  DOTMLPF assessment that is rigorous enough to span
the full scope of organizations and needs typically associated with a CBA activity.
This addresses a significant shortfall in the current CBA process as it relates to the depth of
analysis for which a true value-focused approach is maintained. This is most apparent when the
analysis calls for a Materiel solution to be included as part of the tradespace. The observation of
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the current CBA process is that the value-focused content of the FAA and FNA appears to be
lost as the analysis enters into the more detailed programmatic and engineering realm of the
FSA. By instantiating a rigorous methodology for keeping track of the interactions and
relationships between the DOTMLPF components, maintaining the appropriate value-focused
approach to the Materiel design aspects of the problem are preserved. This also forces the
Materiel community to articulate the results of the analysis back into the attribute space rather
than in technical performance or engineering terms. This provides a way to understand the
contribution of the Materiel component on the same terms as the other factors in the DOTMLPF
framework ensuring a good "apples-to-apples" comparison between alternative methods of
delivering value.
The second shortfall this approach at least sets up is the ability to start thinking about the use of
an executable model for detailed Materiel tradespace exploration using the value-focused
approach developed here and tied in with the Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE)
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Figure 12-2. OPM Connection between Architecture and Materiel Design using MATE.
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The use of an executable model in the CBA framework has all of the same benefits mentioned
previously in Section II. In the case of the existing analysis framework operated by the DoD, the
added advantage is the ability to seamlessly flow capability-focused information from the
beginning of the process at the Joint Staff J-8 level, down through the relevant Functional
Control Boards, out to the appropriate executive agent or lead service, and in the case of the Air
Force, tasked to the appropriate MAJCOM for additional analysis before finally arriving at the
Materiel provider for an assessment of potential solutions. Once the tradespace has been
explored, the information can be returned in the same direction using the same language and
metrics to communicate the utility of any given point design as compared with any of the other
DOTMLPF factors.
Before continuing, a brief comparative assessment between the enterprise architecting construct
put forward by Nightingale and Rhodes and the DoD DOTMLPF framework is warranted to
provide the reader with some sense for the relative degree of completeness these two frameworks
bring to the analysis. A first-order mapping is depicted in Figure 12-3.
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Figure 12-3. Enterprise Architecting-to-DOTMLPF Framework Mapping.
The most obvious differences are highlighted red. In the case of the DOTMLPF construct, the
framework lacks any explicit treatment of either 'Process' or 'Information Technology' in the
"views" through which the enterprise is architected. For its part, the Nightingale and Rhodes
framework does not explicitly address the 'Facilities' perspective from the DOTMLPF
framework. In both instances, each framework could benefit from the additional perspectives the
other could provide. In the case of those views that are colored as yellow, there is either some
limited (or incomplete) mapping between the frameworks, or the information is split into
different segments in the other framework. In the case of the 'Policy' view from Nightingale and
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Rhodes, there is an incomplete mapping of the perspective to that of 'Leadership and Education'.
This is likely an area that the DOTMLPF framework could make more explicit. For its part, the
enterprise architecting framework only partially deals with the 'Training' view advanced by the
DOTMLPF framework. The same holds true for both 'Leadership and Education' and
'Personnel'. The final set of views are those color-coded as green. These represent one-to-one
mappings between the frameworks where each framework treats these views in nearly identical
fashion.
A superficial assessment of these differences suggests that both frameworks may not be
complete as they currently stand, although the Nightingale and Rhodes framework appears to
address a somewhat broader spectrum of issues than does the DOTMLPF framework. In reality,
a rigorous method for evaluating the completeness of these frameworks should be developed that
would provide an "absolute" sense for how robust any particular framework is when it comes to
the completeness with which it addresses the enterprise architecting effort. This is an area of
research that is still in its infancy, and future research in this area would be needed before the
analysis could progress beyond the relatively simple descriptive results presented here.
Tradespace and Executable Model Extensions
With all of the potential advantages highlighted throughout this research on getting the
methodology to the point of an executable model, the natural question is what would be involved
in making this happen. Glazer makes the following observations concerning what is needed
from a simulation capability to be useful to enterprise architects [113]:
- Representative of the actual enterprise, its structure, dynamics, and environment;
- Able to capture behavioral complexity as it arises from the architecture itself;
- Able to address specific problems the enterprise faces in a timely manner; and
- Capable of evolving and adapting to reflect the changing nature of the enterprise.
Glazer goes on to qualify the use of the modeling techniques he has developed with the
following observations:
"This [hybrid] approach is not a predictive approach to simulation modeling intended to
improve operational efficiency (as most are); instead, this approach seeks to yield insight
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into the behavior of a complex enterprise arising from its architecture. This insight, in
turn, helps to accelerate the learning curve for enterprise managers seeking to shape and
guide their enterprise from a system-level perspective. This approach allows the modeler to
capture key attributes of the enterprise from multiple perspectives (e.g., strategy, process,
organization, products, etc.) and examine how the interactions between these perspectives
drive the high-level behaviors of the enterprise. Such an approach takes a strategic view of
the enterprise to guide enterprise architects and managers in understanding how the system,
as a whole, delivers value to its stakeholders."
Glazner's approach implements the notional modeling framework depicted in Figure 12-4. The
work Glazner has conducted is the culmination of over six years worth of research effort, and it




Figure 12-4. Notional Hybrid Enterprise Architecture Modeling Framework.
The big question that remains open as a result of the research in this thesis is whether the MATE
framework could be adapted directly to the enterprise architecting challenge as an extension to
the methodology. To go one step further, if the MATE methodology could be implemented
successfully, would it be robust enough in the enterprise architecting domain to remain
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prescriptive (it is in the technical product arena where it was initially developed)? This would
effectively represent the next logical extension to Glazner's work where the models developed
by Glazner may provide for a way of connecting attribute delivery to cost and performance
characteristics of the enterprise.
To help flesh out some of these issues, a simple set of models was constructed to try to uncover
some of the additional issues to be resolved before a MATE implementation would be possible
in the enterprise architecting effort. Using the work already accomplished on the UAS Al
enterprise, a very course Excel model of the MATE framework is used to explore some of these
underlying issues that require further work. [87] Recall, the interview questionnaire and the
stakeholder analysis were specifically oriented around the MATE approach to gathering and
collecting the needed data for the methodology in Section II. This translates into a 100% match
between the methodology in this thesis and the MATE construct for attribute and utility
elicitation. Although the utility functions were not elicited during the data collection interviews,
reasonable approximations can be estimated from the data (See Figure 12-5). These utility
curves were developed for five out of the nine attributes for the enterprise as a subset to simplify
the analysis.
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Figure 12-5. Estimated Utility Curves for UAS Airspace Integration Attributes.
At this level of analysis, there are no disconnects with the existing MATE methodology and the
requirements for the enterprise architecting effort. An analysis of the three architectures
developed in Section III against the five attributes selected for the MATE assessment provide
some insights into where the complexities of the problem will begin to emerge.
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Weights 0.16 0.1 0.14 0.12 0.08
Best 1.44E-07 80 5 115 3 5
Worst 1E-08 70 10.6 150 1 7
Table 12-1. UAS Airspace Integration Architecture Design Choices.
In the case of each alternative architecture developed in Section III, the challenge is how to
assess the performance of the architecture against each of the five enterprise attributes. A true
understanding of the safety performance will likely require at a minimum some parametric
assessments coupled with higher fidelity models of specific components, such as the sense-and-
avoid sensor, the detection algorithms, and the command and control systems. Mission
capability is an even more difficult value to estimate, and if conducted in reality, would likely
require some kind of relationships to be established between the specific choices in the enterprise
architecture for the degree of collaboration & safety and the willingness of the FAA to approve
an operation. Ops flexibility as it is defined is a bit easier to get a handle on since it is a tangible
construct describing the length of time that is expected in order to receive an approval to fly.
Implementability would require additional models for the expected costs and scope growth for
each architecture examined. The cost category itself is an extremely difficult quantity to assess
and a clear set of standards for establishing the cost relationships to the architecture design
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variables (in this case the "views" in the enterprise architecture framework) would have to be
developed. Notice for the example in Table 12-1 that safety and mission are essentially removed
from consideration by setting all three alternatives equal to one another. This may imply that
these attributes would be better categorized as constraints if this is in fact how they are handled
in reality. On the other hand, if the decision results from simply not knowing how to model
these attributes for each of the alternative architectures, the lack of information or framework for
an approach can be addressed.
Figure 12-6. Utility vs. Cost for UAS Airspace Integration Architectures.
The results for the three architectures examined in Section III are plotted in Figure 12-6 for the
sake of completeness. Notice that as cost is incorporated explicitly into the model for each
architecture, some of the relative rankings begin to shift between the three alternatives. This
may also be due in some measure to the less than complete consideration of all the enterprise
attributes.
Other than the need to deal with cost in an explicit manner, the extension to this point does not
appear to provide much in terms of additional insights into the architecture design and the
associated utility. This is after all roughly the same utility quantities arrived at in the Section II
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analysis. The real power of MATE as applied in the current methodology comes from
parameterizing the decision variables that comprise the overall architecture selections. In the
method used in this research, this translates into the "Mechanisms" used to produce the desired
enterprise attributes. This has a significant advantage over the design-choice method just
described. Instead of attempting to arrive at some overall "cost factor" for each architecture (and
the associated difficulties just described), each mechanism used in the creation of the architecture
can be costed independently, and because each mechanism is a much more concrete object than
the architecture as a whole, estimating the cost relationships for each mechanism relative to the
utility produced should be more straightforward. Again, the QFD approach is used as a very
rough way of associating decision variables to attributes and cost, as depicted in Table 12-2.
Table 12-2. Relationship Between Attributes and Design Variables (Mechanisms).
The quantification of the relationship between the attributes and the mechanisms in the above
table brings out additional issues that have to be resolved. The quantification of mechanisms
such as "Established Criteria" to each of the attributes suggested relationships that were not
initially captured in the OPM description of the enterprise architecture. This suggests that a QFD
approach to relating mechanisms to attributes would be a worthwhile endeavor as part of the
primary methodology sequence articulated in Section II. In other words, beyond just the
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existence of the connection between an attribute and a mechanism, the QFD forces an evaluation
of the strength of that connection and the underlying basis. This underlying basis is the most
important aspect to uncover since it will drive the interaction behavior as well as the cost
function for that mechanism and attribute pair. Arriving at a consistent method for
accomplishing these evaluations and cost estimates is a shortfall in the current body of literature
and would require additional research, although some initial work has been attempted in this
area. See reference [114] for a treatment of policy and budget related methodologies and an
approach for connecting these factors to architectures (although the reference was an assessment
against space systems, the considerations are germane to the current topic in this research).
If the mechanism-to-attribute relationship can be adequately described or otherwise quantified,
the range over which the mechanisms vary can be associated with a particular level of utility
delivery for each attribute. If the cost relationship between the level of performance for each
mechanism is included in the model, an avenue for exploring the full architectural tradespace
now becomes possible. Up until this point, the evaluation was limited to a handful of point
designs. Employing the MATE methodology, even in this very low fidelity approach using the
QFD to associate mechanisms with attributes and costs results in an alternative architecture
tradespace depicted in Figure 12-7.
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Figure 12-7. UAS Airspace Integration Architecture Tradespace Plot.
To provide more insight, the above information is sorted by each contributing mechanism to
understand the impact each mechanism may play on the relative cost/utility location of a given
design. These additional plots are provided in Figure 12-8. General trends can be observed and
considered with these views. For instance, in the case of "Capable Equipage" the decision
variable or mechanism that was varied was the range at which the UAS sense-and-avoid system
could detect another aircraft. The further out the range, the better the utility return, but the more
expensive the UAS becomes. This train of thought is consistent with the tradespace depiction by
noting the yellow triangles in the plot represent a sense-and-avoid system with a "long" range,
resulting in a trend that puts the yellow architectures along the leading edge of the utility "front"
but also typically costing more than architectures using less capable sense-and-avoid systems.
By employing a tradespace analysis perspective, the architect has a much better understanding of
where various architecture point designs fall within the broader tradespace.
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Figure 12-8. UAS Airspace Integration Tradespace Plots for Specific Mechanisms.
Each individual mechanism can be explored in a similar manner so that a clear sense for the
relative impact on the utility and cost functions can be determined. This also serves to highlight
why it is so important to get the relationships between the mechanism and the attributes and costs
identified as rigorously as possible. The validity of the tradespace is only as good as these
relationships and the fidelity to which they are modeled. To reiterate the point made earlier,
arriving at a consistent, repeatable method for quantifying the kinds of relationships and
dynamics for what are typically very "soft" relationships between enterprise attributes,
mechanisms, and costs is the single largest hurdle for implementing the above described
approach.
In closing this discussion of executable models for enterprise architecting endeavors, several
observations are warranted. First, the issues described above only begin to scratch the surface of
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the capabilities the MATE method could bring to the table. The reader is referred to the work by
Ross at reference [64] for an in-depth discussion of how the MATE methodology can be applied
to uncertain and changing contexts in a dynamic, time driven context. A treatment of these
issues is both outside the scope of the current research and premature from the standpoint of
needing the previously identified issues resolved before the more advanced dynamic problem can
be successfully tackled.
The other thing to keep in mind is the general modeling principles that make for a successful
effort. Sterman provides an excellent set of modeling heuristics in Business Dynamics. [115]
The following 5 of 12 principles are provided as most relevant to the discussion of modeling
issues:
- Develop a model to solve a particular problem, not to model a system.
- Be skeptical about the value of modeling and force the "why do we need it" discussion at
the start of the project.
- Modeling works best as an iterative process of joint inquiry between client and
consultant.
- Get a preliminary model working as soon as possible. Add detail only as necessary.
- A broad model boundary is more important than a great deal of detail.
Keeping these overarching principles at the forefront in the pursuit of the above challenges will
keep the results targeted on the enterprise value definition. The extent to which a model like
MATE, or even the approach developed in this research, is useful is the degree to which it
provides insight and understanding to the enterprise architect in designing an enterprise concept
that effectively creates and delivers the value each enterprise decision maker expects as a result
of their contributions and interactions with the enterprise (recall the earlier reference and
discussion from Glazner).
Final Thoughts
In keeping with Sterman's observation that "Modeling works best as an iterative process of joint
inquiry between client and consultant," the analysis and results presented in this research
represent no more than a "first pass" at a solution to the UAS airspace integration challenge. The
results captured in the initial architecture and transformation plan in Section III will require at
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least another couple of iterations with the UAS Al enterprise decision makers before all of the
appropriate constraints and nuances have been adequately addressed to attempt some form of
implementation of the initial results presented in this thesis.
This iterative nature of the methodology is of course at the heart of any successful method
attempting to deal with the complexities of these types of issues. Recall from Chapter 2 that the
method will likely require at least three passes through the framework presented in Section II,
bouncing results and implications off of the enterprise decision makers for feedback and
adjustments before the more detailed transformation planning effort should be undertaken. This
feedback loop should occur early and often in the enterprise architecting effort and cannot be
overemphasized.
As stated at the outset of this research, the intent is to provide a rigorous methodology that is
consistent with the DoD CBA process and robust enough to treat the full spectrum of issues
associated with the UAS airspace integration effort. The methodology is clearly consistent with
the DoD CBA process. The extent to which the UAS airspace integration issues have been
successfully articulated and resolved is a question that only time and additional effort will fully
reveal.
The organization of the material into a methodology and application section is designed to
facilitate the extension and refinement of the approach in future theoretical work while still
providing a concrete "real world" deliverable by addressing a current and growing concern of the
Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. The breadth of issues that are
integral to the enterprise architecting endeavor resulted in obvious omissions of further detail in a
number of sections, most notably the development of tools that could be applied within each
enterprise architecting view to provide further insight and guidance on alternatives the architect
could apply to the challenge at hand. Each of these warrants development commensurate with
this thesis. In addition, the treatment of executable models, the above discussion
notwithstanding, was at best a sketch of the challenges associated with this kind of effort. This is
an area of significant research, and the body of knowledge on modeling enterprise architectures
will continue to expand at ever increasing rates over the next several years. The results of these
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efforts should certainly be leveraged for the additional insights they may bring to the value
creation endeavor.
Perhaps Albert Einstein provides the best summation of this research effort in the following
observation [116]:
The significant problems we face in life cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we
were at when we created them.
If this thesis provides even a small basis for elevating the level of thinking on restoring maneuver
to UAS platforms, then the time will have been well spent. Clearly, the challenge presented in
this analysis will require significant contemplation and a considered course of action to realize
the fullest potential UAS platforms have to offer to the DoD.
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The following list provides a sense for the size of the UAS airspace integration total stakeholder
community. The information contained in this list was provided courtesy of the RTCA Special
Committee 203 leadership, and the organizations listed have attended or otherwise expressed a
desire to be actively engaged in the effort to create or influence the development of FAA
standards governing the flight of UAS in the National Airspace System. No other criteria was
provided to the RTCA SC-203 leadership beyond a request for a list of the organizations
involved in their effort. The only modification made by the author to the information provided
was to remove instances of duplicate organizational entries. The RTCA SC-203 database is by
individual, and for this research, only organizational distinctions are considered. To preserve the
anonymity of the SC-203 participants, all individually identifiable information has been
removed.
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Organization:
Australian Research Centre for Aerospace
Automation (ARCAA)
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Australia
V-TOL Aerospace Pty Limited
Wackett Aerospace Centre
EUROCONTROL
Executive Board Member Technical Affairs
Canadian Air Force
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Jane's
MDA - Airborne Systems
Transport Canada
Unmanned Vehicle Systems Canada Inc.
UVS Canada
ICAO Air Navigation Bureau
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Organization:
EADS Deutschland GmbH, Willy Messerschmitt
Straie
German Air Navigation Services Headquarters
Industrieanlagen Betriebsgesellschaft mbH
Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems
Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd
Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
Nara Institute of Science & Technology
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
TGR Helicorp Ltd.
Boeing
BOEING RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY EUROPE,
BAE Systems




































US Army AMRDEC/SED Aviation Division
AAI Corp
AAI Corporation
Academy of Model Aviation
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Organization:
Air Force, 452 FLTS/DO
Air Force, AFRL/VACC
Air Force, RSW/XRX
Air Line Pilots Association
Air War College
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Airline Pilots Association
Alias Science
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Organization:
Aviation Management Associates, Inc





Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc.
BattleSpace, Inc.
BELL HELICOPTER








































Defense Research Associates, Inc
Department of the Interior
Department of Defense
Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and
Border Protection
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Rutgers University
DHS, CBP Air & Marine
DHS/ CBP Air & Marine
DRA, Inc.





Eagan, McAllister Associates Inc.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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Organization:
Evergreen Unmanned Systems
F.J. Leonelli Group, Inc.
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Aviation Administration - Air Traffic
Organization
Federal Aviation Administration R&D Field Office,
AAR-210
Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center
Federal Aviation Administration, ATO Operations
Planning (ATO-P)




FJ Leonelli Group Inc.
Flight Safety Technologies





General Atomics Aeronautical Systems
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc
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Organization:
General Atomics, Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
General Atomics-ASI
General Dynamics Robotics Systems
Geneva Aerospace
GKN & Associates








Honeywell Inc., Aerospace Electronic Systems
Honeywell International, Inc.




Innovative Solutions International, Inc.
ITT Industries
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Organization:
JIL Information Systems
John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences
University and Tulane
John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences,
University of North Dakota
John Hopkins University/ APL
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory
Joint UAS Center of Excellence
Joint UAS Center of Excellence, JFCOM
Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Center of
Excellence (JUAS COE)






Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Lockheed Martin Information Technology Services
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control
























































Modern Technology Solutions, Inc





NASA Ames Research Center
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Organization:
NASA Langley
NASA Langley Research Center
NATCA
National Air Traffic Controllers Association
National Defense Magazine
National Science and Technology Council




Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Air Warfare Center
Navy
NBAA




NOAA Marine and Aviation Operations Centers
NOAA/Dryden Flight Research Center





























Northrop Grumman Corporation- ES
Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems
NTSB
NTSB, Office of Aviation Safety (AS-50)
Office of Naval Research
Office of Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense
Ohio University Airport


























































Scientific Applications & Research Associates
See Aero
Sensis
SETA II/Federal Aviation Administration
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
SITA
Sky Tech Aerial Imagery Copter Wrights, LLC
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Organization:
Systems Engineering & Consulting, Inc.
TAAC Airspace Operations







The Insitu Group, Inc
The Insitu Group, Inc
Transportation Security Administration







UAV Flight Systems, Inc.
UAV Marketspace, Inc.
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Organization:
UNITE







US Department of the Interior, National Business
Center Aviation Management Directorate
US DOT Volpe Center
US Navy
ViaSat, Inc.
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
Washington Consulting Group
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Criticality Factor Saliency Determination
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Criticality LevelFactor Level DescriptionFactor range
Urgency The stakeholder is time insensible or has very low demands for a timely 02
response to its claims at risk in the enterprise
The stakeholder asks for its stakes or values with enough anticipation allowing 2-4
the enterprise to attend them in a timely manner
The stakeholder requires attention to its stakes in plausible or reasonable times 4-6
The stakeholder calls for a prompt attention to the stakes at risk in the 6-8
enterprise
The stakeholder demands immediate attention to the stakes it compromise in 8-10
the enterprise and their associated payoffs
Urgency Level
The stakeholder has null or very low dependency on the stakes it puts at risk inIe the enterprise 0-2
The stakeholder shows low dependency on the values obtained from the 2-4
enterprise2-
The stakeholder relies on the values obtained from the enterprise for its future 4-6
actions or operations
The stakeholder shows high dependency on the stakes it contributes at risk in
the enterprise 6-8
The stakeholder demonstrates very high dependency on the stakes it puts at risk 8-10in the enterprise and on the values obtained from it
Importance Level
Criticality Attribute (Weighted) Average
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Power LevelFactor Level DescriptionFactor Range
Coercive The stakeholder threatening position to obtain the outcomes desired from the 0-2integrated enterprise is null or very low
The stakeholder uses threatening arguments to obtain the outcomes it desires 2-4
from the enterprise
The stakeholder is able to pose real threats regarding his claims on the enterprise 4-6
The stakeholder is capable of using some elements of force, violence, or
restraint to obtain benefits from the enterprise
The stakeholder is determined and totally capable of using force, violence, or 810
any other restrain resource to obtain desired outcomes from the enterprise
Coercive Power Level
Utilitarian The stakeholder has null or very low control over the resources (material, 0-2financial, services, or information) used by the enterprise
The stakeholder has some control over some of the resources used by the
2-4
enterprise
The stakeholder controls the use of some of the resources used by the
integrated enterprise
The stakeholder heavily administers significant number of the resources used by
the enterprise
The stakeholder extensively administers most of the resources used by the 8-10
enterprise
Utilitarian Power Level
The stakeholder does not use or barely uses normative symbols (prestige,
Symbolic esteem) or social symbols (love, friendship, acceptance) to influence on the 0-2
enterprise system
The stakeholder uses some level of normative symbols or social symbols to
influence on the enterprise system
The stakeholder uses moderate levels of normative symbols or social synbols
to influence on the enterprise system
The stakeholder relies on normative symbols and/or social symbols to claim his
stakes from the enterprise system
The stakeholder extensively uses normative symbols and social symbols in order
to obtain value from the enterprise systenm8
Symbolic Power Level
Power Attribute (Weighted) Average
Power Factor Saliency Determination
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Legitimacy Subtypes Level Description LevelFactor
Generalized perception or assumption that the actions of a
Broad stakeholder are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
definition some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
and definitions.
Exchange Extent to which the stakeholder maintains a materialistic
Pragmatic Legitimacy (based on goods, services, or any other type of exchange) 0-10
agm relationship with the enterprise, and the importance of
those exchanges to the welfare of the enterprise system
Influence Extent to which the stakeholder helps in defining the
Legitimacy strategic or long-term interests of the whole enterprise and 0-10
its submission to those interests before its own welfare.
Dispositional Degree to which the stakeholder is predisposed to share or
Legitimacy adopt the enterprise values demonstrating honesty, 0-10
decency, and trustworthiness in the relationship
Pragmatic Legitimacy Average Level
Consequential Degree to which the accomplishments of the stakeholder
Moral Legitimacy are perceived by the whole enterprise system as "the right 0-10
thing to do"
Procedural Extent by which the stakeholdefs value creation pnrsses
Legitimacy are perceived as sound and goxxl efforts to achieve some, 0-10
albeit invisible, ends s valued by the enterprise system
Structural The degree by which the stakeholder is perceived as having
Legitimacy the right internal organizational structure to perform its 0-10
assigned role in the enterprise system
Personal Extent by which the leaders of the stakeholder
Legitimacy organization are perceived as having the adequate 0-10
charismas, personalities, and authority to perform the job
the stakeholder is supposed to do for the enterprise system
Moral Legitimacy Average Level
Comprehensibility Degree of existence of cultural models that provide
Cognitive Legitimacy plausible explanations for the stakeholder participation in 0-10
an enterprise and its related endeavors
Taken-for- Degree to which the legitimacy of the stakeholder is taken
gratedness 0-10grantedness for granted without an explicit evaluative support
Cognitive Legitimacy Average Level
Legitimacy Attribute (Weighted) Average
Legitimacy Factor Saliency Determination
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CoIT mitts On the Use of Humans as MASSAC14USETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNLOGY




From: Leigh Fim, Ch
COUHES
Date: oc&O8/os
Committee Action: Exemption Granted
Co ittee Action 008
Date:
COUH14 Protocol #: 08002634
Intergrating Unmanned Aircraft Statems in the National Airspace Systems: An
Stdy e: Application of Value-Focused and Enterprise Architecting
The above-referenced protoCol is considered exempt after review by the Committee on the Use of Humans as
Experimental Subjects pursuant to Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 46.101(b)(2).
This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by investigators in such a manner that
subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information
obtaihed not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
If the research involves collaboration with another institution then the research cannot commence until COUHES
receives written notification of approval from the collaborating institution's IRB.
If thee are any changes to the protocol that significantly or substantially impact the rights of human subjects you must
notify the Committee before those changes are initiated.
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.
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V CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW
Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System: An Application of Value-Focused
Thinking and Enterprise Architecting
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Maj Luke Cropsey from the System Design and
Management Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.IT.). The purpose of the study is to identify and
map the relevant stakeholden in the Air Force Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) airspace integration enterprise;
understand decision maker value definitions and attributes; employ enterprise architecting theory to contruct
appropriate value propositions for the enterprise; select the most appropriate architecture for delivering enterprise
value; and assess the robustness of the enterprise architecture to changing environments. The results of this study will
be included in Maj Cropsey's Masters thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you
represent a key airspace integration stakeholder or decision maker; you have firsthand knowledge of specific aspects of
the airspace integration effort; or you can provide important insights to the value definition and constraints your
organization may have with respect to the airspace integration issue You should read the information below, and ask
questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to participate.
* This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time or for
any reason, We expect that the interview will take about one hour, but it may be somewhat shorter or longer depending
on your position and engagement with the airspace integration effort and the organizational level you represent.
* You will not be compensated for this interview.
* Unless you give us permission to use your name, title, and / or quote you in any publications that may result from this
research, the information you tell us will be confidential,
-We would like to record this interview on audio cassette so that we can use it for reference while proceeding with this
study. We will not record this interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for this conversation to be
recorded on cassette, you have the right to revoke recording permission and'or end the interview at any time.
This project will be completed by 15 August 2008. All interview recordings will be stored in a secure work space until
I year after that date. The tapes will then be destroyed.
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to
participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
(Please check all that apply)
[] Igive permission for this interview to be recorded on audio cassette
[] I give permission for the following information to be included in publications resulting from this study:
o] my name [] my title [ direct quotes from this interview
Name of Subject
Signature of Subject Date
Signature of Investigator Date
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Please conact Maj Lukt Cropsey at 617-259-0689, or email lcropsey@mit.edu, with any questions or concerns.
If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may
contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Hulans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T., Room E25-143b, 77
Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253-6787.
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What is (are) the primary need(s) the Certificate of Authorization/Waiver process satisfies for
your organization?
What are the strengths of the COA process?
What are the weaknesses of the COA process?
How well does the existing COA process meet your needs?
If you projected your needs into the future over the next 5-10 years, how are they likely to
change?
How extensible do you feel the COA process will be for meeting your future needs?
Why will the existing COA process work/not work for meeting your future needs?
What marching orders would you give a UAS airspace integration effort to better meet the needs
described above (i.e. describe a mission statement for the effort)?
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In what environments and timeframes must this mission be accomplished (i.e. describe the
need(s) that must be met in terms of mission and scheduled delivery of value)?
Who do you believe the critical decision makers are for satisfying the above stated need(s)?
What benefit do you expect the other decision makers to provide you in exchange for the
resources you contribute?
What do you perceive as the other decision makers' contributions in this activity?
What scope of activities would the airspace integration effort need to undertake in order to meet
the need(s) specified?
What conditions do you have on how the activity should proceed (if any)?
What characteristics would a good airspace integration solution have (i.e. how would you know
if the effort is successfully accomplishing the mission previously articulated)?
What measures do you use to evaluate how well the characteristics described above are
provided?
How would you prioritize these characteristics with respect to one another?
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Measure: something tangible or intangible that you use to evaluate or judge the "goodness" of a
desired characteristic.
For each of the measures described above, what is the minimal amount of each measure that
would be needed before the need begins to be met?
For each of the measures described above, what is the maximum amount of each measure
beyond which there is no further value in meeting the need?
Context: The political, regulatory, operational, and policy environment in which UAS airspace
integration approval process occurs
Describe the near-term (within the next 5 years) environment and conditions in which you need a
solution to the needs identified above.
Describe the mid-term (within the next 5-10 years) environment and conditions in which you
need a solution to the needs identified above.
Describe the far-term (the next 10-15 years) environment and conditions in which you need a
solution to the needs identified above.
Is there a set of scenarios that would better capture the current, intermediate and future desired
delivery of value or need satisfaction? If so, what are they?
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What do you believe are the major barriers to achieving authorization to operate UAS in
different contexts?
How does your definition of the need, the characterization, or the measurement quantities change
with each scenario if at all?
At what point in the degree of access would you say "good enough?" Why?
Constraints: boundaries limiting the extent of activities that can be pursued in the UAS airspace
integration effort.
What constraints must be satisfied in meeting these needs (i.e. cost incurred, time required,
organizational prerogatives, etc.)?
What is it about these constraints (if any) that are important to you?
Which of these constraints do you feel you have the ability to control?
Which constraints do you feel you can influence but don't directly control?
Do any of the decision makers identified previously directly control any of these constraints? If
so, which ones and how would you attempt to influence them?
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Which constraints do you consider to be outside of your ability to change and that you must
conform with? Do any of the decision makers identified previously directly control any of these
constraints? If so, which ones?
If any of the current constraints you just described could be changed, which ones do you think
would have the greatest impact on the extent to which your needs could be satisfied? What
would the impact be?
What resources to you have available to provide to the airspace integration activity in order to
satisfy the needs you articulated? Specifically, what manpower, funding, or influence do you
bring to the table?
For each of the three scenarios presented, in what timeframes would you like to be able to
operate in the described fashion?
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Appendix F contains the full data collection set for all of the interviews conducted to build the
UAS airspace integration enterprise value structure. Several points should be made prior to
presenting the data. First, every interview was conducted in compliance with Massachusetts
Institute of Technology policy and in conformance with the standards established by the
Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES). Appendix D provides
the approval from COUHES for conducting the interviews.
Second, all personally identifiable information has been removed from the data collected. For
the purpose of clarity in the data, an "ID Number" has been retained that was randomly assigned
to an individual. This is important in order to understand the differences within as well as
between organizational value structures and how divergence within a single organization may
influence how the organization's value structure is created.
Third, the information was transcribed from the interview sheets to an Access database to help
with interrogating the data and sorting it across different dimensions. The data reduction was
very much an analysis that evolved over time. As a consequence, the information is binned more
along the interview questionnaire topic lines than it is on the primary inputs categories depicted
in Table 8-1. The advantage of using Access in the data analysis was the ability to create reports
looking at the data across different dimensions. For simplicity, however, the following data sets
are organized at the top level by the questionnaire topic, then by the organization from which the
inputs were solicited, and finally per the individual providing the interview data.
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COA Strengths by Organization





Provides only current method for
allowing us to train with UAS
Doesn't believe COAs should be required to begin with.
Should be able to operate in "routine" capacity using an
exemption to VMC requirement for operations under
specific conditions--AF/A3 should interpret AFI-11202, vol 3
themselves with a determination that UAS are exempt from
VMC requirements based on using charted UAS routes to
display ingress/egress routes to Class A airspace while flying
on an IFR flight plan (contends FAA already tacitly
recognizes IFR in class A airspace as complying with Part 91
requirements. Pipe in additional radar feeds to ground
station to further enhance SA if required. Ditch COA and
pull the trigger.
Only mechanism in place currently for allowing us to
deviate from current requirements for performance. Once
the COA is approved, it generally works well enough.
ID: 3
Only avenue for operating UAS
outside of building a platform that
can comply with the regulations
FAA AJR
ID: 13
Brings all of the needed parties
together
Process is well vetted, oversight is established, and there is
a broad line of communication between ATO, AVS, and
regional facilities. It also serves as a mechanism to educate
air traffic controllers and others in regions that may not be
familiar with UAS operations (Global Hawk going into Grand
Forks is a good example). The process is tailored to mesh
with Flight Standards policy and directives.
Educates people on UAS
Well-vetted process within the FAA
ID: 20
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Presents a safety case to detail how the operator will
establish an equivalent level of safety. This is the biggest
strength. It ensures the public's trust.
The COA process is reviewed monthly by the FAA to
evaluate user feedback and further improve the process
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Requirements are too stringent
COA Weaknesses Comments
Used example of the Reveille MOA approval as an
example. Had been conducting operations in this area for
several years before this past year's renewal, at which point
the FAA decided they needed further "proof' of the safety
of the operations, and required the AF to conduct a safety
assessment of the operations in the MOA. Did the analysis,
and are conducting operations in the exactly the same way
they always have. No value added, process doesn't
quantitatively measure the safety of the operation or
quantify the impacts of changes. Totally personality driven.
Airspace access is at a standstill. FAA is so risk averse we
have to submit a new COA request to go to a new location
even with a national COA for RQ-4.
Airspace access is starting to drive basing decisions. Lack of
available airspace may drive formal training to Base X,
existing Base Y may become LRE for anything not in the
formal training pipeline and Ops may go to the bases with
comm nodes for basing.
Current instantiation of the process is much harder to
complete than the early version. Also made it a "one-size
fits all" form which further complicates the picture. A result
of over-reacting on the FAA's part.
Form is nearly impossible to fill out and you cannot put an
"N/A" in a data requirement box even if it doesn't fit for
that particular COA application
Latest checklist and internal FAA memo on COA










This is especially true with respect to the flight standards
requirements. Originally, when COAs where only being
requested and granted to AF operations, FAA HQ was not
even engaged in the discussion. It was all done through the
local FISDO office. It was highly dependent on individual
idiosyncrasies, but once the folks were educated on the
operation and the platform, the COA process was pretty
straight forward. No longer. The COA process is way too
much into the minutia. We need to get to a "file-and-fly"









Staffing through the FAA
Is cumbersome and detailed, although if you didn't have
this, most organizations would do many of these
requirements anyway. Online application helped
considerably with the workload.
Takes 60 days to essentially do the equivalent of filing a
flight plan on the manned operations side of the house.
Let me fly a Predator and I will prove to you that I can
match and even beat manned equivalent performance.
Don't lump individual platform capabilities (or lack thereof)
into a single UAS category.
Having to have extensive meetings to educated new
segments of the FAA air traffic controller community,
regional offices, flight standards, and proponents on the
requirements and limitations takes a huge amount of time
(again, reference the extensive meetings already taking
place to get people up to speed on Global Hawk operations
preparatory to going into Grand Forks). This includes both the
air traffic controllers as well as the Air National Guard with
respect to what is doable and what is not.
Even with the movement of the COA application to an
online platform, the process still requires a significant
investment in time and effort. As an example, in '06, ATO
only had one individual working COA applications. In '08
that has expanded to 3 full-time people supported with
administrative assistant
The process, while ensuring the appropriate expertise is
engaged on the approval process, is itself a time and
resource intensive effort. The staffing process itself











Have to educate agencies that are not historical airspace
users. Hopefully education is ongoing through interaction
with AJR, policy and regulatory updates and best practices.
Office would need to grow in the number of people
processing COAs just to keep pace; new technologies need
to be developed to provide for better compliance. File and
Fly is both a technology problem and an acceptance
problem.
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Airworthy Anything required to meet our own airworthiness standards
and needed for equipage to fly in the desired airspace. 1)
Must be airworthy, 2) Must have the equipage to fly in the
airspace you want to operate in, 3) Some on-board solution














Still Developing The scope of activities required for the airspace integration
effort are still developing, and will likely continue to evolve
over the next 5 years as we get smarter about what needs
to be done. DoD is still doing R&D, and this provides an
additional mechanism for future emerging requirements
that may not currently be on the books. COAs are still being
issued at a rate of -100/year.
ID: 9
Define a critical scaling of activitiesNeed to define a critical set of activities that are scalable
from the need to meet immediate requirements to the
broader far-term objectives. Figure out how to leverage
activities now to meet future requirements (Track 1
approach to the problem).
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Organization Scope Scope Comments
FAA AJR
IDI): 20
Manned Operations Compare how manned aircraft changes were incorporated,
and you will likely be in the same ball park. VLJ example
would be down the same lines.
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AI Purpose Purpose Comments
Provide mechanism to feed ADS-
B, radar, etc into UAS ground
station for pilot SA
Integrate UAS capability with
combat aircraft in the battlespace
Break down all CFRs/FARs and
where possible include UAS
requirements explicitly.
Put the appropriate equipage on
the airframes.
Targeted Integration
Bring capability up to
requirements
Change the rule set
The first effort will solve the situational awareness picture
between the UAS and manned aircraft operating in the
airspace. This effort will provide the pilot with the SA
needed in the NAS to account for the non-cooperative air
traffic portion of the problem.
If we solve the combat airspace integration challenge so
we can fly UAS and manned combat air operations
seamlessly, we will solve the CONUS airspace integration
problem in tandem--with a couple of add-ons for NAS
specific operations (see next purpose)
Need to incorporate UAS as a full-fledged member of the
family. Get rid of discussing them as "exceptions" to the
manned regulations. They need to be integrated as a
standard part of the rules. Lost link procedures would be
an example of a UAS specific requirement that would need
to be added to the regulatory requirements.
We won't get anywhere until the airframes are equipped
and capable of following the procedural and operational
rules for aircraft flying in the NAS. In the Global Hawk
case, need navigation database to enable RNAV
operations, CNS/ATM equipage, and SAA certified system.
Likely 2015 at the earliest.
Find a way to integrate UAS by examining all of the
options. Have to use the context to determine where to
integrate. Need to fully integrate in some environments.
Example: Due regard requirement for international
airspace access.
Address the materiel shortfalls in UAS so they will have the
ability to operate as specified by the airspace access
requirements denoted in the appropriate regulations.
For UAS specific issues, regulations need to be changed to
recognize fundamental differences. Example: Do right of
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Organization AI Purpose
ID: 24
Drive the materiel solution.
Provide certification path
Purpose Comments
Should lead the effort to drive towards a primarily materiel
solution that provides for the necessary equipage needed
to fly in the NAS. Should provide the mechanism for
someone to file an 1801 to say how you are equipped to
access the requested airspace.
Should provide framework in which certifications can be
approved for maneuvers, pilot's situational awareness,
data collection and ultimate flight.
AF UAS TF
ID: 19
Initiate a combine DoD/FAA
dialogue to figure out what will
meet needs
Grab whoever is needed out of the DoD and the FAA, get all
the materiel solutions together, and then figure out what

















This needs to be done within the existing infrastructure
As progress is made, additional expertise will need to be
applied to the problem to uncover heretofore unknown gaps
with expertise that may not be currently applied to the
topic.
This needs to be done in several representative sets or
configurations
Need to understand and assess the impact of current
automation systems and their anticipated ramifications
due to aircraft performance envelopes
Need solid concepts of operation/employment in the
airspace to assess avionics performance and handling
The question is difficult to nail down because it must be
answered against the broader backdrop. It is only a piece
of the puzzle.
Define the structure of the overall problem in which the AI
participants contribute to the problem.
FAA focus--"Interested in the anticipated case being good
enough versus the best case being the norm."
Need the CONEMPs for standard operations and
contingency responses.
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Organization AI Purpose
Identify each participant's role
Assess intended use environment
Purpose Comments
Each participant's role should be clearly identified and tied
back to the broader objectives framework so they
understand the value of their contributions and how it
contributes to the whole.





Integrate UAS into Air Traffic
Controller Handbook
Provide a safety basis
Establish UAS categories
Do the needed human interface
design
Need integrated and specific UAS regulatory guidance
UAS operations need to be integrated into air traffic
controller procedures and activities so they know how to
address and deal with UAS specific issues
A significant limitation of existing UAS operations is the
lack of concrete safety analysis, data, and experience.
Activities are needed to put UAS safety analysis and
understanding on the same footing as manned aircraft.
Need data on the type and number of UAS operations, lost
link events, emergency procedures, etc. This kind of data
makes us all smarter about operations and how they are
performing. Starting from scratch is difficult in this
context. We are straddling the fence with one foot in the
manned aircraft community with a well established safety
history, and one foot in the UAS community that is on a
very shaky safety ground. Designs need to be done in the
future that specifically prevent safety incidents from
occurring, rather than engineers designing these systems in
isolation for other engineers. Need an operational
perspective incorporated into the design of these systems.
Need appropriate UAS categories established before UAS
separation categories can be created and integrated into
air traffic control procedures. This deals specifically with
UAS sizes, wake vortex, etc.
UAS design and ground stations need a lot of human
factors research. Need to understand how the UAS
context is different. What are the human factors
associated with flying an aircraft 6,000 miles away from
the pilot? Need to understand the bounds on this element
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AI Purpose






Work technology to eliminate
SAA issue




Address the performance gaps Address the performance gaps on a UAS to the point where






Define what predictability means when things go wrong.
Identify how the air traffic controller can help in these
situations. There is a gap in the knowledge in time and
space. How do you fill these? What is done for lost link
procedures? Need to develop prior knowledge of these
things, not something that is gained by trial and error on
the operational fly.
The effort should produce a system that has been wrung-
out thoroughly. Don't want to look at a smoking hole in
the ground and then say "We didn't think of that!" We
need a priori knowledge of how the system is going to
behave across its full spectrum of operations and
contingencies. We need to explore situations and
understand them before they happen in the airspace, not
as a result of them happening in the airspace.
How do we measure the difference between manned and
unmanned aircraft? What do these differences look like
from an ATC perspective? Are the existing manned
standards safe enough? All of these questions need
answers.
Additional aspects will likely come to light as the effort
proceeds. These must also be addressed.
Updated policy on how UAS will be integrated into the NAS
needs to be written
FAA needs to accomplish the required updates to the
regulatory environment to explicitly address UAS
requirements
This is the number 1 thing holding things up.









Get to File-and-Fly Access
Keep long-term perspective
Work local ops challenges
Purpose Comments
Modeling and simulation is required to evaluate needed
performance goals
Need performance standards to figure out what you need
to do
Achieve the same level of access as manned aircraft.
JIPT Track 2 effort is making progress in terms of defining
the problems, what needs to be done to solve them, and
focusing technology development efforts on those pieces
we can't fix.
The TFR at Beale is a procedural fix, but it is extremely
limiting to operations that can be flown out of that
location. If we had a technology solution to solve the 0-
18,000 ft problem, it would help tremendously. Work
immediate operational issues on a platform by platform,
location by location basis for a while to gain further
insights and build experience. ID the functional problem
and then find the technology to support it.
SAF/AQIJ
ID: 11
Preserve principle of Maneuver
Keep critical mass on the effort.
The goal should be to preserve the capability of maneuver
that aircraft bring to the fight. It is this principle that has
been the distinguishing hallmark of history's great generals
that consistently won on the battlefield. If the AF is going
to shift capability to UAS platforms, it must do so without
compromising this fundamental principle of warfare.
As an AF, we need to keep the critical mass of expertise














Need game plan on what needs to be solved and an
effective method of communicating it to senior leadership.
Has to include the full spectrum of issues including
hardware, policy, integration, modeling & simulation, what-
if scenario developments, etc. Need to establish the way
ahead with enough specificity so leadership can understand
the issues, pick up the flag and run with it. Leadership
doesn't know enough yet about what is needed.
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Organization Critical DMs Decision Maker Comments
303 AESW
ID: 5
ACC/A3 Informs COMACC who provides requirements, scope, and resources
in terms of dollars/manpower.
ACC/A5 Informs COMACC who provides requirements, scope, and resources
in terms of dollars/manpower.
ACC/A8 Informs COMACC who provides requirements, scope, and resources
in terms of dollars/manpower.
AF UAS TF
ASC/XR SIMAF to work with the FAA on MS&A to make sure the modeling
reflects FAA concerns and assumptions otherwise the data
won't be worth anything, and we won't have enough flight hours
on the actual system to validate anything.
ESC NextGen Office
FAA Approval authority to turn UAS on. FAA needs to provide
acceptance of flight in the NAS by looking at the data and a
concept of employment by platform and assessing the adequacy
of the materiel component to provide a safe enough operation.
HAF/A2 COMACC-HAF/A3-PBFA chain all have a vote and they have to be
value added in terms of scrutiny of the proposal from different
points of view and perspectives.
HAF/A3 COMACC-HAF/A3-PBFA chain all have a vote and they have to be
value added in terms of scrutiny of the proposal from different
points of view and perspectives.
HAF/A5 COMACC-HAF/A3-PBFA chain all have a vote and they have to be
value added in terms of scrutiny of the proposal from different
points of view and perspectives.
HAF/A8 COMACC-HAF/A3-PBFA chain all have a vote and they have to be
value added in terms of scrutiny of the proposal from different
points of view and perspectives.
USD(AT&L)
PBFA Official conduit through with COMACC voices needs to the FAA.
COMACC-HAF/A3-PBFA chain all have a vote and they have to be
value added in terms of scrutiny of the proposal from different
points of view and perspectives.
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Organization Critical DMs Decision Maker Comments
SAF/AQ
ID: 6
303 AESW GH needs to integrate the solution on the bird.




ACC/A3 Lead for determining feed requirements for command and
control and working battlespace integration along with ACC/A5.
DoD Leadership (JS or AT&L) Would need their support to convince them this was a
reasonable move to make given the context and mitigations in
place.
HAF/A3 Interprets AFI 11202 v3. Would have to determine that UAS are
exempt from VMC requirements based on details provided under
COA Strengths Comments.
PBFA Interface with FAA on AF position. Need to ditch the "play nice"
tact and just tell the FAA how we are going to operate--take
same approach as we use with manned aircraft operations.
ID: 2
303 AESW Works with ACC/A8/A3 to develop the appropriate capability for
aircraft equipage and capability
ACC/A3 Has to work the training and operational need requirements for
the UAS platform usage. Also responsible for articulating AF
airspace integration needs/requirements up the chain of
command
Congress Without a direct and specific interest on the part of the Congress
to get this issue fixed, and the consequential pressure that
follows on the FAA, this issue will not get the level of attention it
needs from the FAA.
FAA Administrator This issue needs to get elevated beyond the layer of middle
management that is currently calling all of the shots on the FAA
side, and taken to the FAA Administrator level by Senior DoD
leadership.
HAF/A3 Works issues forwarded by COMACC and puts together an AF
position to send over to the PBFA
HAF/A5 Works in conjunction with HAF/A3 and SAF/AQ to put together AF
position to send over to the PBFA
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This office needs to be convinced in order to pull along the JCOE
and the Joint Staff to get DoD to engage with the FAA at the
appropriate level.
This office needs to work the official comm channel between
DoD and senior FAA leadership to advocate for the DoD training
and operational needs.
Works in conjunction with HAF/A3/A5 to put together AF
position to send over to the PBFA
Works with ACC/A8/A3 to develop the appropriate capability for
aircraft equipage and capability
Has to work the training and operational need requirements for
the UAS platform usage. Also responsible for articulating AF
airspace integration needs/requirements up the chain of
command
Without a direct and specific interest on the part of the Congress
to get this issue fixed, and the consequential pressure that
follows on the FAA, this issue will not get the level of attention it
needs from the FAA.
This issue needs to get elevated beyond the layer of middle
management that is currently calling all of the shots on the FAA
side, and taken to the FAA Administrator level by Senior DoD
leadership.
Works issues forwarded by COMACC and puts together an AF
position to send over to the PBFA
Works in conjunction with HAF/A3 and SAF/AQ to put together AF
position to send over to the PBFA
This office needs to be convinced in order to pull along the JCOE
and the Joint Staff to get DoD to engage with the FAA at the
appropriate level.
This office needs to work the official comm channel between
DoD and senior FAA leadership to advocate for the DoD training
and operational needs.
Works in conjunction with HAF/A3/A5 to put together AF









Owns the rule set. DoD operates in the airspace, but the public is
represented by the FAA. A lot of heat on the FAA to bend. Not
sure they should on this. Need to work within the existing rule set.
Critical to have the senior leaders of each organization involved




















Needs to come to the table with a clear articulation of what they
need
Needs to have in their mind what must be demonstrated that is
realistic, and they can't lump everything together.
Existing NAS user advocacy groups including AOPA, ALPA, etc.
Provides acceptance from the broader NAS user community.
Standards bodies of all types to include ASTM, SAE, RTCA, etc
Defines operations that need to be conducted in the NAS for
mission accomplishment and homeland defense.
Provides pilot quals, ops approvals, separation standards, wake
vortex classes, OPR for 6 FARS that have to rewritten, and own
5-6,000 civil safety inspections that have to be completed.
Provides aircraft design, TSO'd standards, advanced avionics
requirements, etc.
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Provides inputs for air traffic management issues, procedures,
policies; Interprets CFR Part 91.
End users that have identified specific needs. They need to
assess the viability of a UAS in meeting their needs given the
current operational restrictions. They need to consider what
contributions they would be willing to make to meet their
objectives. Then they need to make the appropriate resource
allocation using the full cost of ownership as the basis for their
decision. In this context, the FAA responds to pull from the end
users. There is no push, only pull. Congress might provide some
push.
Have the responsibility of providing the ability to enable the
operations of the end user in a safe manner. Have to understand
how the system will operate and interact with the rest of the
airspace structure to ensure safety.
Critical player with AVS. Pretty much in synch with AVS.
Critical player with ATO. Pretty much in synch with ATO.
Other public agency player
Major public agency player. Primary focus is on accomplishing
their missions. Some involve research that creates new
products and enhancements. FAA provides greater access to
support their missions.
Needs to write the regs and policy updates. Would oversee the
overall safety look (SRM) process as the lead for the FAA.
En Route Air Traffic. Expertise in their areas to assess impact to
the system.
Safety. Expertise in their areas to assess impact to the system.
Terminal Air Traffic. Expertise in their areas to assess impact to
the system.
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Other NAS users. Through RTCA involvement. Provide anything
and everything to the effort. Whatever they are asked to








Need to be involved because you will be operating and impacting
the airspace they use
Need an interdepartmental structure because the success or
failure of their operations impacts everyone else (ref Predator
crash last year)
Lead the collective effort forward
Need to be totally linked up and synched with airspace
integration activities
Need to engage with the collective safety community to ensure
safe operations

































Keep doing what they are doing. Build it and they will come.
Need to get the primes engaged. Hold an industry day for the
"big kids."
Needs to provide the will to move the airspace integration effort
forward and embrace/comprehend what UAS success means
and looks like. Need to realize they have created a force
structure shift with procurement decisions regarding UAS
capabilities. They need to either fully embrace it and do what is
needed to enable the capability, or they need to stop it
Need them to have near-term responsiveness to Global Hawk
technology needs. Need to figure out what needs to happen
long-term. You can't solve a world-class problem without
including world-class engineering firms.
The solution can't be proprietary. It must be government
owned--buy it and own it like we did with TCAS. Bad Example:
Proprietary software in voting machines--bad news.
Need complete and total embracing of UAS as a community
requiring their services. Currently treat UAS with a degree of
condescension that we have in some cases brought on ourselves.
A zealot, and we need one. Their function is one of oversight.
They should be focusing on making the services do what needs to
be done, not trying to do it themselves. They need to work the
PPBS process, and they need to drive overall OSD behavior into
some degree of coherency--reference the lack of an integrated
OSD position on GH OIPT reviews.
Need complete and total embracing of UAS as a community
requiring their services. Currently treat UAS with a degree of
condescension that we have in some cases brought on ourselves.
Own and operate the UAS assets
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Organization Critical DMs Decision Maker Comments
FAA Approval authority for operational use of UAS in the NAS
Forrest Service
HAF/A3 Should be leading the effort, but currently no leadership. They
are impaired by HAF/A2 mission growth who is busy fighting the
war. Pease should be pushing this issue hard wearing his A3 hat.
Joint Staff J-3/J-8 DoD level leadership for operational usage and planning
NASA
PBFA Super conservative and doesn't want to push the UAS airspace
integration issue. Pease doesn't feel behind in this area in either
of his roles as A3 or PBFA executive director.
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Need Definitions by Organization
ID: 2
Primary Need COA Satisfies
Training Missions for Wartime
Operational Missions
Operational Missions in CONUS
Training Missions for Wartime
Operational Missions
ID: 3








Puts the brake on UAS growth.
One of two ways for UAS to fly in
the NAS safely (other is EAC)
Need Comments
Wartime use of UAS are attractive for missions that would
otherwise be limited from a human factors standpoint such
as duration or G-limits, or are extremely hazardous and
would otherwise not be feasible to attempt with a manned
platform.
CONUS use of UAS the result of force structure decisions
the AF has made concerning replacement capabilities for
existing manned platforms; this will only likely continue to
get further complicated in the future as additional manned
assets are displaced with UAS platforms, making CONUS-
based operations more and more dependent on UAS
platforms. A possible relief to this scenario would be the
potential for the AF to get back into the Counter-Insurgency
business with manned platforms; however, this is currently
unlikely and assets will be limited in their availability to
support CONUS operations.
Safety of our pilots; not limited by human factors; need to
be able to train like you fight; have to use a COA because of
7610.4 requirement to operate outside of restricted
airspace with a UAS.
Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous missions
Once the COA is approved and in place, it works for the
purposes it was approved for.
Until critical shortfalls in the data, knowledge, and
experience with UAS can be filled in, the growth of UAS
operations in the NAS needs to be tightly controlled and
regulated to ensure the safety of operations. The COA
process does that.
COAs will be with us for a long time to come. Much is tied
to the lack of SAA technology, lack of UAS specific
regulatory guidance. Short of these issues being addressed,
the COA is the mechanism by which we mitigate the safety










Means for UAS to fly safely
Primary Need COA Satisfies Need Comments
Application is accomplished through online site. Applicant is
asked for mitigation strategy including lost link procedures,
emergency procedures, airworthiness statement, detailed
flight operations area (defining "the box" the aircraft will fly
in), avionics suite, any sensors, how 91.113 will be
mitigated through AIR-160 approved strategies, etc.
UAS could not otherwise operate given their lack of
compliance with various regulations, especially CFR Part
91.113
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Conforms rather than creates
Does no harm
Man-like access
Equivalent level of safety
Simple for the pilot to use (data
feeds are well-integrated into




system for flight plan, NOTAMS,
weather, etc)
Flexible to meet schedule
requirements (i.e. file flight plan
for approval)
UAS as an accepted, integral
member of the NAS
Safe operations
Flexibility of operations




Number of new regs generated
Currently undefined
access equivalent to manned aircraft operational flexibility.




Does or Doesn't Use Same System
Time in hours
Normal operations
Deviations from ATC direction
Time to launch mission
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Know one will know or care
there is any difference b/w
manned/unmanned
Launching and recovering with
UA Flt 99.
C-130, Huey, Predator all lined




ATC treats UAS just like any
other aircraft with similar
expectation on performance in
response.
UAS has enough capability to
perform like a manned aircraft







Can I do my mission?
Community on board with approach
$$
Change required in infrastructure/procedures
Internal subsystem
Situational Awareness
Provides heading, altitude, speed, range
Transparent with manned ops, no one blinks, very usual,
common occurrence -- Integrated
Follows expected behavior/rules of the road (like NORDO
procedures)--Predictable
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Everything is cooperating with Integrated Ops using Technology Advances
everyone else, the way it was
intended & approved, is safe
Don't know--too much on the










Action item list is being worked







Number of complaints from field
ID: 21
ID: 22
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Consistent with military expectations of military aviation
Implementable
Clear and declare EPs
FAA comfortable with reliability of ops/procedures















$10M and people to work ground
radar capability ($100M LCCE)
Manpower to work the
requirements and policy changes
Minimum possible
Use ground-based radar as an interim work around until the
longer-term SA feeds are available and ADS-B comes online.
Radar becomes part of the system level analysis for the
safety case.
Primarily provide the manpower and expertise to work the
operation policy and regulatory issues associated with
conducting operations using UAS
The AF will only spend as much resources in dollars and




Millions Need to put millions of dollars on this problem for people
who are willing to work the issue.
ID: 24







Think we already have tons of resources applied to this. It
just isn't coordinated and aligned.
Can't even build a program plan in the current environment.
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$20M/10 people per year
Resource Comments
Need twice the number of people that are currently
working the issue without the constraints of a government
bureaucracy. Something along the lines of a mini skunkworks.
Let me move to some place like Atlanta, and come back in
a few years with the problem licked.
Use this to baseline performance and failure mode
characteristics and contingency operations.
FAA AJR
II): 13





$10-$15M/yr for Track 2 work
Need linkage
$10M/per yr/per platform
Access 5 like effort in terms of the organization and
expertise involved in the activity, but should be smaller and
more focused on the specifics that are needed.
There are a lot of people who have their fingers in this
trying to move it forward. RTCA is a good example. Could
use additional manpower and funding to accelerate the
effort.
Put these resources on the Track 1 efforts to resolve
specific operational needs in specific locations
Put these resources on the Track 2 development track for
the first 3-5 years of work to get the larger scale plan put in
place.
We need a linkage between the size of the investment that
would have been made for a manned aircraft like Global
Hawk versus the amount needed to enable using them to
get the advantage of maneuver back for the UAS. You don't
get the UAS advantages for nothing.
Put this kind of money on the problem for the first three
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Organization Resources Contributed
$50M in year 4/per platform
$100Ms/per yr
Resource Comments
Pushes the planning into real execution for tangible results
After year four, need real money to go out and procure the
assets needed to put the capability in the field
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Advocacy for AF position









Appropriate UAS type and quality
to achieve objective
Nothing is moving on this issue at the middle-management
layer, especially over at the FAA. Need the appropriate
stakeholders to engage on the issue so that the line FAA
organizations start approaching the problem proactively
with a solution oriented perspective.
Goes hand-in-hand with proactive engagement as well as
the need for integrated regulatory environment for UAS.
Push to make things happen proactively, in a standardized
way
Have to have the political backing to keep the effort funded
and working towards a solution. Too often the airspace
integration effort gets tossed below the cut line, or raided
for other priorities.
The end user should provide a UAS of the appropriate
quality and type to achieve the operational objectives for
which they intend the UAS. The problem is that while there
maybe a general understanding of the requirement,
management has to decide it is worth the resource
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This is needed to set the appropriate
requirements for the advanced
cockpit activity and to get a leg up on
a proactive approach to integrating
the ADS-B and other future
requirements before they are
required to demonstrate good-faith
effort on our part.
Articulated approach only works if
senior AF and DoD executives are
willing to get engaged on the subject
and spin the issue in a positive
direction for all concerned, including
the FAA. Should be cast in terms of
increased security for U.S. by flying
these missions, a proactive reaching
out to the GA community by
providing them with better
awareness of UAS operations and
safety considerations, providing for
unique frequencies for ingress/egress
routes and awareness of in-progress
UAS operations, and getting ahead of
ADS-B/NextGen requirements
showing good faith effort to comply
with airspace access requirements
Needed for the CAF to ensure the
systems are funded for acquisition.
Equipage is our biggest constraint in
moving forward. Under this
category, the single largest factor is a
lack of SAA capability.
Need to convince senior
AF/DoD leadership to take this
issue on as a major
interdepartmental issue.
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in the end, ACC leadership has to
take the airspace integration issue on
as a command interest item.
Currently have two SSS packages on
the way out the door signed by the
ACC/CV to the Air Staff for
Coordination. One is a CORONA-like
set of taskings to work actions at the
HAF-level. The second is a way
ahead for Ops, procedures, and
policy.
ID: 3
Funding has to be protected to
make any progress on the
equipage/standards. It will
require money to be spent, and
we have to have it on hand to
put together a cogent program.






These issues are not fundamentally
increasing the combat capability on
the aircraft. They provide a
mechanism for delivering the
capability to the fight. Because of
this indirect linkage, leadership
continues to cut the effort in favor of
more direct combat capabilities.
Leadership does not truly understand
how difficult working the
operational approval for flights with
the FAA really is. They just expect it
to happen with no real insight into
the true cost to the organization.
Send signed COMACC package up to
HAF/A3 and PBFA for action
Major constraint on what can be
accomplished and keeping AFRL
working the SAA equipage R&D
piece is critical
Both AF and FAA organizational
biases pose a major constraint to
moving the issues forward. Both
operate under different assumptions
and value different end-state
objectives.
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Change
Time itself is a constraint. The
modeling and testing can't
necessarily be accelerated even if the
budget where available to do so.
Need the time to fly the missions,
collect the data, and build the
experience and comfort factor with






Solution should be variable based on
the area of flight and the needs of
the mission.
Need to have the capability to enable
or disable an equipage component
depending on the operational
context of the flight.
SAA needs to be designed for a man-
on-the-loop capability vice a man-in-
the-loop system
SAA and other equipage
requirements should be designed
internal to the aircraft as an
integrated subsystem--not as a
'strap' on to the existing system, or
one that has to be bolted on before
flight. Should co-exist with any other
subsystem without having to turn
something else off. Not something
you have to externally configure for
flight. Don't treat like tradable
SWAP.
Need a radar to do due regard. Need
to understand and address unofficial
concerns i.e. the need for multi-
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DoD needs to determine collaterally
what the appropriate training and
qualification requirements are for
operating UAS.
SAA isn't going to get here ahead of
the need. We are going to have to
accept some risk and put up with
some more restricted airspace for
national defense. The FAA has had
the luxury of ignoring the need up to
this point. The political pressure will










Standards have to be
developed
A positive example for how to
proceed would be the analysis that is
being considered for putting in
ground based, fused radar at Grand
Forks for Global Hawk operations.
This is a solid, root cause analysis
that is being done from the ground
up. A negative example would be the
way in which TCAS was initially
pursued for integration onto Global
Hawk by Northrop Grumman. The
equipment was not installed by
certified technicians, the equipment
itself was not from a TSO'd parts
supplier, etc.
The current rulemaking process is a
600 plus day process, and that's for a
relatively straight forward, easy
change or addition. This can easily
take 5 years to complete.
The standards that go into the
rulemaking process have to be
developed, tested, and verified.
This is the single most limiting
aspect to making progress on
this issue. Changes here could
cut the time to reach standards
by 1/2 to 2/3s!
ID: 9
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The bounding is based on validating a
concept or approach. Not doing this
results in a premium being placed on
a subjective assessment when it
comes time for submitting an
operational approval request. As an
example consider the 1 pilot/1
aircraft issue. FAA opinion currently
says it is incomprehensible that
something more than 1 pilot/1
aircraft could be safe. If the
response is a subjective argument--
we've already done it--you will get a
subjective analysis of the safety.
Goes back to the middle-out
approach. If you want it bad, you'll
get it bad. Demonstrates a lack of
appropriate
coordination/collaboration.
This is a basic process that needs to
be used to identify the various
objectives and needs the UAS
stakeholder community has that can
be met through a combined,
common effort. By explicitly
outlining what requirements are
aligned and the proposal for meeting
them, confusion can be avoided or
eliminated, and the stakeholders can
make informed decisions about what
they want to be involved with from a
solution standpoint.
Max Impact to Constraint
Change
Arriving at a common purpose
for the effort. Balance across
the activity is needed. A
recognition of the needs and
approaches to meeting those
needs must be articulated.
Fundamentally, a philosophical




Need robust T&E Effort needs a very robust test and
evaluation effort. The current
approach is haphazard, hit and miss.
Aware of some efforts underway
such as TAAC out at New Mexico
State University. Important thing is
to build knowledge of platform
limitations.
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The assessment of what this looks
like tends to be instinctive, cultivated
over a career of doing air traffic
management, versus something you
can nail down as skill based. Need
more time in the research and
development stage along with
experimental efforts to begin to fully
understand how we build these kinds
of checks-and-balances into the UAS.
Who is going to provide us with
the information needed to
establish the regulatory
requirements for things like
wake turbulence categories for
UAS?
Follow rule for playing
fair.
Need to ensure the effort maintained
its integrity by full and open
disclosure of information to the







The approach needs to provide an
avenue for the diverse stakeholders
involved to come to agreement and
consensus on how the airspace
integration issue will be tackled.
The activity needs strong leadership
at several levels to be successful.
Significant progress will be limited
without this.
Activity needs to the appropriate
organizations engaged in the effort
to be successful. Expertise is central
to this problem, and the right
expertise needs to be engaged on
this problem to get it solved.
Generating a higher level of
leadership advocacy for this
issue is the number one issue
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solutions that can be tailorable to
the platforms on which they are
intended to fly.
Ties into the need to reduce
operations cost--from both an
operating and total ownership
perspective. Have a lot of room to
improve on this particular metric, but
part of the problem is that nobody
wants to fully load the total
ownership cost of the system when
considering the purchase of these
assets. Airspace integration needs to
be explicitly included.
Second largest impact would
be to get the FAA to be more of
a partner a the senior level
Cannot propose radically different
approach. Needs to conform rather
than create. FAA controls this. DoD
has very little influence on this.
Needs to address the tools and
technologies that will assist ATC in
managing the airspace
Resource constraints prohibit a
massive launching of resources to
solve this problem all at once. Need
an incremental plan to
accommodate the fiscal realities










Fits in current program allocation
Meets current requirements
Fits in current program schedule
ID: 12
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Our efforts have to arm-in-arm with
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Continue to use existing COAs until a validated SAA
capability can be fielded.
Schedule: iffy, anywhere from 2011 to 2015, with a
start on SDD of 2010-2013. Don't really know what
the schedule is because we aren't sure where the
future priority will be placed on this particular issue.
Timeframes have not been formally established,
environment has not been formally established (i.e.
what does global access mean).
CDD language is too vague to build a program against
with any certainty. Need better definition of the need.
Proceed with existing COA construct until advanced
cockpit solution is at IOC for appropriate platforms to
integrate feeds.
Leave COA altogether for situations in which there is a
defined operating location, assets on published routes
for ingress/egress, flying IFR with rated pilots, using
integrated SA feeds. Use this period as a data
collection timeframe to validate ability to operate
safely in a limited, but integrated environment.
ADS-B mandated on all aircraft; all aircraft become
cooperative air traffic; all flights in the NAS require
transponder and pilot to be squawking.
Will in all likelihood continue to operate on COAs for
the next 8 to 10 years at least. Navigation Database,
RNAV, RNP, route changes on the fly, TCAS issues
resolved, local letters of agreement with published
routes, 7610.4 excepted or amended all accomplished
to allow for ops beyond COA.
Data collection with new SAA equipage on the
aircraft, modeled performance, and on-going testing
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Organization Epoch Descriptions Epoch Scenario Descriptions
Routine Scenario Operations would proceed from restricted routine
operations as described above once the
appropriate equipage and standards are in place.
As experience continues to grow, operations should
continue to expand as the safety of the operation














Maximize the number and use of TFRs available for the
near-term (Beale context).
Reclassify the airspace under CFR Part 93 to extend
"talk and squawk" requirements to 18,000 (Beale
context)
Implement and operate with fully capable SAA
capability on board to provide needed equipage to
meet airspace requirements without the procedural
limitations currently imposed.
Operations continue in the same vein until the
acquisition community can field a viable SAA capability
on a Global Hawk.
COA's become progressively less and less restrictive as
additional information and safety data is collected and
validated against SAA systems and operations.
COA's fade out altogether as system becomes capable
of meeting regulatory requirements.
Next 5 years will see the start of regulatory guidance
emerging
Next 5 to 10 years will see SAA technology and
components maturing and coming into the mainstream.
RTCA is saying 2019 before standards will be available
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Organization Epoch Descriptions Epoch Scenario Descriptions
Routine Scenario
NextGen Scenario
Updated standards, policies, and regs will be available
to measure compliance and access requirements.
Very event dependent timeline from RTCA. Probably
still not full file-and-fly capability. Likely much further
NextGen would be the next thing to look at after
current operations mature. Implementation of that
may create further evolutions.
USD(AT&L)
ID: 22
Ramp up Phase For next 3-5 years, get all of the Track 2 planning stuff
done with long-term plan, major milestones, functional
requirements, testing and evaluation, etc. all laid out
in a coherent manner. Solve near-term problems for












Barriers to AI Barrier Comments
Lack of Leadership
Lack of Definition by the
User on what is really
needed






# one problem with this issue. Nobody is at the top of the
pile leading the way forward. Generate the way forward,
plans, send them around, but get nothing back. Then stuck
waiting for someone to come along and say "let's do this."
people are ducking the decisions they need to make at
every organizational level in the bureaucracy. That means
the guys at ACC/A3/A8 could do a lot to help us if they
would take a stand. Same with the 303 AESW. You end up
with decisions through inaction. Just need someone high
enough up in the leadership chain to temporarily overcome
in the institutional biases and get a solution in place.
The solution needs to be resourced commensurate with the
definition of the activity scope.
don't think the user fully appreciates the magnitude and
complexity of the problem they are facing.
if the User thinks they have defined the problem (a.k.a.
global access) they have not resourced the ability to
generate a materiel solution.
failure to use existing chain of command/organizational
relationships, responsibilities and authorities. Too many
cooks in the kitchen. Ipso facto.
The FAA's perceived adverse attitude toward change is a lim
fac. Perceived difference in urgency. Not doing their job to
create the needed regulatory environment. Need to help
write the test, not grade the test.
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Have organizations that are not sticking to their knitting.
AQ are a money provider, not a solution provider. They are
getting into solutions. Their job is to provide money and
validate the plan, not write the plan. People are talking
instead of organizations talking. There is all kinds of
misinformation, and misperceptions based on personal
views instead of vetting them through organizational
positions. The brainstorming phase is over. The good idea
cut off date has come and gone. People are not being
forced to operate within the disciplined positions and
authorities of their organizations.
We don't need more stakeholders. We need more people
stepping up to fulfill their organizational responsibilities












Someone has to be willing to stand up and say, "We are
going to fly and give this a try because we think it is safe
enough."
Need leadership to put senior level pressure on the FAA to
be more sensible with operational approvals and
approaches to expanding access
FAA culture has become totally risk averse, and their
approach for assessing risk is highly subjective and
personality dependent. It doesn't even make logical sense
sometimes
Missing the pair of eyes in the aircraft. This is an emotional
issue and it must be resolved for there to be any chance of
UAS being accepted as equal players in the NAS.
The AF has yet to truly treat these assets as aircraft. Until
that mindset is changed, there will always be an issue with
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Burden of Safety Proof
Belief that UAS are
fundamentally different
Reliable C2 is a major issue. Lost link issues require pre-
planned contingencies to be worked out which is a
tremendous burden on the infrastructure.
Have to have a deterministic decision on where we will or
won't fly--unless you have the appropriate equipage.
The FAA believes manned performance is actually better
than it really is. Example: crummy clearing by pilots.
Has them trapped in a risk adverse perspective that makes
them late to need. Slow to adopt needs of any kind into the
NAS and the rules governing it
The burden of safety proof is going to require a major fiscal
investment with a long-term payback before results are
seen (i.e. ROI is long).
The FAA believes that UAS are fundamentally different from
manned aircraft. UAS are not as big of a deal as the FAA
thinks they are.
FAA's lack of willingness to
quantify risk
The FAA lumps all UAS together when assessing the risk to
the airspace. They should quantify the risk based on the
individual subsystems rather than a single lumped category
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Barrier Comments
This issue goes directly to the need the AF has to make sure
its own Airworthiness house is in order and that we have
the ability to convince ourselves that the equipage we put
on the aircraft is sufficiently robust and capable to find the
aircraft in compliance with requirements--primarily our own
AF stipulations first, and then in suite FAA standards.
Missing the ability to see-and-avoid with the emphasis on
the avoid part. You need to see so that you can avoid. In
this case, we are not capable of doing that to the extent
necessary to be considered in compliance with the
performance requirements for flight in the NAS.
This issue is stuck until the AF/FAA senior leadership decides
to make it a priority to fix. Solid working level relationships
provide basis for continuing to move forward, but
fundamentally, this needs to be pushed from the top to
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Organization Barriers to AI
FAA won't look at
alternative options
Safety case bar set too high
Lost link
procedures/capabilities
FAA is risk intolerant
Barrier Comments
FAA isn't open minded enough to go look at options and
assess the realities of the operational picture. They are
totally close minded on this.
The FAA's safety case requirements draws such a high
requirement there isn't a system out there that can make
the cut--including manned aircraft if they were to be held to
the same standard.
Lost link procedures need work to keep the aircraft flying
the way it should
DoD has ways that work, the FAA just won't consider them.




Lack of technical expertise
across the community




Lack of equipment heritage
There is an incredibly small pool of technical expertise
available in the UAS community for moving the state of
engineering forward. The very small pool of talent has no
counterpart on the manned aircraft analogy.
Within the FAA, the UAS issue is not a priority in the broader
scheme of things the FAA has on its plate. The result is a
struggle to get resources to commit to the problem.
This is a result of the relatively little priority the program
has in the broader FAA program plan.
A lot of companies think they can get Congress to dictate
the path the FAA must take. A lot of program office time is
absorbed having to respond to these Congressional inquiries.
Acceptance from the manned aviation community is no
where close to being at hand. In addition, the manned
community is not willing to recognize the nuances the UAS
technology base brings to the operational environment. It
needs to be addressed in the broader policy, procedures,
technology arena.
All of the UAS designs on the books are starting from
scratch without the 2-3 years that typically go into
development prior to going operational. There is no
heritage on components. Part of the reason the DoD
memo on sharing safety data with the FAA is so important.
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The inability to meet existing manned aircraft performance
and reaction rates from an ATC perspective is a major
limitation. They are nowhere close to the manned
equivalent yet.
UAS have yet to be fully characterized across the
operational domain. What happens when the aircraft can
fly for 24 hours but your crews wear out? You still have all
of the same traditional aircraft components--aircraft, pilot,
environment--but you have complicated the problem by
taking the pilot out of the aircraft/environment
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Barrier Comments
90% of the manufacturers in the UAS business have never
built an airplane before. Significant disconnect in aviation
culture, both in terms of the manufacturing base as well as
the UAS customer base. For example, there are over 19,000
law enforcement units in the U.S. and only 300 of them
have aviation units. All of them think they will be utilizing
small UAS in the future for law enforcement purposes.
Both on the FAA and the DoD fronts, need better
engagement especially with respect to developing an
agreed to common objective that can be managed
effectively at whatever organizational level is required.
Don't have enough manpower or funding to pursue the
problem in its entirety. Problem is further complicated by
the observation that those that have the most control over
the resources typically know the least about what needs to
be done to solve the problem, or even what the magnitude
of the challenges are that need to be addressed. Those that
have a fundamental grasp of the domain knowledge
typically have the least amount of control over the needed
resources to solve the issues.
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The cultural differences between the FAA and the DoD
drives a fundamental difference in perspective. The DoD
designs and fields many of its UAS platforms as
"expendable" assets with very much of a "disposal mindset"
underpinning their development and procurement. As a
result, the DoD will default to a position that makes UAS
risk acceptability considerably higher than for equivalent
manned missions. The FAA sees the same platform and
defaults to a more conservative risk position due to the
unknown "X" factor associated with UAS platforms--lack of
data, knowledge, experience, heritage, etc. results in a more
conservative risk approach since the boundaries are not
clearly understood or defined. Example: Army lost a Raven
and they didn't go look for it. The rationale is that it would
have costed more to have gone out and found it rather than
just buying another one. This mindset is completely
counter to the way the FAA sees the same issue. Why
wouldn't you go out and find it to make sure you
understand the failure mode, environment, and
requirements needed to make sure it didn't happen again?
At the heart of this issue is the belief that DoD is not
treating UAS as aircraft. They are deploying them to meet
specific operational requirements, not for integration into
the NAS. DoD is still trying to make a platform designed for
a specific combat need work in a much more rigorous
airspace integration environment.
The view point that I can do this cheaper than with a
manned aircraft. I still have pilot, aircraft and mission to
control, only know they are all at geographically separate
locations. How is this easier?
Along with the technology advancements required, this
would be the second biggest issue that needs to be resolved.
Need SAA capability and the ability to meet compliance




No Central Belly Button
Need a track record of performance, and then continue to
demonstrate UAS operational safety.
All of this activity is currently personality driven. Have a lot
"IPTs" going on right now. Need one central belly button.
Need an office for strictly UAS. Probably needs to be a joint
organization being run by a 3-star--especially to have the
horse power to get DSCA ops pushed through
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Rice bowls are and will be an issue (i.e. lost jobs in the
commercial sector to culture in the AF)
UAS are not operating like you expect a manned aircraft to




Moving target The problem is that the situation is evolving, so it hard to
know what requirements will exist in the future. Hard to
know what access will be required as platforms are
changed, as UAS evolve and become more sophisticated (i.e.
500 feet and below may expand significantly). Not a
defined process of that gives us a good sense for this. If
you did know what the requirements where, one measure
would be whether or not your phone was ringing asking why








No single organization with
responsibility/authority
Can't measure progress without a performance objective.
Need something against which to measure effort
The PBFA funnel from the working level groups (like the
JIPT) to the FAA doesn't work.
Need a better way to coordinate with the FAA. AT&L is
filling this role because nobody else is doing it. Need the
Joint Staff/Services to drive this train. Goes back to lack of
advocacy.
no one sees this as a high enough priority to fund it.
People still don't see airspace integration as an issue that
needs to be worked.
Still don't have one organization that is motivated to work
the problem for a day job. Right now the task is still
considered "extra work". This needs to translate into
someone's primary mission or reason for existing if it is
going to be solved in a timely fashion. The organization
itself can be temporary, but the work itself won't get done
with part time committees.
ID:22
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Ad Hoc process
Nobody is really in charge
yet.





Still a very ad hoc process to get issues resolved. Can't have
Fred Pease engaged for every single issue. All of the
middle-management says "no" forcing a dialogue all the
way at the top-level of the FAA. This is incredibly
inefficient. PBFA is not transmitting the DoD position on
Ultimately, the problem needs to be transferred and vested
in the guys who own and operate the assets. This has yet to
happen at an organizational level within the Services.
DoD leadership has not invested the political capital to
articulate the need to the FAA. Example: "No Go" letter to
the FAA saying we have to have 5 flights a week at Beale.
Hasn't happened.
the operational components of the services dominate
decision making. Financial component is relegated to
having to react to the operational decisions. That has to
change. There is an attitude that I will pay any price, that
manpower is "free", and just give me the capability and I'll
find a way to use it. We build capability first, and the we
figure out how to use it.
DoD doesn't throw resources at a problem until it is a
screaming issue. Until it is a current, major issue, we'll do






A major shortcoming that has be resolved for progress to be
made is the collective will to find a solution. The enterprise
as a whole needs to have the desire/will to see this UAS
activity be as successful as it can as soon as possible. It
needs to start with the AF. In the absence of will, we have
an overwhelming propensity to blame shift to the FAA.
We are a product of our history (reference Icarus
Syndrome). In this context it may require direct
intervention on the part of Congress for this issue to be
effectively resolved, much as they had to do with TCAS and
the FAA.
Current approach to implementing UAS results in an
illegitimate shifting of risk. The taxpayer is writing checks for
UAS capability. If they can't be used to maximum effect,
the taxpayer is being short changed on their investment.
The only way a solution will be forthcoming is if leadership
is positively motivated to find one, or negatively motivated
through embarrassment to do something.
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Recognition of the magnitude of the effort required to
provide the needed capability for UAS is due to either
straight ignorance for the issues or woeful disregard for
them.
Need the leadership vacuum filled to provide center of
mass on the issue. Need leadership in several functions and
at all levels of the organization within DoD, FAA, and DHS.
Also need leadership from industry and the private sector to
move forward. There needs to be a collective "stepping up
to the plate" on this issue.
The belief the UAS fix will be a long-time in coming, that a
very methodical approach requires a long time. The belief
that UAS flying in the NAS is just too scary.
A major limiting factor on making progress.
We don't have a radar/EO package that can do what we
need it to do from a performance perspective.
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Assumption: 80% of the global access requirement will be addressed
through the fielding of a GH SAA capability in the above timeframe
and dollar cost.
You won't know what you are building meets the requirement for
performance until you define what you mean for global access. What
does this mean?
Current context implies that the performance needs to include
national airspace access, and this in turn involves the FAA. Therefore,
ultimate success with respect to the performance aspect of this issue
is tied in with the FAA's approval of the operation, which in turn
depends on the safety case for the operation.
Taking an incremental approach to this issue. First increment is
classes 3-5, autonomous (man-on-the-loop) in-flight operations, in
A,D,E,G airspace (SDD in FY2010). Increment 2 depends on the
success of Increment 1. Next increment will depend on what
ACC/FAA think the next most important thing is to fix as defined by
the user and the regulator. Trying to take an approach that avoids
goring each other's sacred cows. Build on success-as defined by the
FAA accepting what we put on the aircraft.
Acquisition leadership is extremely risk averse. Do the best job you
can with the current resources. Don't have the resources to solve
world hunger issue. Airspace integration is the pawn in the executive
agency issue. Have to believe that HAF would act consistently with
existing organizational responsibilities and use the PBFA as it was
intended. COMACC goes to the AF/A3 as a staff agency to get what
he needs done.
Joint Force commander decides in theater, FAA decides in the NAS,















There is growing perspective that general aviation air traffic is not
being responsible enough to train and operate the way they need to in
the airspace. Examples include TFR and Exclusion Zone violations by
GA traffic. This gives rise to a perception that GA traffic is not flying
as safely as it should be, and increasing regulation on their operation
is occurring. Loss of noncooperative air traffic status is only a matter
of time. Germany just banned it within the past year. Our time will
come.
UAS operations should be divided into just two categories, those
conducted on line-of-sight and those conducted on beyond-line-of-
sight. For those conducted on line-of-sight, the aircraft should stay
within visual range of the controller, wouldn't need to be a pilot,
would have more stringent operating altitude limitations, but wouldn't
need approval or COA to operate them. BLOS operations would
require rated pilot and aircraft capable of being integrated into the
airspace picture. Example is the current AF/Army issue with
Restricted Operating Zones (ROZs) for organic Army assets. These
aircraft are not integrated into the ATO, and they create exclusion
zones for the rest of the airspace users. They should be limited below
the coordination altitude and everything else should be on the ATO.
Don't create a whole new way of doing business. These are aircraft,
we are going to treat them as such, and we'll fly them with rated
We should fly UAS just like manned aircraft. Rather than treating
them as special "categories" we should treat them based on their
functionality or mission capabilities.
We need to get the FAA away from the mindset of employing more
restrictive regulatory policies to increase airspace safety and into
better education of the airspace users to increase safety in the
airspace.
FAA won't agree to exempt UAS from VMC rules like it does with
manned aircraft and airspeed restrictions(other examples include
turbine engines, pressurized cockpits, TACANS, RNAV, INS, etc)
because they believe this to " be a bridge too far" from a safety
perspective.
Remote Split Operations (RSO) is a possible work around for the lack
of restricted airspace at guard locations. Launch using the LRE from
Base X while the MCE is located at the local Guard base to fly the
mission after launching. Politics are an issue since the maintenance
would end up being done at Base X instead of the ANG base, limiting
the number of available jobs, making the politics of this option
problematic
Proposed establishing addition restricted airspace in N. Dakota to deal
with the issue up there. Initial FAA look was no, and the long-term
prognosis is this will be denied as a viable work around by the FAA.
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Not sure SAA is an airworthiness issue in the classic sense given the
constraints to moving forward. We should convince ourselves that
we have the SAA problem solved, but do it with the FAA in-tow.
Should be sharing data, safety information, design criteria, etc in
keeping with a good faith relationship with the FAA.
Even if Global Hawk were fully equipped with the appropriate
capabilities to fly in the NAS, we'd still be on a COA until 7610.4 is
updated.
Everything is handled reactively. There is very little activity to work
any issues proactively. There is also a problem with the FAA setting a
"moving target" for performance requirements.
Need to generate a spirit of cooperation between the AF and FAA in
solving this issue
Operations in the NAS account for less than 5% of all UAS flights
currently being conducted.
Original COA coordination between ACC and the SPO was a bear. The
bulk of the effort on the FAA side was geared toward educating and
briefing all of the affected parties to the UAS operation, and much
less on the COA approval process itself
FAA has been, and continues to be, engaged with AFRL on the SAA
development effort. This has been a positive thing.
ACC ops is also now heavily engaged on the AFRL effort. Their
involvement was the driving force behind AFRL finally picking up the
radar as a viable sensor to use for the SAA problem.
Air traffic concerns are relatively straight forward: can you talk,
squawk, and respond--and what are you going to do in the event of a
lost link event?
Large air gap between working-level and the top-level FAA executives.
Somebody above XXX needs to be making the calls on what is
required for these national level issues--especially since FAA HQ
seems to be the only organization with any issue about using or
running TFRs for UAS ops.
Funding choices in our current context are hard choices. We are in
the middle of a shooting war with no clear end in sight, we have an
aging fleet of aircraft, etc. Everything that is needed is important.
Making the resource priority call is difficult.
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May 99: First GH flight in the NAS to participate in Roving Sands
exercise. 02: FAA suggested putting in a RAC-D in the LRE at Beale to
enhance safety of GH operations. AF agreed to do so. 05: FAA pulled
the approval for using Radar at Beale as a sufficient risk mitigator for
flights in and out of Beale when COA approval was moved from the
local Regional offices to the FAA HQs. 07: The FAA suggested an
additional radar as an alternative at Beale
Doesn't trust the FAA on the COA approvals w.r.t. changing the TFR
requirements at Beale given the track history to date. Need some
assurances that if a radar goes in at Beale that it will be good enough
to dispense with the TFRs. Positive the FAA won't be that forthcoming
Part 93, Special Air Traffic Rules, could be used to create custom
designed airspace to meet our operational requirements for flight in
the NAS.
AF leadership needs to strap on a testosterone patch and tell the FAA
we have to have more than three TFRs a week to fly on. We are going
to let those guys at Beale bleed out there because some mid-level
manager doesn't think we need more access. National level decisions
should not be made at that level. They should be made further up the
leadership chain, but we have consistently failed to elevate these
issues to the appropriate FAA offices. Upper middle-management at
the FAA is not engaged on this problem.
It took a year to coordinate the approvals needed for Global Hawk to
fly to Australia, Germany, and Portugal. There are huge coordination
issues with flying Global Hawk across the Atlantic (trans-oceanic
routes are a concern if the UAS goes lost link or craps out and
descends through the middle of these routes).
What good is a car if you can't drive it on the road? Flying is dynamic
in nature, and war is chaos. In segregated airspace, DoD gives UAS
priority handling and right of way. Train analogy--has priority over
road traffic at a railroad crossing. Put appropriate safety mechanisms
in place like road signs, lights, train horns and bells, road barriers, etc.
In the NAS, UAS don't get priority status which means they are trying
to compete on an equal footing with manned. It is really hard to take
the God-given mind out of the picture. IFR is essentially the way we
have achieved the needed "safety systems" for UAS flight in the NAS,















At what level do you need to file-and-fly? Integration should be done
in a targeted manner. In other words, we should pursue integration in
only those instances where it will be of direct benefit to the mission
being accomplished. We shouldn't be chasing world hunger. Need is
location specific i.e. combat airspace vs. NAS. The solution should be
tunable across need and location to make the cost/benefit equation
work. Otherwise, we either need to go with a different asset, or pick
a different location.
This is all about compromise. Technology is a great tool, but the
problem needs to be addressed pragmatically, starting with the
procedural element. Rule sets need to be evolved to keep things safe,
but still accommodating without compromising. Example: We have
traffic rules that we all obey when operating our cars, but there are
instances in which vehicles are provided exceptions from complying--
like fire trucks, ambulances, police cruisers, etc.
UAS a "new phenomenon" in the airspace, and with no equipage
standards, can't just go to file-and-fly. Things are accelerating much
more rapidly than airspace management can deal with.
Success is a moving target. Things can always be improved. There will
always be opportunities and limitations. Once you get there, things
will need to modernize over time.
For a standard to emerge, you have to have developed materiel
solutions. To the extent they fall short, they point you to the solution,
and it becomes baseline data for the next iteration. SAA is important
in this regard and it requires a fusion of different technologies.
There shouldn't be any issues with FAA engagement or interaction at
the working level. In fact, this kind of engagement is needed to move
forward on the problem. This is especially true with respect to the
design requirements.
Not going to launch a Manhattan Project or an ACAT I program. Need
a pragmatic approach fully funding a single vanguard program to
chart the path. Global Hawk is the appropriate test case because it
has the needed SWAP. Once that is working, scale the solution to
other platforms. Current fiscal and political limitations are forcing
this kind of approach. Just need to continue making forward progress
Not sure OSD has caught up to the reality that a JPO approach isn't
going to work from a resource standpoint. It isn't the lack of a





















DoD needs to get the job done. Should be OSD bringing the activity
together, but OSD doesn't appear to have the ability to keep its kids in
order. It also doesn't have the required expertise or resources.
FAA treats every UAS in the same way by lumping them altogether
under one single process. FAA needs to distinguish between UAS
capabilities and provide a measured response to aircraft capabilities
rather than being so risk averse.
Predator could fly today with its current complement of sensors and
equipment and fully comply with the regulations associated with flying
in the NAS except for those conditions in which it goes lost link.
There will be significant issues with labor unions in the transition from
current air traffic controllers to the future vision of air traffic
managers who manage by exception in highly automated systems as
opposed to the current practice of actively directing each aircraft in
flight.
Should engage JPDO and OEP efforts as two primary futuristic
stakeholders and as sources of future funding for UAS development
activity. The FAA and the EU through
EUROCONTROL/EUROCAE/EASA should create a high-level steering
committee to open communication, eliminate redundancies, feed
data, and drive standards. Elevate UAS as an enabling cross over
between OEP--SES and JPDO--SESAR activities between FAA and EU.
The difference between technological capability vs. procedural fixes
can be thought of as the difference between true collision avoidance
capability vs. separation assurance procedures. The minimum
performance requirements are still evolving. Guidance to SC-203 was
to design the highway first and as we start to build it, things will start
to drop off the "to-do" list.
The U.S. Government is going to remain the largest UAS customer for
at least the next 10 years while the rest of these issues get sorted out
for civil.
Using SFARS on the small UAS to move forward. Probably need to
look at Part 23/25 changes that can then be run at a specific size,
weight, and speed for a year to evaluate the changes, and then make
another incremental step forward.
UAS are at the will of every other system that is already in operation
in the NAS. We are trying to take a futuristically capable system and
dumb it down so it will play nicely with a system that is 40-50 years
old.
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Very saddled with 100 years worth of legacy. Can't think more than
just past our nose for out of the box approaches. For example, we
have over 11,000 aircraft airborne at any one time in the NAS, but we
are still using the old 4,086 beacon codes.
There is some truth to the complaint that the FAA is "grading the test
instead of helping write the test." We don't actually write the test,
but we do have a responsibility to provide insight and clarity into
positions that have been taken on issues, which we don't do a good
job of all the time. We can't dictate a system design because it really
limits the possibilities. We have to assess what is brought to us, not
determine before hand what can be brought to us.
Bound the problem using a Track 1 style approach. Collect data over
time, build experience with the system, and use this data and
experience to build a solid safety assessment case with appropriate
risk management system rigor. Without this kind of approach, the
assessment by the FAA will be necessarily conservative in nature.
Are you a consumer/user or a provider/enabler? As a consumer/user,
you will be primarily interested in the business case problem. As a
provider/enabler you will be primarily focused on difficult questions
of safely integrating UAS capability into the airspace structure.
Further complicating this picture is the fact that we haven't clearly
defined the problem set that has to be addressed. We can begin to
draw some boundaries, but we don't have all of the details yet.
Bounding the problem set becomes the critical issue that needs to be
UAS operations should be assessed based on the technology, system
integration, and operational environment in which a safety threshold
is established using specific criteria. Can't lump UAS into a single
number. Need a set of parameters to establish appropriate safety
levels, and these haven't been established yet.
Sexy and easy to point to SAA, but there are a number of issues.
Concern that this is AF centric, and calling GH as "starting from a
known" is an overstatement. We don't actually know that much.
There are a lot of unknowns based on where GH came from, and the
activities that are taking place with it that would provide data. It is
being used in an operational mode, not a research mode. General
philosophy is an incremental approach using baseline data to build
safety case.
Concern that this is AF centric, and calling GH as "starting from a
known" is an overstatement. We don't actually know that much.
There are a lot of unknowns based on where GH came from, and the
activities that are taking place with it that would provide data. It is
being used in an operational mode, not a research mode. General
philosophy is an incremental approach using baseline data to build
safety case.













"Can do" doesn't represent a sufficient safety case for "Should do."
MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4 come into the picture in the middle of the
problem. They have not provided a true safety assessment from the
ground up. They typically want to base an operational approval on
some paired down subset of issues that don't address the broader
underlying concerns.
Those that want to use UAS have not fully assessed the cost with their
use. Because this wasn't done up front, there is an inability to meet
the need due to performance shortfalls. The end user has to consider
these points before they buy these systems, and they have to budget
and plan for their remediation if they do.
A major effort on the part of ATO with the COA process, and in a
broader context, with the UAS issue in general, is the need for broader
education on the nature of UAS activities and capabilities. Populating
UAS terminology into regulations and handbooks, especially for air
traffic controllers, flight standards, and proponents, is a major ATO
effort. Developed a UAS 101 course that runs between 2-4 days long
depending on the level of knowledge of the audience.
in the future, the airspace structure will change, technologies like ADS-
B will drive different procedures, modernizing through NextGen effort
will create further evolutions. Need to look forward into this
environment for understanding where UAS performance needs to go
in the future.
UAS operational pressures will continue to grow, especially once the
war effort start to ramp down and DoD brings assets back to the
States at the end of OIF. In addition, their uses are continuing to
expand with applications that are now reaching into law enforcement,
fire fighting, border patrol, etc. The memo that was signed last year
between the DoD and FAA for Class D airspace and for defining
operations of Small UAS provides some relief on this growing
pressure, but it isn't the final answer for addressing the need.
COAs will not be extensible much further into the future. COA
growth: 04-24, 05-55, 06-102, 07-119, 08-200, 09-250, 10-400
Already convened and closed a safety panel to address safety issues
with UAS flight in Class D airspace.
FAA has a safety panel convened to address safety issues with UAS
















Talking out of both sides of our mouth on our performance. We say
that we want to integrate into the airspace just like a manned aircraft,
but then we turn around and say we want/need special handling
because we can't perform like a manned aircraft.
Doesn't mind the fact that there are rules that we have to comply
with. You need them to provide order and structure. Doesn't know
what they need to be for UAS, but you clearly need them for future
operations.
Have to ask the hard questions about how we are going to operate,
and there are going to be folks who aren't going to like it.
Every new technology that has been introduced faced resistance from
the status quo.
If UAS can't get to the same general level of performance as manned
aircraft, they will never be fully accepted or integrated into the
manned environment.
Integration activities should occur in a smart, gradual manner. JPDO's
marching orders are to develop the NextGen plan, not to do the
actual program. The FAA is the implementation mechanism. Right
now on the JPDO activity, there is growing interest in the UAS topic,
but there is currently no study group or team dedicated to the topic.
Industry is currently engaging through the RTCA. There is an R&D














Attributes: through space congestion, proximity to busy airfields, proximity to
ranges and restricted airspace, political constraints (talk with XXX on
this angle). Each flying wing has a number of flying requirements:
sorties to be flown, pilots with training objectives to be met. If these
are not being met, there will be issues with achieving operational
competencies. Training syllabus identifies a number of requirements
that you have, but the student is always getting weathered out or his
access is being stretched out, then the training effectiveness goes
down as well. You can't train them in a reasonable amount of time.
The whole process is delayed (A30T can provide additional insights).
Maintain currency for combat. For operational missions, they would
be somewhat the same. If you have missions that have to be flown in
support of an activity, you need to be able to fly them when you need
to, for however long it takes to get it done. In this regard, it is pretty
cut and dried. Where you able to actually execute the mission? Or
did you have to use some other less desirable asset to do the mission
because the UAS was unavailable to fly the mission for whatever
reason. If available to fly the mission, how effective was the UAS in
actually accomplishing the required tasking?
Future UAS Access motivation: There is also the culture of the Air
Froce/DoD to always (to the best of our abilities) to maximize
weapon system utilization and effectiveness. Current manned fleets
will at some point be replaced with unmanned. As a result, we have a
need to get to integrated operations as UAS take over more and more
of the mission space. Establishing an equivalent mission space to
enable consistent freedom of maneuver. Our present day access is
not meeting current requirement in some ways in some locations.
This will only continue to get worse over time. Expectations are
continuing to shift with the access (Ex. Nov 06 everyone was happy
with being to fly on a TFR with 5 flights a week. The pressure is
already growing to expand this). Our increasing requirements will eat
into the expectation of how well these are satisfied. Rate of growth
in UAS missions is exceeding the rate at which we can expand
operations into non-segregated airspace.
Internal fight as where the UAS thing belongs. Right now A2/A3 are
battling the issue out. A2 has such a strong grip on the issue as a
result of spinning up the Intel function. Decided the UAS Task Force
would integrate into a lot of these existing IPTs.
Training is a current issue. It should be worked next after we have a
handle on the safety aspects. Everything else can be worked in
parallel.
7610.4 should be specific to military operations. The argument
shouldn't be that we have to make it work for everyone else.
Page 413






Starting to take a lot more interest in this issue.
Could take a lesson from the Army. They are spending a lot of money
to get Warrior a full airworthiness certification.
Not happy with the lack of leadership the AF is displaying on this issue.
AF leadership doesn't get it. Cultural inertia is a problem. Seems to










The only way Congress is going to get engaged on the airspace
integration issue is from the bottom up. National Guard units across
the country are not going to be able to operate, and the issue will
bubble up from the collective pressure that builds from these
"independent" issues
The NextGen thing is significant. DoD needs to reassess its airspace
needs in our current context with UAS. We need to be pushing for
more access, not more TFRs. Our bill will be huge if we don't get out
in front of NextGen and drive. We'll be displaced otherwise.
We've had the technology for decades to hit things. We can clearly use
the same technology to avoid them. Technology is not the problem--
it's the social element.
Have to deal with the entire scope of the problem in an integrated
fashion. You cannot take a piecemeal approach to this issue and
hope to get it solved.
Have to deal with the concrete realities of budget, schedules, and
programs. In this environment it is important just to keep the ball
moving down the field. If Global Hawk will put a due regard system
on board, this is progress. Progress needs to be measured in concrete
program terms. What is enabled that wasn't before?
Underlying culture and presupposition about the UAS airspace
integration effort: "I'm worried that if I solve the UAS problem, I'll be










A good solution will occur gradually, in steps, phases, and by platform.
File-and-Fly is the objective and is composed of three specific pieces:
technology, procedures, and policy. The measure of success will be
UAS doing ops "all by themselves, routinely." Example: pilot training
progresses from the instructor doing it and you watching, to you doing
it and the instructor watching, to you soloing. Use analogy for
progressing on UAS front. The technology, policy, and procedures all
have to happen together.
The JIPT benefit was in putting real leadership on the problem. This is
the importance of keeping the JIPT effort together. They've thought
through the problem, understand the magnitude, and have answers to
the questions leadership will have on this topic.
Hoping we would have taken this on at the institutional level. It is
slipping away from us with the way we are dealing with the subject
right now, and we could loss the effort to someone else
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